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THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2014 EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT ELECTION: 
VOTERS GONE OUT, NEW PARTIES IN
Abstract:
This article describes and evaluates 2014 Czech European Parliament 
(EP) election. Starting with the context of the election, it goes through all rele-
vant party actors participating in the election and introduces them both in ge-
neral ideological terms as well as in relation towards the European integration. 
After results of election are discussed, the article concludes that 2014 EP elec-
tion confirmed recent changes in the Czech party system – inter alia destabili-
zation of the system as a whole, reconfiguration on its right wing and emergen-
ce of populism. Concerning the European message of the election, their results 
confirmed their second-order character.
Key words:
EP election 2014, Czech Republic, ANO 2011, party system, second order 
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Introduction
Czech Republic became a member of the EU in 2004 as a part of the big-
gest wave in the history of EU enlargement. Completion of accession process me-
ant that the popular and simple slogan “Return to the Europe” connected with it 
was not valid anymore – Czech Republic was back on track and instead of dre-
aming about all positive values associated with the “West” the country had to start 
a process of “being EU member”. This active membership can be inter alia opera-
tionalized as participation in the EU political system – e. g. through EP elections. 
Both EP elections that took part in the Czech Republic in 2004 and in 
2009 [Hloušek, Kaniok 2014] did not bring a lot of positive news regarding 
this participation. Czech voters as well as Czech politicians followed the same 
approach and the same bad habits that have characterized EP elections in old 
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2013 – however, without any changes in presidential power and competences. 
As the first election that was held in January 2013 won M. Zeman, strong and 
charismatic former prime minister, influence of presidential office at least infor-
mally increased. Despite of having the same position and role within the Czech 
political system as his indirectly elected predecessors; M. Zeman has become 
very active and activist president. As good example can be used M. Zeman´s role 
in forming non-partisan caretaker cabinet in summer 2013. Government that re-
placed coalition cabinet of Civic Democrats (ODS), Tradition-Responsibility-
Prosperity 09 (TOP 09) and Liberal Democrats (LIDEM)1 resigning in June 2013 
was led by J. Rusnok, close ally of M. Zeman. This government in majority 
consisting of former Social Democrats and allies of M. Zeman, was initially 
formed against the will of fragile but still existing centre right majority in the 
House of Deputies – ODS, TOP 09 and LIDEM possessed 101 from 200 seats. 
However, M. Zeman, when designating J. Rusnok as new prime minister, said, 
that he “could not disappoint voters who had supported him in the presidential 
elections with promise to stop Nečas government”. Although Rusnok´s govern-
ment did not succeed in the vote of confidence, it led the country until end of 
January 2014 when new government, following results of early parliamentary 
election held in October 2013, was formed [Hloušek, Kaniok 2014].
Results of early parliamentary election of 2013 confirmed tendencies 
that had been indicated already in election of 2010. Results of both elections 
(including distribution of seats and differences between 2010 and 2013) can be 
seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Overview of results of parliamentary elections of 2010 and 2013 
(House of Deputies)
2010 2013
Party Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats (+/-)
Social Democrats (ČSSD) 22.09 56 20.45 50 (-6)
Civic Democrats (ODS) 20.22 53 7.72 16 (-37)
Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09) 16.71 41 11.99 26 (-15)
Communists (KSČM) 11.27 26 14.91 33 (+7)
Public Affairs (VV) 10.88 24
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) 4.39 0 6.78 14 (+14)
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011)  - 18.65 47 (+47)
Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit)  - 6.88 14 (+14)
Others 14.44  - 12.62  -
Source: Czech Statistical Office [www.volby.cz].
1 LIDEM was a small party existing only between as a result of internal tensions within 
Public Affairs (VV). 
member states since 1979 – low turnout, low media coverage, domestic con-
tent, second or even third order candidates. What is interesting, both 2004 and 
2009 Czech EP elections were framed very specifically – the former took part 
just one month after EU accession and the later was held within the Czech EU 
Council Presidency. Thus, the 2014 EP election was from this perspective first 
“normal” EP election as it was not affected by any important EU related event 
as in the previous cases. However, as this analysis reveals, it made no substan-
tial difference – also the 2014 followed the same second order election pattern 
[Reif, Schmitt 1980] as in 2004 and 2009. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, as the Czech politics has been 
very turbulent in recent years, domestic context of the election is briefly in-
troduced. After that, all relevant parties that run the election are characterized 
in terms of their ideology and approach towards the EU. This part particular-
ly focuses on ANO 2011 and Dawn of Direct Democracy, two newcomers in 
the Czech party politics. Third part of the analysis is devoted to the electo-
ral campaign; fourth section discusses the results of the election. Conclusion 
of the analysis pays attention particularly possible implications of the election 
for the Czech EU policy and Czech party system. 
Domestic context before the election
It is very difficult to briefly sum up and characterize domestic politi-
cal situation in the Czech Republic before 2014 EP elections. A lot of things 
have changed in recent years, both in terms of structures and relevant actors. 
Starting with the latter, during five years that elapsed from 2009 EP elections 
Czech party landscape almost completely transformed – something that had not 
been expected as the Czech Republic had been seen as quite stable party sys-
tem whose core poles had been established already in 90´s [Havlík, Kopeček 
2008: 188]. However, voting down Topolánek EU Presidency government in 
March 2009 started process when several new parties emerged and have persi-
sted, some emerged as comets and in the same way disappeared and some pre-
viously key actors became rather marginal players. Almost all relevant parties 
changed their leaders (some of them not only once), arrival of new parties and 
political movements introduced new strong figures. Between May 2009 and 
May 2014 there were acting four different governments, two of them careta-
kers or semi-caretakers ones. This obvious instability led to three nationwide 
elections during this period – two of them parliamentary and one presidential. 
Last sentence of previous paragraph refers to the most important structu-
ral change that affected Czech politics between 2009 and 2014. In 2012, all par-
liamentary parties agreed on introduction of direct presidential election since 
11
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opposition than governing parties etc. It was thus obvious that composition of 
the Czech EP delegation will be substantially altered after the election – both 
in terms of parties and individual MEP. Table 2 offers an overview of 2009 EP 
election in terms of parties´ gains.
Table 2. EP election 2009
Party Votes (%) MEPs EP party group
Civic Democrats (ODS) 31.35 9 ECR
Social Democrats (ČSSD) 22.39 7 S&D
Communists (KSČM) 14.18 4 GUE-NGL
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) 7.65 2 EPP
Others 24.43 0 -
Source: Czech Statistical Office [www.volby.cz].
Parties participating in the EP election
There were altogether 39 lists which were registered for the EP election – 
however, strong majority of them without having real chance to reach 5 % thre-
shold from the beginning of the campaign. Among these “political dwarfs” could 
have been found traditional outsiders as Czech Monarchists or Right Block of 
former dissident P. Cibulka, colourful mix of extremist and small Eurosceptic 
parties as No to Brussels – National Democracy or ambitious but only to big ci-
ties intellectuals appealing projects as Liberal Ecological Party. 
Among relevant parties could have been counted all four traditional par-
ties that have been parliamentary represented (for the whole period or for its 
substantial part) in the House of Commons since 1992 – ČSSD, ODS, KSČM 
and KDU-ČSL. These four parties have not only formed the core of Czech party 
system, but have been in various configurations also responsible for executive 
power. Except of them, TOP 09, Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011), 
Dawn of Direct Democracy (The Dawn) could have believed in good results as 
all three parties succeeded in last parliamentary election. There were also several 
potential “black horses” which might have done a breakthrough – Eurosceptical 
Party of Free Citizens (SSO), Czech Pirate Party and The Greens. 
Czech Social Democrats belongs among few major socialistic/social 
democratic parties in the Central and Eastern Europe which has not its origin 
in the former communist parties – ČSSD refers both to the tradition of inter-
war Czechoslovakian Social Democracy as well to the Social Democracy ex-
isting during communist regime in exile. The party is firmly grounded in mod-
ern socialist ideology being inspired itself by West European social democratic 
Last parliamentary election pointed out three interesting trends which 
had been already indicated in 2010 or earlier. Firstly, the 2013 election confir-
med presence and increasing support for populism in the Czech politics. In 2010 
election this phenomenon was emphasized by Public Affairs party (VV)2 which 
based its campaign on wiping out political dinosaurs and strong anti-corrup-
tion ethos. Ironically, VV very soon adopted the same practices it had criticized 
and splitted due to internal tensions in 2012 [Havlík, Hloušek 2014]. In 2013 
total amount of voters dissatisfied with established major actors (as Social 
Democrats and Civic Democrats) substantially increased, because new parties 
with populist or slightly populist rhetoric (ANO 2011 and The Dawn) got al-
most 1/3 of parliamentary seats. 
Secondly, both Social Democrats and Civic Democrats, two key players 
in Czech party system since 1996 (and in case of ODS since 1992), continued 
their withdrawal from leading positions. While in all elections between 1996 
and 2006 these two parties together secured majority of seats, in 2010 election 
became their decline which in 2013 continued. While ČSSD can still be consi-
dered as major force in Czech party system, ODS has become only one of its 
ordinal members. 
Thirdly, ODS cannot be labelled a major right wing party anymore. 
For long time was dominant position of ODS at this part of party scene seen as 
granted for ever, but emergence of TOP 09 in 2009 started to complicate things 
– which was illustrated in 2010 election and confirmed in 2013 when TOP 09 
took a leading role. Thus, the question that has been relevant in 2014 changed 
from trying to identify the strongest right wing party to estimating whether 
ODS can survive as relevant actor at all.
There could be probably found another interesting news brought by the 
2013 election (as, e. g., comeback of Christian Democrats into the House of 
Deputies, low turnout etc.), but the most important one was establishment of 
new government. Problematic semi caretaker cabinet of J. Rusnok was repla-
ced by coalition government consisting of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and ANO 2011. 
Composition of government followed election results – ČSSD got 8 seats (inc-
luding Prime Minister B. Sobotka), ANO 2011 6 seats and KDU-ČSL 3 seats. 
New cabinet succeeded in vote of confidence in the mid of February 2014 with 
110 votes for, 38 against and 33 abstaining.
Timing of the early election as well as establishment of new cabinet 
obviously affected character of EP election. As both important domestic events 
happened very close to the start of the campaign, opposition could not profit 
from typical second order elections features [Reif, Schmitt 1980] – EP elections 
are usually held in the mid of parliamentary term, voters usually tend to support 
2 Interesting analysis of VV as a business party provides article by Hloušek [2012].
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Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 was the first results of disinte-
gration of Czech party system after 2009. The party was founded by several 
prominent former Christian Democrats (as e. g. M. Kalousek), but succeed in 
gaining popular and influential politicians and persons also from other “camps” 
– the most typical example of this is current and so far the only party leader 
K. Schwarzenberg, before TOP 09 foundation associated with The Greens4. 
As important and strategic factor seems to be TOP 09 close cooperation with 
political movement called “The Mayors and Independents” that organizes suc-
cessful local and regional politicians. After existing for more than 5 years, TOP 
09 aspires to be leading party on the right wing of Czech party system, where it 
tries to adopt moderate conservative and strongly pro-European stances.
Last parliamentary election brought two newcomers among Czech 
relevant parties. The history of the first of these, ANO 2011, started in au-
tumn 2011. One of the leading Czech businessmen operating in the chemi-
cal and food industries A. Babiš, initiated the foundation of the “Action by 
Discontented Citizens” political movement, which was registered officially by 
the Czech Ministry of Interior in 2012 as the political movement “ANO 2011”. 
Roughly 17,000 citizens signed the movement´s original petition in November 
and December 2011, supporting a protest voice raised by Babiš against the po-
litical elite. The organisational structures of the movement were, however, only 
minimally developed during 2012 and the first half of 2013 because A. Babiš, 
who has been the head of the movement since the very beginning, concentrated 
his efforts on organising his weekly newspaper 5+2, and later on to investing 
in and buying leading quality media; this led to his occasionally-used nick-
name of “the Czech Berlusconi”. The activities of the movement increased pri-
or to the 2013 early parliamentary elections 2013. Babiš succeeded in engaging 
some popular political as well as non-political figures to back his movement. 
ANO 2011 pumped lots of money (provided mainly by the different companies 
of Agrofert Holding, owned by Babiš) into the campaign and this, together with 
a perfect political marketing strategy and a brief „protest” manifesto focusing 
on corruption, catapulted this newcomer without any previous significant po-
litical impact to the position of the second largest parliamentary club. Still it 
was unclear what the programmatic priorities of his party would be, because 
A. Babiš most typical answer of to any question related to his movement´s 
precise positioning on any given issue was something like “I have to ask the 
experts”. It was even difficult to assess the movement’s exact position on the 
left-right spectrum. We can undoubtedly say that ANO 2011 did not represent 
4 As another similar “purchase” can be pointed out Jiří Pospíšil, before January 2014 member 
of ODS and former Minister of Justice. Pospíšil was ranked among most popular politicians 
and left ODS after he had not succeeded at party congress in January 2014. 
parties. Its position towards the European integration is continuously strongly 
positive – there is no major Eurosceptic camp of fraction within the party. 
ODS was for the long time the second pillar of Czech modern party sys-
tem – from 1996 to 2010 each elections were competition particularly between 
ODS and ČSSD as no other party could have attacked first place. After fall of 
Nečas government in 2013 ODS substantially declined and its leading posi-
tion in the right wing of party system (and leading position in the party system 
as a whole) disappeared. It was not only due to the scandals of last ODS led 
cabinet, image and reputation of party was for a long time affected by corrup-
tion scandals of its local politicians, weak leadership and internal quarrels – 
Klíma argues that ODS denegerated itself into a new type of political party, that 
he identifies as “clientelistic party” [Klíma 2013]. In terms of ideology, ODS 
is usually described in ideological terms as a moderate conservative [Cabada, 
Hloušek, Jurek 2014: 93] or conservative-liberal subject [Havlík 2011: 134]. 
The party is labelled in relation to European integration as Eurosceptic or soft 
Eurosceptic [Haughton 2009: 1371-1392, Hanley 2008].
Third strong key actor of Czech party system is the Communist party. 
Its role and existence constitutes another unique feature of Czech system – 
Communists neither changed their name, nor never fully cut themselves off 
from the legacy of Communist party of Czechoslovakia. Thus the party partly 
has been for a long time living on collecting protest votes and on nostalgia after 
the former communist regime. As such, KSČM have never been a part of an ex-
ecutive coalition since the foundation of the Czech Republic [Cabada, Hloušek, 
Jurek 2014: 93]. Concerning party´s EU profile, Czech Communists have been 
traditionally criticizing the European integration from various perspective – 
taking into account both political and economic shortcomings of the EU. 
As well as ČSSD and KSČM, also history and tradition of Czech Christian 
Democrats can be traced down to the inter war period. Ideologically, the KDU-CSL 
reports to the political centre and is described as part of the Christian-democratic 
party family [Hanley 2010: 115-133]. In modern Czech history, the Christian 
Democrats have traditionally played a role of “pivotal” party, cooperating in vari-
ous periods and various cabinets either with the Social Democrats or with the 
ODS. In 2010 parliamentary election the Christian Democrats paid for several 
years lasting weak leadership3 and subsequent secession of substantial part of elec-
torate, party members and party elites, did not come over 5% threshold and thus 
lost its parliamentary representation. However, only after one term, KDU-ČSL re-
turned back into the House of Deputies. Concerning EU, Czech Christian demo-
crats perceive European integration as a good thing and in principle they support it 
in both its economic and political dimension [Havlík 2009: 82-87].
3 During the period 1998-2009 the party leaders changed 6 times [Hloušek, Kopeček 2010: 144]. 
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traditionally followed pan-European patterns: very low turnout, second-rate 
candidates and a strong preference for domestic issues over the European ones. 
And, as already mentioned, Czech voters are being asked to attend their third elec-
tions at national level in 16 months. In January 2013 they voted for their first di-
rectly elected president and last October there was an early parliamentary election.
Going through party manifestos and main issues they tried to emphasize, 
one can simply sum up that general valence statements and empty slogans pre-
vailed [Havlík 2014]. Concerning governmental parties, it was sometimes very 
difficult to distinguish among them, especially in the case of ANO 2011 and 
ČSSD. Starting with ČSSD, the party emphasised especially social issues, trying 
to capture voters´ interests by saying ‘Together in Europe’. In addition, the party 
wanted ‘to play the first fiddle in Europe’. Similarly, ANO 2011 published a mani-
festo full of vague statements best expressed by the main slogan ‘For Our Children 
to Have a Chance in Europe’. Only KDU-ČSL slightly differed as the party bet on 
motto ‘We Protect the Czech Interests’. However, also Christian Democrats did 
not fall behind the previous two governmental parties in vagueness and emptiness. 
The opposition camp did not deliver any substantial message as 
well. TOP 09 tried to present itself as a clearly pro-European party (a slogan 
‘I am a European’ under the picture of K. Schwarzenberg clearly expresses the 
positive attitude of the party towards the EU) and persuaded the voters about 
the importance of the EU with the slogan ‘Don’t give up on Europe’. The main 
issue of the ODS campaign and manifesto was the rejection of the entrance 
of the Czech Republic to the European Monetary Union and criticizing of the 
European Parliament and its power. The party organised a petition against the 
euro during the campaign and managed to collect more than 40 000 signatures. 
KSČM did not invest much effort and money into the campaign and relied on 
its usually much disciplined voters – the Communists did the same as they had 
done in 2004 and 2009 EP elections. Some media attention (even abroad) got 
the anti-immigration campaign ran by the Dawn. The party ‘borrowed’ a well-
known sheep poster first used by the Swiss People’s Party.
Concerning non-parliamentary parties, the most visible campaign was 
run by the SSO. The main message of SSO was criticizing of – in SSO words 
‘Euro-nonsenses’ including not only the euro but also, for example, the regu-
lation of bulbs or flushing of toilets. Both the Greens and ČPS were not able 
to find any similar simple message and they probably hoped that voters would 
vote for changes and new faces.
Except of looking into the party manifestos and their headlines, it is also 
interesting to evaluate them on the basis of standardized coding. Kaniok and 
Havlík [2014] did so following the Euromanifestos5 project´s codebook which 
5 Euromanifestos project is run by Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). 
the political left, but it was also difficult to say that the party´s programme fit-
ted with what one might call the “typical” political right. However, the tycoon´s 
rhetoric against traditional “lazy” politicians (who certainly knew how to run 
large businesses) proved to be impressive in eyes of many Czech voters.
Evaluation of the Dawn of Direct Democracy party´s position was a much 
easier. The party was on the far-right of the Czech party system, not inevitably ex-
tremist but approaching some issues in ways close to political extremism, such as 
its stance on the role of Roma in society. The political movement, the full name 
of which read the “Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura” was founded 
at the beginning of 2013 by the Senator and aspiring Czech presidential candi-
date T. Okamura [Kaniok, Hloušek 2013]. The movement was registered as late 
as June 2013, yet was still able to recruit supporters, leaders and candidates for 
the early election in October. The main message of the Movement - under whose 
umbrella, incidentally, some politicians from the Public Affairs Party found a new 
political home, was clear from the very beginning. T. Okamura supported a sub-
stantial switch from representative to direct democracy (including popular recall 
of politicians at all levels of decision making) as a panacea for everything that was 
wrong with Czech politics. Beyond this surface, however, many extremist under-
tones could be heard such as Okamura´s support for creation of “the Roma state”. 
All accusations of racism were fended off with a single argument that, as a man 
of Czech-Japanese origin, T. Okamura simply could not be a racist. Observing the 
positioning of Okamura and his movement, we can, however, conclude that he 
was to fill the niche of the “missing” relevant party on the Czech far-right.
There were also three parties which in various pre-election polls balan-
ced around 5% threshold. Party of Free Citizens tried to address Eurosceptical 
voters as the party was originally founded as mainly (but not only) Eurosceptical 
party [Kaniok 2014]. On specific group targeted also Czech Pirate Party (ČPS) 
while The Greens believed that EP election could help them to restart their po-
litical relevance. 
Election campaign
EP election 2014 campaign was probably the least visible and intere-
sting campaign in modern nation-wide elections held in the Czech Republic. 
It does not mean that both the parties and media ignored the election, but the 
intensity (number billboards, ads, meetings, TV debates etc.). Probably only 
those people who were really interested in politics and in European integration 
and of course, the politicians themselves, did really care.
Such picture is hardly surprising. European elections were never popu-
lar in the Czech Republic, which in both previous cases (2004 and 2009) have 
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Election 
Compared with the pre-election polls, the results (which are displayed in 
Table 4) brought some surprising results. Firstly, polls expected that ANO 2011 
would have won with greater difference than it did. Secondly, support for TOP 09 
had been estimated as substantially lower than was party results. Thirdly, ČSSD 
as well as ANO 2011 should have according polls got more than 20 % of votes. 
Polls also underestimated support for SSO and for the Christian Democrats.
Table 3. EP election 2014
Party Votes (%) MEPs (+/-) EP party group
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011) 16.13 4 (+4) ALDE
Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09) 15.95 4 (+4) EPP
Social Democrats (ČSSD) 14.17 4 (-3) S&D
Communists (KSČM) 10.98 3 (-1) GUE-NGL
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) 9.95 3 (+1) EPP
Civic Democrats (ODS) 7.67 2 (-7) ECR
Party of Free Citizens (SSO) 5.24 1 (+1) EFDD
Others 19.91 -
Source: Czech Statistical Office [www.volby.cz].
The election brought a narrow victory for ANO 2011, which can lead 
to a twofold interpretation. Taking into account that the party was new, win-
ning the election and acquiring four seats in the EP can be sold as big success. 
However, as the party had counted with triumph and at least 7 MEPs, it was at 
the same time bitter victory. TOP 09, which ended as the runner-up, can be seen 
as the real winner of the election. The party was expected to be third at the best, 
acquired also 4 seats in the EP and was beaten by ANO 2011 with marginal dif-
ference. On the other hand, three MEPs elected for TOP 09 were non-partisan 
candidates8, and one represented movement The Mayors and Independents – 
that casts some doubts on personal policy of TOP 09 and points out to obvious 
shortage of its own cadres.
ČSSD and its leaders probably shared the same feelings as ANO 2011 did. 
Having taken into consideration the traditionally low discipline of social demo-
cratic voters, internal quarrels that occurred after the parliamentary election, 
14.17 % of votes (and four seats) can be interpreted as a success for ČSSD. 
However, the same number can be very convincingly interpreted as sign of 
continuing decline of ČSSD support. KSČM ended on the fourth place, close-
ly followed by KDU-ČSL. While the former lost one MEP – which was 
8 Luděk Niedermayer, Jiří Pospíšil and Jaromír Štětina. 
divides codes among eight policy domains6 and three levels of governance7. 
Following the policy domains, parties considered as the most important issues 
those connected to the economy. Political topics (political system in general 
and political system of the EU) as well as issues connected with human right 
or external policies were downplayed. In this sense, relevant parties stressed 
the same topics (and policy agendas) that were important in the case of 2013 
parliamentary election. As Kaniok and Havlík [2014] identified, parties pre-
ferred the European level of governance as a governmental frame. This not 
that surprising finding, because even 2004 and 2009 euromanifestos can be de-
scribed as Europeanized [Kovář 2013]. However, presence of Europeaniaztaion 
(e. g. in sense of preference of EU governmental frame) tells nothing about 
quality and consistency of euromanifestos. 
Perhaps more interesting than the content emptiness of campaign were the 
candidates standing in the election. Among the most prominent could have been 
found P. Telička, former Chief Negotiator for Czech EU accession and former 
Member of the European Commission who led ANO 2011 list. When choosing 
candidates, A. Babiš party tried to confirm its non-party and expert self-charac-
terization as the list consisted mainly of diplomats, lobbyists and EU specialists 
– no prominent politician were present. The same strategy, at least at level of 
leaders, was adopted also by ČSSD (list led by sociologist J. Keller) and TOP 09 
(leader L. Niedermayer, former vice governor of the Czech National Bank). 
The rest of parties combined experienced and young politicians as their lead-
ers. While the former was the case of ODS (MEP J. Zahradil) and KDU-ČSL 
(former minister P. Svoboda), the latter strategy adopted probably surprisingly 
KSČM (young and quite attractive Member of House of Deputies K. Konečná).
All in all, the campaign preceding the election was hardly visible, lacking 
any contentious issues. As already mentioned, voters were fed up with politics 
on one hand and they do not have many incentives to show change of their pref-
erences that shortly after the parliamentary election. And there was clear short-
age on the supply side as well. Parties were financially exhausted by the previ-
ous campaigns and they could not pump much money to keep voters engaged. 
The ruling parties were consumed more with their intra-governmental agenda and 
disputes. On the other hand, the opposition was very fragmented and obviously 
needed some recovery from heavy loss in October 2013 parliamentary election.
In the framework of the project all euromanifestos in the period between first EP election 
(1979) and EP election of 2009 were coded. 
6 These domains are: External Relations (EXT), Freedom and Democracy (FD), Political 
Systém (PS), Political System of the EU (PSEU), Economy (ECO), Welfare and Quality 
of Life (WQL), Fabric of Society (FS), Social Groups (SG). In origibal coding, domain 
Economy is diveded into two domains (Economic Goals, Economic Structure). 
7 These levels are National, European, Global/Other.
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but perhaps with the whole political system. Constant support for political for-
ces which apparently portrait themselves as “non-parties” (ANO 2011) or sup-
port for new parties (SSO) was in the case of EP election accompanied with 
candidacy of non-politicians and non-parties members (J. Keller, P. Telička 
and whole ANO 2011 list, L. Niedermayer etc.) and growing support for them. 
This phenomenon may be dangerous for the political system as whole if pre-
vailing – it may mean that parties resign on their elite production function and 
thus their role in the political system.
Concerning Czech European policy, 2014 election confirmed that EU 
doesn´t matter much in the Czech Republic. This applies not only for parties, 
politicians and media, but for the voters as well. The turnout record of 18.2 % 
was more than 10 percentage points lower than in 2009 which made the Czech 
voters the second lowest willing to vote in whole EU. It is also questionable 
how successful will newly elected MEPs be. As majority of them lack expe-
rience with the EU and have not so far established network of contacts not only 
within the EP, it will take some time before they are able to conduct any real 
politics. On the other hand, there is also one possibly positive outcome of the 
election. New MEPs could change existing perception of the Czech Republic 
as Eurosceptic country. Compared to the previous two EP elections, support for 
both soft and hard Eurosceptic parties (ODS, KSČM, SSO) decreased – there is 
obvious majority of at least declaratorily pro-European MEPs in current Czech 
EP delegation.
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hardly success – the later party confirmed its comeback among relevant forces. 
Only 7.7% of voters cast their votes far ODS which meant a decrease of sup-
port of the party by more than 20 percentage points since the 2009 EP election. 
On the other, no one (including rational party politicians) had expected substan-
tially better outcome after 2013 parliamentary election. Party of Free Citizens, 
with 5.24 % of votes and one seat for the leader of the party Petr Mach, was the 
last political party that managed to pass the threshold. Only several thousands 
of voters lacked ČPS (4.78 %) to pass the threshold while The Greens and 
The Dawn ended with only 3.77% and 3.12 % of votes respectively.
As expected, the election substantially changed the composition of 
Czech national EP delegation. Only 6 MEPs were re-elected, which represents 
the biggest change in the Czech MEPs composition so far. This earthquake was 
caused not only by success of new parties, but also by simple fact that many 
of MEPS elected for term 2009-2014 had not been either successful in party 
primaries, or had not stood for the election at all. Among new MEPs s can be 
found many apolitical figures coming from diplomatic circles or persons lack-
ing substantial experience with European politics.
Conclusions 
It would be very risky to say that 2014 EP election had some direct and 
visible impact on Czech politics or that it delivered some substantial changes. 
Election as a whole (not only its results) rather confirmed already existing ten-
dencies and trend both in Czech party system and in the Czech European policy. 
Starting with the former, it is obvious that Czech party system is changing 
and unstable. Even if ANO 2011 confirmed its success from 2013 parliamenta-
ry election, its position within the system is not unshakable. As history of VV 
and failure of The Dawn in 2014 EP election show, Czech new parties – espe-
cially when based upon strong leader – can have very short life or perform very 
differently. Particularly the very future of ANO 2011 represents one big query. 
Will ANO 2011 transform itself into party that will be leading force in the right 
wing camp? Will it be able to generate more stronger and visible leaders than 
A. Babiš? Second question mark can be spotted above existing right wing parties 
– after EP election there are three of them: TOP 09, ODS and SSO. All these par-
ties (plus ANO 2011) compete in many aspects about similar voters; on the other 
hand they differ substantially in various agendas. Anyway, all these player can 
hardly survive even in the medium term perspective. Compared to the right wing 
camp, left wing part of the party system seems to be relatively stable.
Results of EP election confirmed and probably deepened overall dis-
satisfaction of Czech voters with performance not only with Czech parties, 
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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CROATIA
Abstract:
This text discusses the results of European elections in Croatia. It reaches 
the conclusion that voters, unhappy with the economic situation, punished the 
ruling social democratic coalition which suffered a heavy defeat. On the other 
hand, election results prove the recovery of HDZ, the opposition, centre-right 
party. It is also obvious that most Croatian citizens do not believe that European 
elections are important enough to warrant voting. Euroscepticism in Croatia is 
on the rise because citizens see no obvious benefits from joining the European 
Union. On the contrary, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in its first year 
as a member, Croatia will pay more funds into EU budget than it will receive 
from it. It is evident that direct elections of European Parliament members did 
not succeed in strengthening EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of Croatian voters, 
and that European elections are actually of secondary importance.
Key words:
European elections, Croatia, European Union, Euroscepticism
In Croatia, like in most other European Union member states, elections 
for the European Parliament attracted little public interest. One gets the impres-
sion that even major political parties did not put enough energy into informing 
voters about the importance of their participation in the European elections. 
The key question of why would someone even bother to vote in the European 
elections was not answered, neither by Croatian political parties nor non-go-
vernmental institutions. The answer they gave to this and other similar questions 
was only a general phrase that European elections were “very important“. 
Those who put a little more effort into it pointed out that around 50% of legi-
slation that has a direct bearing on Croatian citizens is adopted in the European 
Parliament. Which legislation are we talking about? Why is it important? What 
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is the procedure for their adoption? How can citizens change them through the-
ir representative in the European Parliament? How can citizens benefit from 
European institution? None of these questions were subject of public debate in 
the Republic of Croatia. That is why I think that the real question which should 
be asked is this: what is the point of participating in the European elections?
Although it was generally claimed that EU citizens will be able to di-
rectly choose the President of the European Commission for the first time, 
the question of why this was even good was never answered. Anyway, it turned 
out that this position did not account for the Treaty of Lisbon, which clearly 
states that the President of the European Commission is chosen by heads of go-
vernment of EU member states in consultation with the European Parliament. 
First reactions to the triumph of the Christian democratic European People’s 
Party and, consequently, its candidate Jean-Claude Juncker, have shown that 
heads of governments are not willing to stand on the sidelines and that their 
opinion in this matter is the most important, while European Parliament plays 
a secondary role. This demonstrated once again that the European Union is not 
a union of European citizens (the big questions is can and should it be one), 
but of nation states. Furthermore, we should take into account the fact that 
the European elections were held in the time of crisis of the European pro-
ject, but also of the traditional model of representative democracy which is one 
of fundamental values of the European Union. First analyses of the European 
elections began with a media mantra which blamed the choice of bad politics 
and bad politicians on the good citizens who stayed at home and did not vote. 
The worst criticism was aimed at citizens of Eastern Europe who, allegedly, 
do not have a sufficiently developed democratic political culture, which pre-
vents them from voting in larger numbers. It is interesting that nobody even 
considers the possibility that citizens of those countries are familiar with the 
situation in European politics, and are aware of the fact that representatives 
of political parties from their countries cannot really change anything in the 
European Parliament. That is because policies are not decided upon in the 
Parliament, but between heads of governments, representatives of big business, 
and lobbyists for other interest groups. So, maybe people are perfectly awa-
re of European Parliament’s impotence? Maybe that is why they do not vote? 
Maybe most people, meaning the passive ones who do not vote, simply do not 
understand the European Union project, and political elites cannot be bothe-
red to explain it to them? Maybe this passivity of the silent majority points to 
a deeper problem in the relationship between political elites and citizens? Isn’t 
it true that this divide is exploited by radical right parties? Isn’t that the reason 
for their relatively good results? The question which should be clearly articu-
lated is why should people go to the polling stations and vote if they do not see 
any point in it? Namely, it is obvious that, in spite of euphoric comments about 
halting the decline of voter turnout, most citizens of EU member states still do 
not care about European elections. European Parliament data suggests that 87% 
of voters in Slovakia, 80% in the Czech Republic, 79% in Slovenia, and 77.3% 
in Poland did not vote; in Croatia, 75.7% of people stayed at home that day, 
same as 70.8% in Hungary. It is obvious that citizens of former socialist coun-
tries have very little interest in participating in the European elections. My opi-
nion is that this is not just the result of underdeveloped democratic political 
culture, but primarily of the fact that EU institutions are still totally abstract 
because political elites have not demystified them. An even stronger reason is 
the realization of citizens from former socialist countries that their representati-
ves in the European Parliament do not have much influence. Most people think 
that the logical step would be to form alliances of representatives from smaller 
European countries around certain issues and pertinent legislation, but this rare-
ly happens. On the other hand, voter turnout is significantly higher in EU foun-
ding member states, which have more decision-making power. The third group 
of countries consists of Nordic states which have a long democratic tradition 
of encouraging citizen participation, resulting in a relatively big turnout at the 
European elections. It means that, in deciding whether to vote in the European 
elections and who to vote for, people are guided by their perceived interests 
and affiliations with specific political identities. However, considering the lack 
of interest for taking part in the European elections, it seems evident that the 
European Union did not manage to become a true political union of its citizens. 
Thus the once popular idea that direct elections of European Parliament mem-
bers will strengthen the legitimacy of the European Union, which will then 
be shaped into a democratic political community [Hix, Hageman 2008: 37], 
has not been fully realized.
In Croatian politics, political parties deeply rooted in certain identities 
effectuated a great stability of the party system and determined the results of 
parliamentary elections for a long time. This situation also carried over to the 
European elections. The second important factor which influenced the turnout 
and choices made by the Croatian voters at the European elections were the cir-
cumstances of Croatia’s entry into the European Union.
This text will therefore aim to: a) give a short outline of the economic 
and political circumstances in Croatia that created scepticism towards the EU, 
b) show and analyse the results of the European elections in Croatia and, finally, 
c) point to the causes of EU’s democratic deficit which, in turn, resulted in low 
voter turnout for the European elections in Croatia. In the end, this text will 
ask the question whether democracy at the level of the European Union is even 
possible? Isn’t democratic deficit a reality that will characterise the European 
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Union for a long time? Isn’t it caused by the fact that European institution will 
remain abstract to its citizens for a long time? And anyway, isn’t democracy 
a type of political order designed for nation states!? Let us first take a look at 
democracy and peace as basic values of the European Union.
The European Union is commonly perceived as an economic union 
of European countries, partly due to its initial name - European Economic 
Community (1st January, 1958); however, its goal wasn’t exclusively economic 
development of its members, but a political unification of Europe1. During the 
last fifty years, this initial form of economic integration, known as the European 
Union, went through various stages of development - from the Customs Union, 
through a Common Market to the current European Union which, basically, 
represents a successful economic and monetary union. Although economic in-
terests were an especially important motive for its establishment, the European 
Union is not exclusively a monetary union; it is also a union of values, foremost 
liberal-democratic, based on the achievements of the Enlightenment which are 
at the core of the Western world: individual freedoms, three branches of go-
vernment, system independence, and free democratic elections. 
Today, the European Union is facing several crises. First is Eurozone’s 
financial crisis, which has revealed the lack of efficient political institutions 
capable of dealing with the recession, and thus demonstrated that the real 
crisis is a political one. Furthermore, the crisis in Ukraine also showed that 
the European Union is having trouble dealing with geopolitical problems and 
forming its foreign policy. All these problems had an influence on the politi-
cal mood of European citizens. But most of all, this seems to be the crisis of 
the traditional model of democratic decision-making itself. This crisis led to 
a low turnout at the European elections in nearly all member states, and a re-
lative success of radical right and Eurosceptic political parties. The populari-
ty of the radical right caused a big moral panic that was, naturally, restricted 
to the political elites and liberal non-governmental organisations. At the same 
time, warnings about how the politics of the radical right is endangering de-
mocracy did not impress most average European citizens. Quite the contra-
ry: election results clearly speak to the relative success of the radical, even 
1 After the two World Wars, it became clear that something was not right with the way Europe 
was being managed. All those casualties and tenths of millions of dead and injured prompted 
the question of avoiding the next war, i.e. the question was how to prevent the emergence of 
fascist and nationalist totalitarianism and overcome communistic dictatorship. So, the main 
motive for EU establishment was lasting security and preservation of peace on the territory 
of Europe. Countries which didn’t experience great casualties in the Second World War 
(such as Switzerland, Scandinavian countries and Great Britain) didn’t wish to enter this 
supranational political organisation, but focused mainly on economic associations among 
themselves that resulted in the establishment of the European Free Trade Association. 
extreme right. Marine Le Pen’s National Front got 24.85% of votes in France, 
Austrian Freedom Party got 19.5%, Party for Freedom won 13.2% of votes in 
the Netherlands, and the more moderate British UKIP 27%. Parties of the extre-
me right also achieved good results: Greek Golden Dawn won 9.4% of votes, 
and Hungarian Jobbik 14.64%. Therefore, there is no doubt that radical and 
extreme right parties achieved relative electoral success. In Croatia, such par-
ties were left without a mandate in the European Parliament. This was the re-
sult of the previously mentioned deep social roots of main political parties: 
Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), member 
of the European People’s party (EPP), which represents Christian democratic 
and popular politics, and Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija, 
SDP), member of the Party of European Socialists (PES), a social-democratic 
party that originated from the Croatian League of Communists. The manner 
and circumstances of the formation of Croatian political parties, the timing of 
Croatia’s War of Independence, and deep divisions within Croatia’s electorate 
led to ideological rifts and the formation of distinct political identities firmly 
embedded in the electorate, which in turn shaped two very strong parties: HDZ, 
a centre-right party which presided over most of the current democratic period, 
and SDP, a centre-left party currently in power which won its first mandate in 
2000. It has been shown that this division into HDZ and SDP stems primarily 
from structural social rifts caused by identity-symbolic divisions that are mo-
stly based on the interpretation of World War II events and characteristics of the 
Croatian Quisling state NDH (Nezavisna država Hrvatska or Independent State 
of Croatia). Another important cause of the division is worldview issues, pri-
marily those related to the role of the Catholic Church and religion in public life 
(the definition of marriage, attitude towards the family etc.). This quintessential 
rootedness of the two main parties in the political identities of Croatian voters 
makes the economic-social dimension of party rivalry less important [Čular 
2013: 5]. Question which should therefore be asked is: does this also hold true 
for the European elections in Croatia? It seems that the 2014 European elec-
tions did not bring into question the basic division of voters nor the stability 
of the Croatian party system. Although some voters, disappointed by SDP’s 
politics, voted for the newly established green party ORaH, which won some 
10% of votes, it is also evident that large majority of voters still support the 
mainstream parties. The stability of the Croatian party system therefore stems 
from the structural characteristics of the Croatian society and a unique politics 
which, with regards to the European integration, was led by two main parties: 
HDZ and SDP. So, let us first look at the process of Croatia’s negotiation with 
the European Union. Why did Croatian political and economic elites decide 
that Croatia would benefit from joining the EU in the first place?
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The European Union is not only an economic alliance, but also a union of 
values. In today’s globalized world, the European Union has set itself several go-
als: a) ensuring peace for its members, b) increasing freedom of individuals, en-
suring human rights and developing democracy, c) economic development of its 
members based on a free market economy, d) solidarity between member states 
and preservation of some sort of a social state. These goals were the reason that 
Croatia – after it gained independence in a defensive war – decided to become a 
member of the European Union. Since 2000, all efforts of Croatian political elites 
have been oriented towards this goal. The admittance of Croatia in the European 
Union was considered to mean its separation from the Balkans and the former 
Yugoslavia, and its membership was supposed to guarantee security and econo-
mic prosperity. The country signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the European Union in October 2001. The country applied for EU 
membership in 2003, and the European Commission recommended making it an 
official candidate at the beginning of 2004. Croatia was granted the candidate sta-
tus by the European Council in mid-2004. Accession negotiations, originally set 
for March 2005, began in October that year together with the screening process. 
Croatia’s accession was further complicated by the insistence of Slovenia, an EU 
member state, that the two countries’ border issues be dealt with prior to Croatia’s 
accession to the EU. Croatia finished accession negotiations on the 30th June 
2011, and on the 9th December of the same year signed the Treaty of Accession. 
However, long-lasting negotiations diminished Croatian public’s enthusiasm for 
the accession. When the negotiations finally finished after ten years, Croatia’s re-
ason for entering the EU wasn’t really clear anymore, especially since the Union 
was also experiencing a big economic crisis. Most people were afraid that Croatia 
would lose its sovereignty and once again become part of a supranational entity. 
Euroscepticism was growing; political elites became aware of it and decided to 
change the constitutional provision which mandates a referendum before entering 
into an alliance with other countries. Previous provision stated that a referendum 
is valid only if it achieves the required voter turnout of more than 50%. The con-
stitutional changes have omitted this condition, so that the referendum was valid 
regardless of the number of voters who had cast their ballots. The referendum 
on the EU accession was held on the 22th January 2012; the turnout was 43%, 
of which 66% voted in favour of joining the Union. The ratification process was 
concluded on the 21st June 2013, and Croatia’s accession to the EU took place on 
the 1st July of the same year. Political elites claimed that this was a great day for 
Croatia and announced 2013 as a turning point in Croatian history.
The number of voters that came to the polls showed that the majority of 
Croatian people didn’t share the enthusiasm of its political leaders. The avera-
ge number of voters for the European Parliament has decreased from 65.89% 
in the 1979 elections to 47.85% in 2004. In the “old“ member states, the avera-
ge turnout was 52.88%, but citizens of new member states were not so enthu-
siastic about the elections and thus contributed to the decrease of the overall 
percentage. The lowest turnout was in Slovakia (16.94%), followed by Poland 
with 20.87%, Estonia with 26.83%, Slovenia with 28.43% etc. The avera-
ge percentage was slightly increased by Malta with 82.37% and Cyprus with 
71.19% [Weidenfeld, Wessels 2006: 246]. This trend of decreased citizens’ in-
terest in the European elections has continued all through the last elections, 
held in 2009, which attracted only 43% of voters.
The situation is paradoxical: although the power of the European 
Parliament is growing, its members are chosen by a decreasing number of voters. 
Why is that the case? I believe it is a result of people’s realisation that, on the 
level of nation states, there is politics, but no policy. At the same time, the situ-
ation on the European level is reversed – policy, but no politics. So, most poli-
cies that affect citizens’ lives are adopted on the EU level, i.e. in the European 
Commission and the European Council (by representatives of member states’ 
governments), but at the same time there is no proper political competition. 
The European Parliament itself – although a strong political institution in na-
tional states – is in a way depoliticizing; there is no proper authority or oppo-
sition. Since democracy is a political order which understands an authority and 
opposition that form inside a state, it is not possible to give a precise answer to 
the question who is the actual authority and who the opposition in the European 
Parliament. The Union is not a state, but an alliance of states, and it can hardly 
exist in any other form. Since there are no citizens of Europe, for the time being 
they are impossible to form. That is why citizens still perceive their own national 
states as the platform for true politics, and institutions of the European Union as 
too abstract. This situation also affected the European elections in Croatia.
The first Croatian elections for the European Parliament were held on 
the 14th April 2013, when its citizens elected twelve members of the European 
Parliament. Those members will serve the remainder of the Parliament’s 2009-
2014 sessions, starting from Croatia’s entry into the European Union on the 
1st July 2013. The country formed a single constituency, with members elec-
ted by proportional representation using open lists. Despite the prediction of a 
decisive victory for the governing, centre-left SDP coalition, HDZ’s centre-ri-
ght coalition won by a razor-thin majority of votes. The turnout of just 20.76% 
was the lowest of all national elections in modern Croatian history and the third 
lowest EU Parliamentary election turnout (after the 2004 election in Slovakia 
with 16.96% and Poland with 20.87%). The low turnout was caused by two fac-
tors. The first one is the already mentioned democratic deficit of the European 
Union: simply put, liberal-democracy is a political order designed for nation 
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states, and it has difficulty functioning in a supranational system. This feeling of 
alienation from European institution is especially strong among citizens of new 
member states, in which democracy is just starting to take hold after the fall of 
communistic dictatorships. These nations have become fully-affirmed as inde-
pendent states only after the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, or of bigger coun-
tries they had been members of (as was the case with Croatia). It is not only that 
citizens of these countries don’t have enough experience living in a democratic 
order, but they are also especially sensitive about their national identity and fear 
that they will lose it in the European Union. The second reason why most vo-
ters from post-communist countries don’t vote in the elections is a very weak 
mobilisation potential of their political parties; political parties from those states 
are bad at mobilising voters, and even worse at recruiting new political elites. 
Parties are not well-connected to the society, members of the party elite are invo-
lved in many corruption scandals and are not adept at translating citizens’ intere-
sts into politics. For all these reasons, only a small number of citizens can identi-
fy with a certain party, while the majority is not interested in the political process 
at all. Citizens find politics completely dependent on foreign factors which they 
cannot influence, and believe that political parties don’t work in their best inte-
rest. It seems as though not voting represents a form of civil rebellion, which in 
itself symbolizes a weakness of European democracy and the entire European 
project. „At the heart of the European project, which is characterized by policy 
without politics on the European level and politics without policy on the nation-
-state level, is an act of self-subversion: an example, in other words, of the cultu-
ral contradictions not of a capitalism, but of democracy“ [Krastev 2013].
We also find that political elites of member states have different appro-
aches to European politics and the European Union itself. National Parliaments 
of “old“ EU members feel that European questions and politics encroach upon 
their competencies too much, while new members’ legislatures consider the re-
lationship towards the EU to be primarily a question of foreign policy. That is 
why their political elites believe that European politics is not a question for 
member states’ legislatures, but for ministries of foreign relations. The situation 
in Croatia is similar: the attitude that European politics is closely connected to 
domestic politics of every member state is only gradually becoming accepted.
Considering the problem of democratic deficit, the discussion centred 
around three strategies: parliamentary, post-parliamentary and presidential. 
The parliamentary strategy emphasises the democratic function of national par-
liaments in the European decision-making processes; it analyses their attempts 
to strengthen their legitimacy through special committees for European issues. 
The post-parliamentary strategy supports direct coordination of interests betwe-
en the European Commission and associations that represent corporative interest. 
It is believed that corporative and lobby networks, although conducive to effi-
cient decision-making, cannot replace the role of the Parliament. They do not 
have democratic legitimacy and are not subject to democratic control. Through 
their proposal of direct elections of the European Commission president, presi-
dential legitimacy strategies are moving towards increasing democratic legiti-
macy of the Union on the one hand, but on the other are neglecting the imminent 
principle of consensus. The European Parliament remains the only institution 
that is attempting to establish general interests of EU citizens, which gives it 
a decisive role in establishing democratic legitimacy, alongside European poli-
tical parties [Cipek 2007]. However, none of these strategies has proved to be 
especially good. Attention should also be directed to a discussion about the au-
thority of the European Parliament which also became a subject of debate in 
Croatian expert public. The legitimacy of the European Parliament has been 
found weak because it does not have any law-making and does not reflect the 
multinational structure of the Union. Although the European Parliament is the 
only institution of the European Union whose members are directly elected by 
citizens, it only has the power of co-decision, while the legislative initiative is 
held by the European Commission. Nevertheless, the Parliament has the right 
to suggest that the European Commission regulate certain questions by a legi-
slative initiative, but it cannot initiate passing of that legislation. Most of the 
participants in this discussion believe that the development of the European de-
mocracy depends upon the European Parliament getting the power to initiate 
legislation, even if only in (previously) specified and limited fields. Regarding 
Croatia, I find it important that the European Parliament gets the opportunity to 
influence the politics of regional development which is closely tied to agrarian, 
social and environmental policies. Those policies are of the utmost importan-
ce for the Croatian agrarian region Slavonia, which has been subsisting on the 
production of wheat and corn, but has been hit by a deep economic crisis. Some 
predictions say that, if this situation continues, only 300,000 people will rema-
in out of the one million that currently live in this region. The decision to grant 
European Parliament the right to a legislative initiative regarding these policies, 
which are closely linked, would be welcomed in Croatia. Namely, it is obvio-
us that agrarian policy, which is also the most expensive one in the European 
Union, affects social and regional policy, as well as the policy of sustainable de-
velopment. All this points to a conclusion that the European Parliament could 
have a bigger role in this area. Furthermore, the goal of this policy is to achieve 
economic, social and territorial, i.e. regional, cohesion of the European Union, 
which should be formed on the basis of growth achieved through knowledge 
and innovations. It is predicted that, as part of these policies, Croatia will draw 
some 8.6 million euros in the period between 2014 and 2020. Since this is a large 
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amount for Croatian circumstances, I assume that effective policy such as this 
one could decrease Euroscepticism in Croatia. As it is, after its first year as a EU 
member, it is very difficult for a Croatian citizen to name even one advantage 
of this membership beside the fact they can cross borders more easily. Croatia 
is still in a state of “post-accession” shock which all other states that have en-
tered the Union in 2004 have gone through. Some of them are Slovenia, Czech 
Republic or Slovakia which has reached 80% GDP per capita of the EU today, 
and Hungary and Poland which have reached 60%. Today, the Czech Republic 
has 20.270 euros per capita, while, for example, Germany has 28.400 euros of 
GDP per capita. It is evident that the differences are decreasing and that all co-
untries that have entered the Union reaped great economic benefits. Unlike co-
untries that have entered the Union in 2004, Croatia became a member in 2013, 
at the time of economic crisis. From today’s perspective, it is clear that predic-
tions of the Institute of Economy in Zagreb, which in 2007 stated that EU ac-
cession will bring economic growth and lower unemployment in Croatia, were 
completely wrong. The reality was completely opposite - in 2008, Croatia fo-
und itself in a strong recession. A country with 4 300 000 residents lost 217 000 
jobs. Today, Croatia’s GDP has dropped 12%, real wages are 18% lower, indu-
strial production 16% and retail sale 21%. None of these negative trends were 
changed by the social-democratic government, which came into power in 2012 
by beating Christian-democratic and people’s party HDZ. Even worse, econo-
mic situation in Croatia only deteriorated after its 2013 accession to the EU. 
Unfortunately, Croatia had the misfortune of entering the Union at the time of the 
biggest Eurozone debt crisis, so the initial effects of the accession were negative. 
The labour market suffered a significant rise of unemployment and a decline in 
real wages, i.e. decrease of disposable income, all of which led to a further dive 
of personal consumption. At the beginning of 2014, 363 400 people were unem-
ployed, which is 5 000 more than the previous year. Furthermore, the unem-
ployment rate has reached 21.6%, which is 0.5% more than in December 2012. 
Youth unemployment is especially high, over 48%, which makes it the third hi-
ghest youth unemployment in the EU, following Greece and Spain.
In 2013, industrial production has decreased by 2% in relation to the 
previous year. Last year, exports have amounted to some 68 billion kuna, which 
is 6% less than in 2012, and import has decreased around 2%. Macroeconomic 
prediction is that 2013, fifth recession year in a row, will see an economic do-
wnturn of around 1%, which would be less than in 2012 when the GDP has 
decreased by 2%. In spite of EU membership, the year 2014 will likely bring 
further stagnation of the Croatian economy, as well as an estimated 1% drop 
in GDP. Credit agencies have lowered Croatia’s credit rating under the cre-
dit level. All this considered, it is evident that there are no obvious economic 
advantages of EU accession, at least as far as we can see in Croatia. Just the op-
posite, different tax rules have taken billions of tax income out of state hands. 
Customs income is now shared with the European Union, and Croatia can keep 
only one fourth of it. A great increase in Croatian external debt and a lack of 
funds in its budget led the country into a cycle of excessive deficit reduction, 
which is mandated by the Union and entails some loss of fiscal sovereignty. 
Croatian administration was proven to be slow and inefficient in producing 
the documentation necessary for the withdrawal of money from EU structural 
funds. In its first year, Croatia could very well find itself in a position of having 
paid more money into EU funds than it has received. European Commission 
data states that all 12 new member states, which joined the EU in two previo-
us circles of expansion, have finished their first year of membership in surplus. 
Cyprus is the only country which has marked financial loss in its fourth year of 
membership, while all other states, in all years of membership, have received 
more from the EU budget then they have paid. This proves that the European 
Union is a truly successful solidarity community, but that the incompetence of 
Croatian government could singlehandedly make it an exception to this rule.
Of course, none of this contributes to the popularity of European inte-
grations in the Croatian society, nor to the popularity of the centre-left govern-
ment which, according to over 70% of people, is leading the country in the 
wrong direction. This government will most likely be replaced in the next elec-
tions, but European integrations policy will continue to bear a negative image 
in people’s minds, at least for now.
In Croatia, the deep economic crisis prompted several, distinctly con-
servative referendum initiatives. The conservative right organised a success-
ful referendum which resulted in the introduction of a constitutional provision 
that marriage is a union between a woman and a man (as a way of preventing 
the legalisation of gay marriage). Another civic initiative was a referendum on 
Cyrillic alphabet, used by the Serb ethnic minority, aimed at restricting its use 
on public buildings. Public discussion also revolves around the question of how 
liberal should an education program be, and what is the parents’ role in cho-
osing the education program for their children. This conservative movement, 
supported by the Catholic Church and conservative organisations, also has the 
backing of the centre-right opposition party HDZ, which used it to win the sup-
port of some conservatively-oriented voters.
The economic and political crisis had a significant impact on the 
European elections in Croatia, but it did not motivate voters to use their say 
in these elections to change something. Just the opposite, the majority of dis-
gruntled voters “protested“ by staying at home, thinking they are powerless to 
change anything; European elections in Croatia remained secondary. It is true 
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that election turnout rose from 20.84% in 2013 to 25.24% (Table 1); this repre-
sents a bigger increase than the one on the level of the European Union, where 
it went up by 0.9%. This increase is not significant and has primarily a sym-
bolic value because, for the first time since the introduction of the European 
elections, the downward voter turnout trend has been halted. Croatia saw its 
voter turnout increase by some 5%, which may seem as a positive move to-
wards an increased interest of Croatian voters for European topics, but actual-
ly represents a negligible shift. Rather than signalling a trend towards halting 
the deeply rooted Euroscepticism of Croatian voters, it is a matter of deep vo-
ter dissatisfaction with the situation in the country which prompted them to go 
to the polls in larger numbers and express their protest. Low turnout also sho-
wed that Croatian political parties do an increasingly bad job of performing 
their democratic functions and are having more and more trouble mobilising 
voters. Present-day parties mostly boil down to party apparatuses that reward 
their members with well-paid positions in national or European administration, 
which loses them credibility with the voters.
Table 1. Turnout in EP election in Croatia
Elections 2013 Elections 2014
Total number of voters 3 748 815 3 767 343
Number of votes 781 216 950 980
Percentage of voters 20.84% 25.24%
Number of invalid ballots 39 572 29 076
Percentage of invalid ballots 5.07% 3.06%
Source: www.izbori.hr (7.8.2014).
A smaller percentage of invalid ballots shows that, this time, voters co-
uld choose from more protest parties listed on the ballot, which gave them 
a chance to express their disgruntlement by voting instead of spoiling ballots. 
Generally speaking, European elections in Croatia were marked by protest vo-
ting against the current Croatian politics led by the social democrats. This is 
corroborated by the results achieved by the hard right, assembled in a coalition 
of parties called the Alliance for Croatia (Savez za Hrvatsku), and even more 
by the entry of a new green party into the European Parliament. The Alliance 
for Croatia got the votes of conservative nationalists who were unhappy with 
government’s politics, but also the politics of the centre-right opposition gathe-
red around HDZ. Protests votes of leftist voters, disillusioned by SDP’s rule, 
went to the green party ORaH, founded just six months before the elections 
by the former Minister and SDP’s member of Croatian Parliament M. Holy, 
which succeeded in entering the European Parliament.
But most of all, it was a protest against government policies that resulted 
in the victory of the coalition of centre-right parties led by HDZ as the main op-
position party. What is interesting is that, thanks to the possibility of preferen-
tial voting, most votes from that electoral slate went to two candidates represen-
ting extremely conservative positions – R. Tomašić and M. Petir. Ruža Tomašić 
is the first name of the radically right Croatian Party of Rights – Ante Starčević 
(Hrvatska stranka prava – Ante Starčević). She won 107,206 preferential vo-
tes. As a member of Parliament, R. Tomašić is active in the parliamentary gro-
up European Conservatives and Reformists, and her success has shown that 
Euroscepticism is definitely strong in the Croatian society. Considering that 
predictions of the Croatian National Bank say that Croatia is a country which 
will pay more money into European funds than it will receive, R. Tomašić’s re-
sults are not surprising. In the second place by the number of preferential votes 
on HDZ’s slate is M. Petir, member of the Croatian Peasants Party (Hrvatska 
seljačka stranka, HSS) She won 42 683 votes by actively promoting conse-
rvative values like traditional marriage, but also by championing the protec-
tion of rights of Croatian farmers. Strong performance by these two candidates 
from HDZ’s coalition slate, with their right-wing, national-conservative rhe-
toric, prevented an even bigger success of the Eurosceptic, hard, conservative 
right in Croatia. That type of right-wing organisations gathered around seve-
ral parties and civil organisations, assembled into a coalition popularly known 
as the Alliance for Croatia, which won 6.88% of votes. Since these parties did 
not have a single candidate with enough prominence and popularity among the 
national-conservative public, they could not convincingly go up against par-
ties in HDZ’s coalition and the right-wing rhetoric of R. Tomašić and M. Petir. 
These two candidates thus prevented a vote drain from HDZ to a more radi-
cal right option. That is why, in spite of the difficult economic situation and 
high unemployment, Croatia did not experience the same phenomenon of the 
success of right-wing populists and the radical right as a number of European 
countries. Anyway, studies have shown that there is no automatic connection 
between the success of the extreme and radical right and the economic crisis. 
Such parties owe their success more to their identity politics and ability to pu-
blicly present certain topics (such as fear of strangers) as their own, rather than 
to their socio-economic programmes [Mudde 2007; 2014].
What is interesting is that, in Croatia, economic crisis and high unem-
ployment did not result in an increased popularity of left-wing parties like, 
for example, in Greece, where SYRIZA emerged as an election winner by cap-
turing 22% of votes. On the contrary, the left party which emphasised workers’ 
rights and the idea of equality – Croatian Labourists - Labour Party – did not 
pass the electoral threshold and lost its only mandate in the European Parliament 
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elections for the European Parliament were not justified. The initial claim was 
that these elections would enable the formation of a genuine European political 
community and increase European Union’s legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. 
This did not happen; on the contrary, the interest for taking part in the European 
elections kept falling. It remains to be seen whether the 2014 elections, which 
stopped this tendency, will also mark its reversal or just a temporary suspen-
sion of a clear trend which shows that citizens consider European elections to 
be of secondary importance. Hence, the lack of interest in the European elec-
tions clearly shows that democracy is a political order designed for nation sta-
tes. This is an indisputable fact which will make the gulf between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments of EU member states, as well as between 
European and national elections, difficult to overcome. Moreover, it seems that 
this gulf will continue to grow, at least for the time being. Namely, the Treaty 
of Lisbon gave the European Parliament considerable power, but it conflicts 
with the fact that EU is a union of states, not its citizens. That is why the ten-
sion between decisions on the European level and the consequences of those 
decisions for member states will continue to exist. So, there will still be some 
sort of tension between the politics of the member states and the EU, and that 
will discourage voters from taking part in the European elections. Citizens did 
not miss the fact that the process of globalisation led to decision-making cen-
tres becoming more and more distant, and often completely non-transparent 
[Dahrendorf 2002]. It has become perfectly clear that elections can serve to 
depose ruling politicians, but they cannot change the politics [Blühdorn 2011; 
Krastev 2013]. Democratic elections lose their point if they cannot bring abo-
ut any significant change, which is why more and more people are giving up 
on the election process. That is why most political theoreticians agree that the 
crisis of participatory democracy is an undeniable fact. It is thought that this 
crisis was caused, among other things, by the rise of neoliberal ideology which 
followed the collapse of communist dictatorships. Neoliberalism took the slo-
gan of the French bourgeois revolution, “Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood”, 
which represented the ideological foundation of parliamentary democracy, and 
replaced it with “Costs, Profit, Efficiency”. This represents a new type of fun-
damental liberal “political rationality”, which views every democratic institu-
tion, person and politics through entrepreneurial glasses and sees no differen-
ce between political and economic activities. This process casts most people 
in a passive role because the actual political process takes place behind stage 
lights in the form of privatised interaction between political elites and repre-
sentatives of economic interests [Jörke 2010]. It is not a question of businesses 
buying politicians, but a hard-to-unravel web of joint interests of companies 
and state [Bofinger, Habermas, Nida-Rümelin 2012]. This is about a tendency 
(won in the 2013 elections). In the 2014 elections, Croatian Labourists won only 
3.40% of votes, in spite of the widely-held opinion that Nikola Vuljanić, their 
representative in the European Parliament, was doing a good job. The elections 
clearly showed that, at the moment, there is no room for a traditional-left par-
ty in Croatia. They also made clear that left-oriented young people, who make 
up the biggest percentage of the unemployed in Croatia, do not favour traditio-
nal left-wing values like equality, but are more attracted to postmodern topics of 
environmental protection, gender equality, gay marriage etc., championed by the 
newly-established green party ORaH. So, although Croatian left-wing voters are 
clearly not satisfied with the politics of SDP-led government, they did not vote for 
the leftist party which ran on the platform of traditional social-democratic values.
The question which should therefore be asked is how come the govern-
ment’s very poor economic results and the deepening economic crisis did not 
compel voters to be even more decisive in punishing the ruling party? My opi-
nion is that SDP’s relative high percentage of votes (29.93%) is the result of 
identity politics. Namely, SDP clearly positioned itself as a defender of liberal 
values against HDZ’s national-conservative politics. The election campaign, 
generally weak and half-hearted, centred around topics connected to dome-
stic, primarily identity politics, and the results achieved by the Croatian go-
vernment. In this contest, the victory went to the opposition headed by HDZ, 
which won 41.42% votes. HDZ emerged as a well-organised party which, even 
in conditions of low voter turnout, managed to mobilise its members and se-
cure a decisive victory. SDP’s ruling coalition paid the price for its thoroughly 
unsuccessful economic policy and interparty conflicts. Many votes were also 
lost to corruption scandals of middle-ranked SDP members that tarnished its 
image as an honest party.
Table 2. Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections in Croatia
Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections
HDZ coalition 381,844 votes 41.42 %
SDP coalition 275,904 votes 29.93 %
OraH 86,806 votes 9.42 %
Alliance for Croatia (Savez za Hrvatsku) 63,437 votes 6.88 %
Croatian Labourist (Hrvatski laburisti) 31,363 votes 3.40 %
Source: www.izbori.hr (7.8.2014).
European elections have shown that both European and Croatian politics 
revolve around the centre, so that best results are achieved by centre-right and 
centre-left parties – the same ones which already govern the European Union in 
a big coalition. It also became clear that great expectations surrounding direct 
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of increasingly entwined power of big business and the state which ordinary 
people cannot easily fathom. Transnational movement of capital, goods, money 
and people, as well as the power of international institutions, weaken the nation 
state, and thereby also democracy. Namely, it is worth repeating that democra-
cy is a political order designed for nation states, and that is why the European 
elections are of secondary importance.
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Abstract: 
The 2014 European Parliament elections in Lithuania were success-
ful for mainstream political parties: no new-born political movement came up 
in the political scene; no open Euro-sceptic party was able to gain any seats. 
But such a victory came at a price: the major European topics (joining the eu-
ro-zone, land-ownership by the foreigners) were left aside; the EP electoral 
campaign was overshadowed by Presidential elections with populist discus-
sions about Russian threats and national security. The coincidence of two poli-
tical campaigns boosted the voter turnout and made a significant impact on the 
distribution of MEP seats; because of the higher turnout, smaller parties were 
able to enter the EP, while two established parties with devoted core voters suf-
fered some losses compared to the 2009 EP elections.
Key words:
European Parliament, Lithuania, elections, campaign, electoral slogan, 
populism
Introduction: Lithuania in the EU and the EU in Lithuania
In 2014, Lithuania elected members of the European Parliament for the 
third time. In every election, the number of parliamentarians representing the 
country declined by one: from 13 in 2004 to 11 in 2014. The 15% decrease of 
the number of seats in ten years remained mostly unnoticed. Lithuanian apathy 
towards European affairs and an uncritical attitude towards Brussels could ex-
plain the public ignorance of the fact, that the Lithuanian (as well as the Irish) 
delegations in the EP proportionally shrank in comparison to other countries’. 
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This attitude dates back to the very beginning of the Lithuanian membership 
in the EU: on November 11th, 2004, the Lithuanian Seimas1 was the first (even 
before the European Parliament) to ratify a contradictory Treaty, establishing 
a Constitution for Europe, which was signed less than a fortnight earlier and 
rejected half a year later by the referendums in France and the Netherlands. 
Ten years ago, the premature decision to ratify the imperative document with-
out public or even parliamentary discussions was justified by the fears of the rul-
ing elite: in October 2004, a new born Darbo partija (DP, Labour Party) won the 
Seimas elections and the outgoing parliament was afraid to leave the ratification 
of vitally important documents to unknown politicians. A few weeks later DP en-
tered the coalition government and later joined Lithuanian mainstream politics. 
The escape from broader public discussions on European affairs gradu-
ally became a sad tradition in Lithuania. This was clearly reflected in the 2009 
EP elections, where the turnout was less than 21% - Lithuanians were the sec-
ond least active voters in the EU (only Slovaks were less enthusiastic). Even the 
presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2013 did not stimulate 
substantial changes in this field.
Lithuania remains a strongly pro-European country, but the attitudes are 
going through gradual transformation. In 2004, i.e. in the first year of member-
ship, 68% of Lithuanians said they trust the EU, while only 52% preserved such 
high expectations in 2013. Meanwhile, the proportion of the population who dis-
trusted the EU more than doubled from 15 to 35% in ten years [Eurobarometer 
62; Eurobarometer 80]. The fact that trust of the EU had not dropped below 50% 
in Lithuania is more symbolic, and it is hard to answer the question: has the at-
titude of Lithuanians towards the EU become more realistic or more sceptic?
The roots of an uncritical attitude towards the EU could be traced back 
to over a quarter of a century ago. Membership in the EU and NATO was the 
dream in the first decade of Lithuanian independence; this goal united the na-
tion, was accepted without public discussion and understood as a vital guaran-
tee of lasting independence and prosperity. The Baltic States were in the second 
wave of the NATO enlargement, they joined the Alliance five years later than 
the first applicants from the CEE. Initially, Lithuania was absent in the first pro-
posed wave of the EU enlargement as well, and a fear to be left outside the EU 
and NATO was politically real and publicly insulting. The membership talks 
resembled a horse race; Lithuania tried to close negotiation chapters as quickly 
as possible in order to overtake the countries which started negotiations ear-
lier. In the 2003 referendum, 89.95% Lithuanians voted for membership in the 
EU. This was the second best result in the history of enlargement referendums. 
At the same time, Slovakia scored 92.5% in favour of membership. 
1 Lithuanian Parliament
On the eve of the 2014 EP elections, a few uncomfortable questions 
clearly revealed the widening gap between the rank and file and the political 
elite on their attitudes towards the EU. Joining the euro-zone was an old dream 
of Lithuania. In 2006, the Lithuanian application was rejected because of the 
failed inflation target. When the economic crisis hit, the common currency lost 
its idealized appeal to Lithuania, however, two consecutive governments and 
President D. Grybauskaitė continued to vow for the common currency. Because 
surveys showed Lithuanian distrust in the Euro, the political elite faced a deli-
cate task of how to avoid ‘uncomfortable’ discussions about joining the euro 
during the EP election campaign.
Another, just as troublesome issue, was the problem of land ownership. 
During membership negotiations, Lithuania agreed on a 10 year transition pe-
riod during which foreign citizens were not allowed to own land in Lithuania. 
From May 2014, the land ownership rules were relaxed, but Seimas failed to 
pass the legislation which would protect local landowners. The situation pro-
voked discontent; a group of citizens initiated a referendum on a law, forbid-
ding foreigners to buy land in Lithuania. Strict Lithuanian laws on referendum 
require at least 300 thousand signatures supporting the call of referendum for 
it to take place. In a country with less than 3 million inhabitants it is a huge 
task, which, up until then, had never been fulfilled. The Supreme Electoral 
Commission and Seimas did everything to postpone the vote after the EP elec-
tions and at least temporary to bury the question.
Introduction of the euro and land ownership were obvious topics for the 
EP election campaign. If put on the electoral agenda, they could have made 
an essential impact on the vote results and Lithuania would have followed the 
mainstream European trend of increasing Euro-scepticism. Yet, because of the 
united attempts of all mainstream political parties, as well as favourable cir-
cumstances, the main discussions concerning Europe shifted towards security 
issues. The Ukrainian crisis and Russian aggression in Crimea easily overshad-
owed economic problems. It became possible to present the euro-zone not as 
an economic question, but as security dilemma. Supporters of the referendum 
on land ownership were presented as undercover agents for the separation from 
the EU by the mainstream media. In the face of Russian aggression, any doubts 
about the importance of the EU (or NATO) looked like betrayal. The Baltic 
States had suffered from Russian occupation more than any other countries in 
the EU, hence, their attitudes towards Moscow are often perceived as an over-
reaction. But even after a quarter of a century, the Soviet past remains an im-
portant political factor in Lithuanian politics.
In 2014, the EP elections in Lithuania coincided with the second poll 
of Presidential elections, which are generally valued as the most important 
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national vote. Security problems, even ‘the feeling of the upcoming war’ be-
came the best tools for mobilisation of the voters. Without any doubt, the EP 
elections were overshadowed by the Presidential vote. Both electoral cam-
paigns influenced each other, but with different strength and outcomes.
Electoral calendar and political landscape
If we would look for a single most important factor which influences the 
outcome of elections in Lithuania, the timeline for elections would be the best 
bet. The timing of elections not only dictates the main political topics of the 
campaign, but also determines the voter turnout. A low turnout is highly benefi-
cial for the so called traditional parties, whose roots go back to the struggle for 
Lithuanian independence in the late 1980s and beginning of 1990s. The leading 
right wing party Tėvynės sąjunga-Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai (TS-LKD, 
Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats) inherited traditions of the 
Sąjūdis movement, which played a crucial role in the struggle for indepen-
dence and was the main opponent of local and Russian communists. The lead-
ing party of the left wing Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija (LSDP, Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party) incorporated ex-communists and social democrats 
who recreated their party shortly after restoration of Lithuanian independence. 
These two parties extremely benefit from the stubbornness of their core vot-
ers: the proportion of TS-LKD and LSDP votes dramatically increase in case 
of a low turnout. TS-LKD and LSDP in Lithuania are immune to the conse-
quences of declining voter turnout which could be noticed all over the CEE 
countries. We could even identify some sort of ‘a paradox of democracy’, when 
parties with disciplined voters are not interested in broader public discussions, 
which could boost a higher turnout. Encouraging civic activism becomes a vi-
tal task for smaller political parties which are short of a devoted poll of voters. 
Electoral date and additional questions supplemented to the vote (in the form 
of a referendum) remain a few instruments capable of political manipulation.
Every parliamentary election in the 21st century saw a birth of a new 
political party in Lithuania. In 2000 it was Naujoji Sąjunga-socialliberai (NS, 
New Union–Social Liberals), 2004 saw a rise of DP, in 2008 Tautos prisikėlimo 
partija (TPP, National Revival Party) was created, in 2012 Drąsos kelias 
(DK, The Way of Courage) entered Seimas. From all these newcomers, only 
DP managed to become an established political force. The rise and fall of new 
parties together with ‘pulsation’ of voter turnout is replacing the ‘electoral pen-
dulum’ which was the most important electoral factor in the first decade of 
Lithuanian independence, when in 1992 parliamentary elections did a sharp 
turn to the left, followed by no less sudden turn to the right in 1996. From new 
party creation point of view, there are essential differences between the EP and 
national parliament elections. Victory in the EP elections gives no greater polit-
ical influence on the national political stage. For most new parties, Seimas elec-
tions become the entry point, but the electoral calendar plays its role as well. 
In 2004, the EP elections were a rehearsal for DP just before Seimas elec-
tions, which were held the same year. New born TPP was very successful in the 
2008 Seimas elections, but totally defeated in the EP elections the next year. 
New DK received moderate support in its first electoral attempt on national 
level in 2012, but after two years in Parliament was unable to even register for 
the EP elections.
In the public eyes, the EP elections only provide an opportunity for a 
handful of politicians to get high paid jobs in Brussels. Different parties use 
different strategies to choose their candidates for the election list. In 2004, 
the leading parties - TS-LKD and LSDP - decided to send to the EP their most 
experienced politicians (V. Landsbergis, L. Andrikienė, A. Sakalas, J. Paleckis). 
It is not clear whether these parties consider the job in the EP a promotion, 
honourable pension or political exile. In any case, LSDP logically preserved 
this principle of selection in all the following elections. Meanwhile in 2009 
and 2014, TS-LKD put some new, unknown politicians into the first positions 
of the electoral list. DP, the winners of the first EP elections in 2004, picked un-
known politicians for their electoral list, at the same time, Liberalų demokratų 
partija (now known as Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumas, PTT, Party ‘Order and 
Justice’) recruited a professor of philosophy; while Valstiečių ir Naujosios de-
mokratijos partijų sąjunga (now Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga, LVŽS, 
Lithuanian Peasants and Greens Union) was lead by the chairwoman of the party. 
2009 marked a great shift in favour of parties’ leaders: the chairmen of three 
parties DP, PTT and Lietuvos Lenkų rinkimų akcija (LLRA, Electoral Action of 
Poles in Lithuania) were elected into the EP. A strategy of ‘celebrity promotion’ 
was used by one of the liberal parties, Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis 
(LRLS, Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania), who endorsed a pro-
fessor of philosophy who was simultaneously a TV personality.
Because the EP elections in Lithuania coincide with Presidential vote, 
the second round of Presidential elections, which is held at the same day as the 
EP vote, becomes a crucial factor. If the President is elected in the first round 
(as it happened in 2009), voters do not bother to vote in the EP elections; if the 
votes coincide, they boost the turnout (as in 2004).
Another important question concerns the electoral support for parties 
which are currently in power. The EP elections in 2004 were held half a year 
before Seimas elections and were a boost for a new political force DP. The EP 
elections in 2009 were held just half a year after parliamentary elections, which 
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saw a victory of the right wing and populist parties. A short period between two 
votes was useful for the ruling coalition. As the economic crisis had just begun, 
the first steps of the government were unpopular, but the impact was not widely 
felt. Together with the low turnout, this helped TS-LKD claim the victory of 
the EP elections in 2009. The EP elections were another sign that the ‘electoral 
pendulum’, which usually punishes ruling politicians, is losing its strength. 
It is very complicated to speak about the ideological background of the 
parties in Lithuania. The Left-Right axis in Lithuania lacks traditional socio-
-economic content and even after a quarter of a century brings up Communist-
Anti-Communist discussions from the period of the fight for independence 
[Ramonaitė 2007: 166]. The European context makes the situation even more 
uncomfortable. It is not a problem with the identity of TS-LKD or LSDP: their 
representatives join groups of European People’s Party and the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the EP. But the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe recruited representatives of two very different Lithuanian 
political parties – DP and LRLS (in 2004 LICS, Liberalų ir Centro Sąjunga, 
Liberal and Centre Union). DP is considered to be left wing populists, while 
LRLS is clearly on the right side. The representatives of PTT during different 
terms joined different political groups. But these changes had its logic: PTT in 
2004 was a part of the Union for Europe of the Nations group, later migrated to 
the Europe of Freedom and Democracy, and then to the Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy. The leader of LLRA stayed in the European Conservatives 
and Reformists group for both terms, while representative of LVŽS in 2004 was 
a member of the Union for Europe of the Nations group, but joined the Greens-
European Free Alliance in 2014. However, we should take note, that during this 
period, LVŽS consolidated its powers with part of the Green movement.
Table 1. Lithuanian political parties in the EP. Data Parliamentary Research 
Department, 2014-05-19.
European 
United 
Left/
Nordic 
Green 
Left
Progressive 
Alliance of 
Socialists & 
Democrats
Greens-
European 
Free 
Alliance
Alliance 
of Liberals 
and 
Democrats 
for Europe
European 
People’s 
Party
European 
Conserva-
tives and 
Reformists
Europe of 
Freedom 
and Direct 
Democracy*
Union 
for 
Europe 
of the 
Nations
2004 2 LSDP 5 DP2 LICS 2 TS-LKD
1 PTT
1 LVS**
2009 3 LSDP 1 DP1 LRLS 4 TS-LKD 1 LLRA 2 PTT
2014 2 LSDP 1 LVŽS 1 DP2 LRLS 2 TS-LKD 1 LLRA 2 PTT
* Europe of Freedom and Democracy in 2009; ** became LVŽS in 2014
Election campaign
After the 2009 EP elections, certain changes in Lithuanian laws were 
made and had direct impact on further campaigns. In 2010, the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court decided that the requirements of the electoral law, claiming 
that only political parties can form electoral lists, contradicted the Lithuanian 
Constitution. Lithuanian Seimas passed the changes of the law which created 
an option to form new entities – Electoral Committees. Citizens could join such 
committees, create electoral lists and participate in the EP elections. Such libera-
lisation of electoral laws was followed by changes in the regulation of funding. 
In order to minimise the influence of business on politics, it was decided to in-
crease state support for political parties. Simultaneously, political parties were 
forbidden to receive donations from legal entities; only physical persons‘ sup-
port was allowed. In practice, Electoral Committees were left without options to 
receive any substantial funding and the possibility of their creation and electoral 
success remained highly uncertain. In theory, these changes were designed to 
support democracy and curb political corruption. In practice, the changes favo-
ured existing political parties, reduced possibilities for new political movements, 
and, to some extent, encouraged the conservation of the Lithuanian political sys-
tem, which, even after 25 years of independence, cannot be called a mature one.
On the eve of the EP elections, the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice had 
registered 42 political parties: 11 of them had not met requirements to submit 
a list of their members each year or had already declared intentions to stop ac-
tivity. The remaining parties had a total of 114 147 members, what means that 
about 4.5% of Lithuanian voters had declared their support to one or another 
political group. Only two of the parties had more than 20 thousand members 
(DP and LSDP), another two claimed membership of more than 10 thousand 
(TS-LKD and PTT). Four political parties had more than two thousand mem-
bers (LRLS, LICS, LVŽS, LŽP). A new law, passed in 2013, requires political 
parties to have at least two thousand members. All minor political parties have 
two years (till the end of 2015) to satisfy these new requirements or face cl sure. 
If we consider any elections as an opportunity to increase visibility of the po-
litical party and to boost its membership, the EP elections and local elections in 
2015 were the last chance to do so.
All political parties with more than two thousand members entered the 
electoral race on their own. For the elections, LLRA formed a coalition with the 
party Rusų aljansas (RA, Russian Alliance), while DK, which was born just before 
2012 parliamentary elections failed to collect 10 thousand signatures of support-
ers, required by electoral law was not registered for the elections. From the minor 
political parties, only Tautininkų sąjunga (TS, National Union), with 16 hundred 
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members, decided to take part in the elections and managed to collect 10 thousand 
signatures supporting their bid. The attempts by extreme left wing Socialistinis 
liaudies Frontas (SLF, Socialist People’s Front) and populist Liaudies partija (LP, 
Peoples party) failed. There were two attempts by the Electoral Committees to 
enter the race, but both failed on different stages of their activities.
It is rather complicated to speak about the programmes of 10 political 
parties which entered the electoral race, as well as about the issues raised in 
discussions. Presidential electoral agenda was the moving force of both elec-
tions; and the escape from genuine European problems as well as concentration 
on security questions and Russian aggression were the most important features 
of campaigning. 
In most political campaigns, party programmes remain out of reach of 
the ordinary voters. The ideas are interpreted and commented by the media; 
the rank and file are influenced by a mixture of these interpretations. To some 
extent, the most authentic ways of self-expression of the parties are the slogans, 
i.e. the most important messages politicians would like to send to their constit-
uencies. A brief analysis of the slogans used by Lithuanian political parties in 
2014 EP elections allow us to notice a few interesting things. 
Eight out of ten Lithuanian parties used one or two geographical names 
in their slogans (Europe, Lithuania, or both). It would be too bold to make pre-
cise conclusions from these observations (picture 1). We could presume that 
mentioning only Lithuania in their election slogans shows more nationalistic 
attitudes of PTT and LVŽS, or that no geographical names in the slogans of 
LŽP and LSDP is a sign of open-mindedness. Geographical names in political 
slogans of the EP elections could serve as a map, which shows the routes of po-
litical parties on their trips to the ‘hearts and souls’ of the voters. In this case, 
it is clear that the Coalition’s target is the Polish and Russian speaking voter; 
for DP the accent on Europe helps escape some uncomfortable questions (their 
leader is ethnic Russian). It is worth to notice, that all parties with overlapping 
voters tried to choose different geographical names (LSDP and DP; LICS and 
LRLS; LŽP and LVŽS).
The words signifying certain values in the slogans of the election cam-
paign could develop into an even a more useful instrument for identification 
of the orientation of political parties. In picture 2, we have grouped these ‘value 
words’ in four categories: up-left concentrating on Success (Security, Strength, 
Action, Victory), up-right on Materialism (Prosperity, Money, Cleanness), bot-
tom-left is centred on Locality (Nation, Home, Land, Human), and bottom-right 
on Universality (Rights, Equality, Everybody, Christianity). Of course, this iden-
tification of values is highly conditional. But a few interesting features could be 
mentioned. LICS was the only party which diversified its electoral message into 
three out of four categories: was speaking about money, home and everybody. 
Besides other important factors (after 2012 Seimas elections, LICS had no repre-
sentatives in the parliament for the first time, the party was losing the fight with 
LRLS for the votes of the liberal minded population) such electoral tactics of 
‘catch them all’ could have contributed to the defeat in the EP elections. DP was 
the only party which packed its electoral slogan into two categories, all the other 
parties concentrated into one field. It is interesting to mention, that the topics 
promoted by TS-LKD and LRLS – Security, Strength, Action, Victory – were 
in the centre of presidential campaign of incumbent president D. Grybauskaitė.
Picture 1. Key geographical names in official slogans of Lithuanian political 
parties participating in 2014 EP elections
Picture 2. The key words in official slogans of Lithuanian political parties par-
ticipating in 2014 EP elections
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Electoral tactics of political parties in the 2014 EP elections should also 
be considered in the context of presidential elections. We could identify two 
main models (support of incumbent president or competition), but the models 
have some interesting variations, for different political parties’ application of 
these models brought very different results.
Two most influential right wing parties, which, until 2012, were in the 
government and during the EP elections remained in the opposition – TS-LKD 
and LRLS – decided to support incumbent president D. Grybauskaitė and did 
not evoke candidates of their own. Grybauskaitė’s electoral tactics were based 
on alienating herself from any political party; she presented herself as independ-
ent. Such a situation complicated positions of conservatives and liberals. As all 
the attention was concentrated on the presidential campaign, TS-LKD and LRLS 
lost chances to increase their visibility and to present their agenda to the voters. 
However, as the main theme of D. Grybauskaitė electoral campaign was mobili-
sation against Russian aggression, TS-LKD felt extremely comfortable with the 
topic, as patriotism remains the distinctive feature of this party’s identity.
TS-LKD decided to use an electoral trick which, to some extent, could be 
classified under ‘the false name’ category. ‘The father of Lithuanian independence’ 
V. Landsbergis had always been one of the greatest electoral assets of TS-LKD. 
He is now in his eighties and, after two terms in the EP, V. Landsbergis decided not 
to participate in elections any more. TS-LKD recruited V. Landsbergis’ grandson, 
Gabrielius, to be on the list. A young man without any political experience was con-
sidered to be a strange and risky choice [Navickas 2014]. However, the traditional 
conservative electorate warmly welcomed the new politician and he finished the 
race in first place of the party’s list (originally G. Landsbergis was third). For TS-
LKD, the best outcome of presidential elections would have been D. Grybauskaitė’s 
victory in the first round. In such case they could expect a repeated 2009 scenario: 
low turnout in the EP elections gives extra opportunities for traditional parties.
Although LRLS supported D. Grybauskaitė’s presidential bid, they were 
highly interested in two rounds of presidential elections. An increased turnout 
would have attracted more voters who could have chosen neither TS-LKD nor 
LSDP. LRLS was inspired by its success five years ago, and expected to go on 
with the consolidation of the liberal electorate and focus on younger urban voters. 
In order to achieve their aims, LRLS tried to replicate their old tactics and recruited 
a well-known businessman A. Guoga as number two of their list, which was led by 
ex-minister for education G. Steponavičius. The ranking of the party list (A. Guoga 
finished first), showed how liberal voters love celebrities and despise politicians.
Other political parties tried to combine the presidential and the EP elec-
toral campaigns. The most successful in this model was Coalition lead by 
LLRA. In principle, they used the same strategy, which was very effective five 
years ago: the leader of the party, V. Tomaševski, was nominated as a presiden-
tial candidate with no chances of success. However, the very fact of his par-
ticipation helped mobilize the Polish speaking voters. With the turnout as low 
as it was in 2009, this easily gave him a seat in the EP. In 2014, the task was 
much more complicated, as the second poll of the presidential vote was near-
ly inevitable as well as the higher turnout in the EP elections. V. Tomaševski 
could not be sure that the same tactics would lead to the same success twice in 
a row. So LLRA formed a coalition with RA. Before, such coalitions were frag-
ile. Since there are more active Polish than Russian voters in Lithuania, after 
ranking, Polish politicians usually won the seats and the Russians left empty 
handed. However, after the 2012 parliamentary elections, a few Polish candi-
dates declined to enter the Seimas and the leader of RA became a MP, the mood 
changed and the coalition partners gained more trust in each other.
The most contradictory combination of the two election campaigns was 
chosen by the leading party of the governing coalition, LSDP. Prime Minister 
A. Butkevičius declined the offer to participate in presidential elections. 
At the time he was the most popular LSDP politician with modest chances to win 
the presidency. The party nominated MEP Z. Balčytis as the presidential candi-
date; he was simultaneously assigned to lead the party list in the EP elections. 
In the LLRA case such a strategy and the logic of a ‘double candidate’ was very 
clear to the supporters. For the LSDP, the same strategy brought a lot of misun-
derstanding, which translated into an awkward situation and possible losses for 
the EP elections. Z. Balčytis succeeded to win the second place in the first poll of 
presidential elections and participated in the second. But being on two separate 
ballots in the same election raised difficult questions about Z. Balčytis preferenc-
es: was he eager to become the president or a MEP? Z. Balčytis lost the presiden-
tial elections, the voters ranked him down from the first place in the party list to 
the second, but in any case, he succeeded ant became MEP for the second time.
Similar electoral combinations were on the agenda of PTT and LŽP, 
but their nominees were excluded from the participation in presidential elec-
tions. The leader of PTT, R. Paksas, was president of Lithuania in 2003-2004, 
but was impeached and barred from any office where he has to take an oath for 
the Republic of Lithuania. MEP remained the highest political position avail-
able for R. Paksas and he was elected in 2009. The lifetime ban from elected of-
fice for R. Paksas was ruled as illegal by the European Court of Human Rights 
in 2011, and Lithuania was obliged to change the law, but had not met this com-
mitment. Despite the fact that the party, led by R. Paksas (PTT), participated in 
the ruling coalition, attempts to make last minute changes of the Constitution to 
enable R. Paksas to participate in presidential elections failed; PTT decided not 
to nominate another presidential candidate.
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The Supreme Electoral Commission refused to register the leader of LŽP 
L. Balsys as a candidate for president. LŽP managed to collect 20 411 signatures 
in support of the leader’s presidential bid, but part of the signatures were de-
clared invalid. The former adviser to the incumbent president D. Grybauskaitė 
and current MP L. Balsys remained on the top of the party list in the EP elec-
tions. However, LŽP lost the opportunity to show up in presidential debates, 
which significantly decreased its visibility.
DP and LVŽS participated in both elections, but the DP more and the 
LVŽS less actively tried to separate their campaigns. DP presidential candidate 
A. Paulauskas was not on the EP electoral list, his presidential campaign had little 
correlation with the party EP campaign. In comparison with other large political 
parties, DP electoral campaigns could be characterised as the most profession-
al. DP hires expensive foreign consultants; their campaigns have precise targets, 
are well funded and managed. It’s hard to escape the impression that the leaders of 
DP considered the 2014 EP elections of secondary importance. As the leaders of 
the party were on trial for financial manipulations, the founder of DP, V. Uspaskich, 
needed parliamentary immunity. These modest, but selfish, intentions were unable 
to build a sufficient motivation for a successful election campaign.
LVŽS strength lies in rural regions: this party is more represented in lo-
cal politics, so a combination of the presidential and the EP elections became a 
good opportunity to present themselves as a national political force. The leader 
of the party, R. Karbauskis, led the electoral list; the second position was left 
for party presidential candidate B. Ropė. Due to moderate chances of success in 
presidential elections and modest prospects in the EP elections, this tandem was 
the best decision for the party. B. Ropė’s participation in presidential debates 
helped the party increase their visibility. To some extend this electoral strategy 
resembles LLRA case. When R. Karbauskis refused to enter the EP in favour of 
B. Ropė, it was quite understandable to the supporters of the party.
The two parties which were considered as the outsiders in the EP elec-
tions tried to replicate the mainstream strategy of connecting two electoral cam-
paigns. But for different reasons TS and LICS were unable to succeed. TS was 
the weakest participant in the elections: it had no representatives in the parlia-
ment and lacked state funding which, after changes of party financing laws, be-
came an important factor of success. TS ties with the presidential candidate MP 
N. Puteikis were not officially exposed. TS and N. Puteikis helped each oth-
er with the collection of signatures supporting their electoral bids, openly ex-
pressed sympathy to the upcoming referendum on land ownership, which was 
ignored by the other political parties. TS received nearly six times fewer votes 
than N. Puteikis in the first poll of the presidential election, but nearly doubled 
in comparison with the 2012 Seimas elections.
The 2014 EP elections could be the last for the LICS. In 2009, the party 
had already begun losing its position as the center of liberal electorate, when 
another liberal party (LRLS) managed to get twice as many votes. Participation 
in the government and unconditional support for president D. Grybauskaitė 
in the 2012 parliamentary elections became a handicap for LICS. The former 
leader of the party, A. Zuokas, entered the presidential race independently, but 
it remained unclear how either side could benefit from this ‘silent coalition’.
Election results
The results of the 2014 EP elections in Lithuania were unexpected and 
inspired passionate public discussions about the actual winners. The results pro-
voked the political instinct to claim victory even in the case of defeat. The iden-
tification of the winner was confusing due to the even division of votes: 4 par-
ties received 2 MEP seats each; 3 parties got 1 seat and 3 parties received zero. 
But the main factors which aggravated the identification of the winner, were soci-
ological forecasts, which predicted unexpectedly good results for the ruling par-
ties. LSDP was nearly positive of the victory and even planed personal chang-
es in the government as some key figures were expected to leave for Brussels. 
The difference between expectations (the first place and 30% of votes) and real-
ity (the second place and 17.26% of votes) was a shock for LSDP and a great joy 
for TS-LDK, who received 2 thousand votes more than LSDP and, despite los-
ing half of their seats in the EP, spoke of ‘success’. The situation prompted one of 
the leaders of LSDP, G. Kirkilas, to put all the responsibility on sociologists and 
declare, that “our sociologists are becoming participants of electoral campaigns” 
[Samoškaitė, 2014-05-26]. To some extent this is correct: in Lithuania, sociologi-
cal data has not become a valuable instrument for strategic decisions, but is used as 
a propaganda argument or to help construct ‘self-fulfilling forecast’. However, the 
results are to be blamed on the politicians, not sociologists [Žinių radijas 2014].
There were no problems with the identification of the winners in all previ-
ous EP elections. In 2004, DP became a clear leader with 5 seats and more than 
30% of votes, in 2009 TS-LKD claimed victory with 4 seats and nearly 27% of 
the votes. In 2014, no party received more than 18% of votes and the more rational 
evaluation of the outcome is revealed by analyzing the changes of the MEP seats 
gained (or lost) compared with the 2009 EP elections. Two traditionally largest 
political parties representing right (TS-LKD) and left (LSDP) came in first and re-
ceived a nearly equal shares of votes (17%), thus 2 seats in the EP. But it was a loss 
of half (for TS-LKD) or a third (for LSDP) of their representation in the EP. Three 
political parties (PTT, LLRA, DP) retained status qua, while LRLS doubled their 
number of MEP (from 1 to 2) and LVŽS regained a seat in the EP after five years.
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Without a clear impact on national politics, the EP elections could be 
considered as a test of trust for the incumbent government. As parliamentary 
elections are held in Lithuania every 4 years and the EP elections every 5 years, 
the time gap between the two votes has an impact as well: the less time passed 
after national elections, the better results governing parties can expect. In 2004, 
the EP elections were held three and a half years after Seimas election, the ru-
ling coalition suffered hard defeat and a new born DP gained victory. In 2009, 
the time gap between national and the EP elections was only half a year, the out-
come of elections was much better for the ruling parties. That year, members of 
the governing coalition, the short lived populist TPP was defeated, but the core 
ruling party, TS-LKD, gained victory. In 2014, the governing coalition was 
1.5 years old and did much better than the opposition parties for the first time. 
However, we should note that in 2014, no new-born political party participated 
in the elections, and it is also important to note that the governing coalition was 
unusually vast. 
Conclusions: short time impact or long lasting tendencies
Five weeks after the EP elections, the Referendum on land ownership 
was held in Lithuania. Under the turnout of less than 15%, the vote was declared 
invalid, as Lithuanian laws require the minimum turnout of 50%. The Supreme 
Electoral Commission and Seimas did everything to separate the referendum 
from the EP and presidential elections. This separation of referendum from EP 
elections and the connection of the EP vote with the second poll of presidential 
elections were the most important factors which determined the character and 
outcomes of the vote. We could presume that without ‘support’ of presidential 
elections the real turnout in Lithuanian EP elections could be about 15-20% in-
stead of the actual 46.35%. The situation in Lithuania reminds of Slovakia, where 
presidential elections are held just before the EP elections and Slovak voters do 
not bother to come to the polls for the third time in a few weeks. The rise of voter 
turnout in 2014, in comparison to the 2009 EP elections is an illusion; in ten years 
the EP elections in Lithuania became a routine political act, traditional Lithuanian 
Euro-optimism is more a mood than an active civic position.
The Lithuanian media noticed that the ordinariness of the election in 
Lithuania is unique in the context of the EU, where Euro-scepticism is gaining 
power [ELTA 2014]. The domination of traditional parties and failure of extreme 
and populist forces was presented as a welcome outcome of the elections [BNS 
2014]. Such observations please the governing establishment and simultaneously 
help mask the emerging contradictions inside the society. The European project 
becomes more and more elitist, and as the 2014 EP elections in Lithuania showed 
One important outcome of the elections was evident even before the 
vote: compared with previous votes there were fewer registered electoral lists. 
Only 10 lists competed in 2014, while in 2009 there were 15 electoral lists and 
12 lists in 2004. In 2014 only 7.04% of the votes ‘were lost’: the share of the 
voters whose support to political parties was not translated into MEP seats dra-
matically decreased. In 2009 and 2004, 15.31% and 17.36% votes were cast for 
parties which had not gained participation in the EP.
Picture 3. Lithuanian representatives in EP.
2004 (13 seats – inner circle); 2009 (12 seats – middle circle); 2014 (11 seats – outer circle)
* in 2004 participated as TS; ** in 2004 participated as LICS; *** in 2004 participated as 
LDP; **** in 2004 participated as LLRA & LRS Coalition, in 2009 as LLRA
Picture 4. Results of EP elections in Lithuania. Balance between governing 
and opposition parties
* 2004 – LSDP; NS; 2009 – TS-LKD, LICS, LRLS, TPP; 2014 - LSDP, DP, PTT, LLRA; ** 
2004 – DP (new party), TS, LICS (LRLS), PTT (LDP); LVŽS (LVNDPS); 2009 – LSDP, 
DP, PTT, LLRA, LVŽS (LVLS); 2014 – TS-LKD, LRLS, LVŽS; *** 2004 – including 
LLRA; 2014 – including LICS
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in order to get popular support the established political parties are turning away 
from European problems and returning to old discussions which remind of the 
two decade old debates about national security and Russian threats. The victory 
against Euro-scepticism and populism in Lithuania was achieved at the cost of 
broadening the gap between political elites and ordinary voters.
In recent years we can observe certain attempts of the established parties 
to preserve the existing political system in Lithuania, to create artificial obstacles 
for establishing new political parties or movements. The 2014 EP elections saw 
the further steps in this direction. Formal relaxation of the rules for participation 
in the EP elections was inactivated by the tightening of financial restrictions on 
political campaigns. In Lithuania we can observe a situation when political par-
ties are losing the interest to appeal for broader audiences; politicians are concen-
trating their attention on their core voters. The most important political challenge 
is the encouragement of your voters’ participation; in this situation manipulations 
of electoral calendar becomes the principal method of political contest.
The ranking of party electoral lists remains one of a few channels for the 
voters to send their direct messages to politicians. All four parties which gained 
two seats in the EP saw important changes in their party electoral lists after the 
voters’ ranking. In most cases, this influenced the personal distribution of MEP 
seats. The fact that after unexpected ranking into the second place of PTT list 
Minister of Environment V. Mazuronis decided to resign and choose the MEP 
seat instead of the important government job and leading position inside the 
party, is only an example how Lithuanian politicians value comfortable work-
ing conditions of MEP.
If we consider the EP elections as an important attempt to create a uni-
fied European political sphere, Lithuanian vote results did not support this illu-
sion. The electoral campaign was highly concentrated on national topics, with-
out any doubt, the EP elections lost the competition to the presidential vote 
even before the beginning of campaigning. Strategic decisions and steps by 
political parties in the EP elections were subordinated to the presidential vote. 
The 2014 EP elections in Lithuania revealed a fact that is clear in most ‘old 
members’ of the EU: the European project needs new stimulus. This stimulus 
should have a popular appeal. It is difficult to speak about the future of a united 
Europe if this union only makes the materialistic dreams of professional politi-
cians and bureaucrats come true.
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Annex: 
Table 1. Lithuanian political parties mentioned in the article
Abbreviation Lithuanian name English translation
DK Drąsos kelias The Way of Courage
DP Darbo partija Labour Party
LICS Liberalų ir Centro Sąjunga Liberal and Centre Union
LLRA Lietuvos Lenkų rinkimų akcija Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania
LP Liaudies partija Peoples party
LRLS Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania
LSDP Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
LVŽS
Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga
(earlier Valstiečių ir Naujosios demo-
kratijos partijų sąjunga)
Lithuanian Peasants and Greens Union
NS Naujoji Sąjunga-socialliberai New Union–Social Liberals
PTT Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumas(earlierLiberalų demokratų partija) Party ‚Order and Justice’
RA Rusų aljansas Russian Alliance
SLF Socialistinis liaudies Frontas Socialist People’s Front
TPP Tautos prisikėlimo partija National Revival Party
TS Tautininkų sąjunga National Union
TS-LKD Tėvynės sąjunga-Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai
Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian 
Democrats
Abstract:
The 2014 European elections in Romania represented a test for the poli-
tical parties preparing for the presidential elections at the end of the same year. 
Firstly, we analyze the political context in which the European elections took 
place. Since 2012 the changing governing coalitions have created an unstable 
party system with many politicians shifting party allegiances. Several high ran-
king party officials were considered suspicious for corruption acts and this affec-
ted the nomination of candidates. Secondly, we show that although the ideolo-
gical allegiance of citizens and political parties increased since 2012, the match 
between policy preferences of political party and their supporters continues to be 
remarkably low. Finally we discuss several effects of the European elections, in-
cluding difficulties in appointing candidates and creating electoral coalitions for 
the presidential elections encountered by the center right wing parties. 
Key words:
EP election 2014, party system, Romania, political competition, European 
Parliament
Introduction
Romanian politicians and analysts viewed the 2014 European Election 
as an important test before the presidential elections at the end of the same 
year. One important consequence was that the main political parties postponed 
the nomination of a presidential candidate until after the European elections. 
Another outcome was that many of the policy issues that filled the European 
agenda, such as debates on Euro skepticism, on European integration, freedom 
of movement, and imposing economic sanctions on Russia, were much less vi-
sible than topics linked to internal politics. The left wing political parties were 
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concerned to obtain sufficient support to win presidential elections in the first 
round after the liberals decided to leave the governing coalition. Right wing po-
litical parties were confronted with the creation of a new political party, a splin-
ter of the main opposition party, an organization that is supported by president 
Basescu, the main opposition figure of the government. This article presents 
several key aspects of the party system and political situation Romania that 
shaped the electoral campaign and influenced the results of the 2014 European 
Elections. It will describe the main political parties and electoral alliances, fun-
ding resources and strategies of the political actors, with a focus on ideological 
stances of the parties and of their voters. We will evaluate the extent that certain 
policy preferences differentiated between party attachments during the campa-
ign of the 2014 European elections by using data collected by a EU-wide vo-
ting advice application (VAA). The final section discusses the main outcomes 
of these elections on the Romanian politics.
Party Mappings in Romania
Romania had a continuous decrease in the number of successful politi-
cal competitors in Parliamentary elections: 16 in 1990, 7 in 1992, 6 in 1996, 
5 in 2000, 4 in 2004, 4 in 2008, and 4 in 2012. At the same time, the number of 
entries in the Romanian party system was very small. 
The main Romanian political parties are the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD), the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the National Liberal Party (PNL), 
the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and the Greater 
Romania Party (PRM). A short description of each will follow below.
The Social Democratic Party (PSD) is the largest Romanian party in 
the post-communist period. It is one of the two successors of the Romanian 
Communist Party and the direct continuator of the Iliescu-wing of the National 
Salvation Front (FSN). After the 1992 National Convention of FSN, when 
P. Roman became its new president, the supporters of the country’s President, 
Ion Iliescu, left FSN to form a new party, FDSN (later called PDSR and PSD). 
The Democratic Liberal Party, PDL (formerly called ‘Democratic Party’ 
– PD until late 2007) is the other direct successor of the National Salvation 
Front (FSN). After a decade-long affiliation with the Socialist International, 
PD/PDL has become a member of the European People’s Party in 2006.
The National Liberal Party (PNL) is the only historical party reestabli-
shed in 1990 that managed to survive as a parliamentary party until the current 
legislature.
The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) is an ethnic 
party which reunites different organizations representing approximately 1.4 million 
ethnic Hungarians in Romania. UDMR has been present in all the post-communist 
parliaments and in all governments formed since 1996, except for one year betwe-
en 2008 and 2009 and for two years between April 2012 and February 2014.
The Greater Romania Party (PRM) is run by V. Tudor since its begin-
ning and reached a peak of popular support at the 2000 elections, when it re-
ceived the second largest share of votes. However, in 2008 and 2012 the party 
failed to gain parliamentary representation.
The main electoral coalitions in Romania were CDR, USD, DA, USD 
and ARD. CDR was formed in 1992 and consisted in several political parties: 
PNȚCD, PNL, PSDR, PER, PAC, UDMR, PNLCD, PNL-AT, FER, and ci-
vic organizations Partidul Unității Democratice, Uniunea Democrat-Creștină, 
Alianța Civică, Asociația Foștilor Deținuți Politici din România, Solidaritatea 
Universitară, Asociația 21 Decembrie, Mișcarea România Viitoare, Sindicatul 
Politic „Fraternitatea”, Uniunea Mondială a Românilor Liberi. In 1996, CDR 
had a slightly different structure: a group of parties--PNȚCD, PNL, PSDR, 
PER, PAC, UDMR, PNLCD, PNL-AT, FER--, and one of civic organizations-
--Partidul Unității Democratice, Uniunea Democrat-Creștină, Alianța Civică, 
Asociația Foștilor Deținuți Politici din România, Solidaritatea Universitară, 
Asociația 21 Decembrie, Mișcarea România Viitoare, Sindicatul Politic 
„Fraternitatea”, Uniunea Mondială a Românilor Liberi.
USD was established in 1995 and was formed by two political parties: 
PD and PSDR. DA, formed in 2004, was an alliance between PNL and PD. USL, 
established in 2012, was the alliance between PSD, PNL and PC. ARD (Just 
Romania Alliance) was an electoral alliance formed between the Democratic 
Liberal Party, the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party, the Civic Force 
and supported by the Centre-Right Civic Initiative and other NGOs.
Funding resources and strategies
Parties in Central and Eastern Europe have traditionally been short of 
financial resources, which many of them tried to compensate by semi-legal 
and illegal funding practices, including the capture of the state and the media 
[Gherghina, Chiru, Bertoa 2011]. Most of the post-communist political parties 
rely on state subventions for their funding [Ikstens et al. 2002; van Biezen 2003; 
Lewis 2008]. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia parties are 
highly subsidized by the state [Smilov, Toplak 2007], whereas in Romania it 
amounts to considerably less [Gherghina, Chiru, Bertoa 2011]. The Romanian 
parties have developed tools to obtain state resources for electoral purposes. 
These practices include: partisan tailored transfers of money from the govern-
ment to own constituencies prior to elections; relying on large-scale patronage to 
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reward party sponsors and activists; as well as making state agencies contribute 
indirectly to campaign funds under the guise of workshops [Gherghina, Chiru, 
Bertoa 2011]. Party financing in Romania gradually evolved from very general 
provisions valid for the first post-communist elections from 1990 to very speci-
fic regulations applicable in the 2008 parliamentary elections. 
Migration of legislators
Since 1990, elected legislators moving from one party to another was si-
gnificant and has da a gradual increase. Party switching by individual represen-
tatives altered the party system and the internal life and logic of party functio-
ning. In several occasions, party defectors created new parties and made others 
disappear, or helped forming of new political majorities. In the 1990-1992 legi-
slature, party switching in both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate was 
a minor phenomenon and primarily affected the dominant party, FSN/National 
Salvation Front, which lost eighteen deputies and twelve senators by the end of 
the legislature. The following legislatures were more noteworthy in this respect, 
especially in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, during the 1996-2000 legi-
slature, when 91 members (out of 332) switch parties [Marian 2013]. One re-
ason that favored migration of party members is the weak ideological basis of 
the parties, which prevented most of those who moved along the left-right axis 
to be significantly penalized by the voters. 
The importance of left-right placement
The left-right cleavage has proven highly salient among the voters of long-
standing democracies. More than 80 percent of Western European voters can po-
sition themselves along a left-right scale [Fuchs, Klingemann 1990], and most 
also can position the parties. The prevailing assertion [Downs 1957] is that voters 
tend to vote the political party that resides the least ideological distance from their 
own identified location. The empirical evidence generally supports this claim, re-
vealing that ideological congruence between individuals and parties is a strong 
predictor of the vote [Klingemann 1995]. Despite changes in voter preferences 
and party structures over time, the simple continuum of left-and-right continues 
to provide an efficient vehicle of communication in the long-standing democra-
cies, linking political parties and their prospective voters [Sum, Badescu 2008]. 
The newly democratized nations of Eastern Europe do not share the same 
historical development of political parties. Traditional social cleavages and or-
ganizational networks were destroyed under communism. In most, political 
parties were not prominent during the 1989 revolution or during the period 
of constitutional construction that followed immediately after. As they emer-
ged out of an unstructured political space, Eastern European parties tended to 
be centralized institutionally and state-dependent, with weak social bases and 
low linkage to the populace [Lewis 2000; Kopecky 2008; Saarts 2011]. Yet the 
number of effective parties gradually stabilized and ideological stances solidi-
fied. Personalized parties lost prominence relative to more value-driven ones. 
Parties positioned themselves in spatially, associated with ideological blocs in 
the European Parliament, and competed with increasing strategic skill. Studies 
appear to confirm the relevance of left-right discourse for the new democracies 
of Eastern Europe. It is reflected in the appeals of the main political parties, 
the ideological self-positioning of voters, and the party preferences expressed 
through votes cast. Although the degree of attachment is less than in Western 
Europe, alignment along the left-right axis serves as “an important simplifier 
of partisan alignments in post-communist party competition” [Kitschelt et al. 
1995: 203; Badescu, Sum 2005; Sum, Badescu 2008]. Romania has one of 
the lowest proportions of people who place themselves on a left-right scale 
(Table 1), and also one of the weakest correlations between ideological distance 
to parties and party preferences [Sum, Badescu 2008]. 
Table 1. Percentage Who Do Not Place Themselves on a LR Scale
Taiwan (2004) 0.56
Kyrgyzstan (2005) 0.51
Romania (2004) 0.44
Slovenia (2004) 0.40
Italy (2006) 0.37
Russia (2004) 0.34
Mexico (2003) 0.28
Great Britain (2005) 0.27
Brazil (2002) 0.25
Hong Kong (2004) 0.24
New Zealand (2002) 0.24
Poland (2001) 0.23
Ireland (2002) 0.22
Australia (2004) 0.18
Peru (2006) 0.17
Korea (2004) 0.17
Portugal (2005) 0.16
United States (2004) 0.14
Spain (2004) 0.12
Chile (2005) 0.12
Canada (2004) 0.11
Iceland (2003) 0.10
Belgium (2003) 0.10
Finland (2003) 0.10
Hungary (2002) 0.09
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Bulgaria (2001) 0.09
Czech Republic (2002) 0.08
Germany (2002 Mail-Back) 0.08
Albania (2005) 0.06
Philippines (2004) 0.06
Germany (2002 Telephone) 0.06
Israel (2003) 0.05
Norway (2001) 0.05
Switzerland (2003) 0.05
Sweden (2002) 0.04
Denmark (2001) 0.04
France (2002) 0.04
Netherlands (2002) 0.02
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Studies Surveys.
When measures of individual left-right self-placement in Romania are 
compared across time, they show no systematic change between 1991 and 
2011, and then, a sudden increase of the proportion of those placing themselves 
on the scale (Table 2). 
Table 2. Individual Left-Right Self-Placement
(Lower Numbers = Further Left; Higher Numbers = Further Right)
Left         Right
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK/NA
1991 - 1.0% 2.2% 5.0% 10.1% 21.0% 11.9% 7.7% 4.3% 2.5% 1.3% 33.0%
1996 3.4% 0.8% 1.4% 2.4% 2.9% 20.3% 5.8% 6.4% 7.1% 2.1% 10.6% 36.7%
2003 - 2.0% 2.0% 4.6% 8.2% 5.0% 2.9% 3.4% - - - 71.9%
2004 0.6% 1.5% 2.3% 5.7% 4.8% 13.4% 6.7% 7.4% 6.3% 3.9% 3.3% 44.2%
2006 - 3.3% 2.1% 5.5% 4.1% 13.2% 11.5% 5.5% 6.5% 3.2% 5.9% 39.2%
2007a - 3.1% 2.1% 2.9% 3.5% 15.5% 6.6% 4.1% 6.3% 2.5% 3.7% 49.8%
2007b - 4.2% 2.2% 5.1% 5.2% 14.7% 10.2% 5.1% 6.2% 2.0% 3.8% 41.4%
2009 3.9% 3.6% 2.3% 3.2% 2.9% 16.9% 4.9% 4.9% 5.7% 3.5% 5.4% 42.9%
2011 - 4.8% 3.2% 5.1% 4.4% 16.5% 4.9% 4.2% 3.8% 1.8% 4.6% 46.6%
2012 3.2% 4.0% 5.2% 6.3% 5.5% 24.5% 6.5% 6.4% 4.8% 2.7% 5.5% 25.5%1
Source:
1991 – United States Information Agency survey, Romania Module, October. (1-10)
1996 – Comparative Study of Electoral Systems/CSES, Romania Module. (0-10)
2003 – Public Opinion Barometer, Romania, October. Soros Foundation Romania. (1-7)
2004 – Comparative Study of Electoral Systems/CSES, November. Romania Module. (0-10)
2006 – Public Opinion Barometer, Romania, October. Soros Foundation Romania. (1-10)
2007a – Public Opinion Barometer, Romania, May. Soros Foundation Romania. (1-10)
2007b – Public Opinion Barometer, Romania, October.Soros Foundation Romania. (1-10)
2009 – Romanian Electoral Surveys, Presidential Elections Set. Soros Foundation Romania. (0-10)
2011 – Romanian Electoral Surveys, Soros Foundation Romania. (1-10)
2012 -- Ce-Re & CSD Survey. (0-10)
1 A survey conducted in October 2012 by IRESCOP found an even lower proportion of those 
who do not place themselves, 22%.
The European elections in Romania
The electoral system is based on proportional representation having the 
entire country as one electoral district. There is an electoral threshold of 5%. 
First a national electoral coefficient is computed, which is the division betwe-
en the valid votes and the number of European parliament seats allocated for 
Romania. To win a seat, independent candidates have to achieve that specific 
quota of votes. Secondly, the d’Hondt method is used for the transformation of 
votes into seats.
Table 3. European elections in Romanian - elections results
   2007   2009   2014 
PSD-UNPR-PC  23.11%  31.07%  37.60%
PNL   13.44%  14.52%  15.00%
PDL   28.81%  29.71%  12.23%
UDMR   5.58%  8.92%  6.30%
PMP   -   -  6.21%
LászlóTőkés  3.44%  -  - 
Elena Basescu  -  4.22%  - 
Mircea Diaconu  -  -  6.81%
Source: Romanian electoral data [http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/romanianelectoraldata].
Parties participating in the 2014 EP elections
The international membership of the Romanian parties preceded the 
country integration in the EU in 2007. In 1996 the Democratic Party (PD), 
the successor of the National Salvation Front (FSN) and predecessor of the 
Democrat Liberal Party (PDL), became member of the Socialist International. 
In 2005 the party joined the European People’s Party group. In 2007 UDMR/
RMDSZ (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) joined the same 
European parliamentary group. PNL (National Liberal Party) adhered to the 
International Liberal in 1999 and to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrat 
for Europe (ALDE) after Romania joined the EU. PSD (Social Democratic 
Party) became fully affiliated to the Socialist International and to the Party of 
European Socialists (as an observer) in 2005. Next, we present brief descrip-
tions of the Romanian political parties programs for the 2014 EP elections.
PSD (Partidul Social Democrat – Social Democratic Party). The party 
emphasizes the importance of a mixed economy, protecting the workers, con-
sumers and the small entrepreneurs, an extensive and complex social protection 
network, progressive taxation, public education and healthcare systems, minimal 
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wages and social rights for the workers. In terms of public policies, the USL go-
vernment, having PSD as a major coalition partner and a PSD prime-minister, 
Victor Ponta, restored the wages cut by the previous PDL government, adjusted 
the pensions with a percentage in accordance with the inflation rate, re-opened 
17 hospitals and began the process of employment for 4.000 positions in the he-
althcare system, reversing the budgetary cuts imposed on medical care by the 
former government; it also reinstituted a system of subventions for the agricul-
ture. These measures strained the national budget. In accordance to the IMF, 
the government promised to cover half of the bank credit installments of the in-
solvent borrowers with lower incomes in order to encourage the consumption 
(a decision criticized for being rather in the favor of the bank instead of the deb-
tors) and to support with credits the companies which create at least 20 new jobs. 
On the political agenda, PSD emphasized that the agriculture was a prio-
rity. Although 2012 and 2013 were years with good agricultural crops the acqu-
isition prices for raw products from the farmers remained prohibitively low 
compared to their expenses, and the situation was not reflected positively on 
the food market. The VAT for bread was reduced from 24% to 9%. Another as-
sumed priority, the energy market, who’s independence from the external sup-
pliers was to be obtained, remained a long-term objective, pending upon natu-
ral gas and oil extraction technologies (from the resources recently discovered 
on the continental platform of the Black Sea) not yet available to Romania. 
Other macro-economic measures regarded the continuation of the privatiza-
tion of the state-owned companies (CFR – the national railways system, Poşta 
Română – the national postal service). The PSD-led government aimed at im-
proving the transport infrastructure that lacks motorways.
PNL (Partidul Naţional Liberal – National Liberal Party). This par-
ty focuses in its official documents on need to strengthen the rule of law, the se-
paration of powers, the individual freedom and rights, to promote dialogue 
and tolerance, pluralism, diversity. In addition, it emphasizes on the individual, 
the economic freedom and the importance of the middle class, the free initiative 
and the entrepreneurship for the economy and for the society proper. The sti-
pulated non-interventionism and anti-centralism does not point nevertheless 
towards a minimal state, but rather towards a functional state: “The liberalism 
does not reject neither the social responsibility of the state, nor its responsibility 
to provide qualitative public services [for the citizens] as a consequence of the 
‘social contract’ between the state and the citizens”. 
In the preamble of PNL manifesto, “The liberal state – the second mo-
dernization of Romania”, the accent is placed on the need of transforming 
the state from an assistential and clientelistic one to a liberal state. The state 
structures, which are inherited from the totalitarian communist period, keep the 
society and the citizenry captive and need to be rebuilt from the ground in order 
to recreate a new functional, modern and competitive state, centered upon the 
citizen. Even it is labeled as “minimal”, it maintains enough attributes which 
entitles a skeptical reception of that label. 
PNL’s vision is that the state becomes efficient, with a workable and 
flexible public administration, using the criteria of the free market in order to 
judge its efficiency. 
In terms of economic policies, the manifesto advocated for a new and 
flexible industrialization of the country (including the agriculture), promoting 
the development, a friendly fiscal system (with a further lowering of the flat in-
come tax to 11%) and a strategy for developing the public-private management 
for the public capital investments. In the field of social policies the liberals cal-
led for a consolidation of the private component of the retirement funds and for 
switching the accent of social protection from the individual to the family.
As a minor coalition partner, PNL shared the PSD concern for develop-
ment, at least at the declarative level. The USL coalition created a new mini-
stry, label by the media as “The big projects ministry”, and the liberals control-
led the Ministry of Finance. Although they went along with the PSD-inspired 
measures to restore the incomes and to adjust the pensions (see above), their 
biggest achievement in terms of right-wing economic measures was to impo-
se the flat income tax of 16%, even if PSD agenda clearly stipulated the pro-
gressive taxation. As recent as the beginning of this year they promoted a new 
scheme of “gradual taxation”, moving downward from 16% to another two 
lower thresholds, 12% and 8%. The dissolution of USL and the withdrawal of 
PNL from government in mid-2014 prevented them to make any further steps 
in that direction.
PDL (Partidul Democrat Liberal – Democratic Liberal Party). “PDL 
vision for Romania” party program links the elements of the party agenda with 
the previous measures taken by the PDL and Dreptate şi Adevăr (DA) coalition 
government. The vision is synthesized, in general terms, in a perfectly accepta-
ble national conservatism slogan [Gallagher, Laver, Mair 2002: 217-218; Ware 
1996: 32]: “PDL wishes for Romania to be a country in which its citizens want 
to live, a modern, powerful and competitive country. A country in which the 
law is respected, in which the hard work and the performance is encouraged, 
a country in which each can develop through his/her own forces.” There are 
several major themes of this vision. First, a modern state is viewed as a small 
state. In several speeches the incumbent president, a former PDL president, 
used the formula “fat/obese man” as a metaphor for the burden the public sector 
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represented for the private sector and for the entire society. The decentralization 
and modernization of the public administration is seen as a needed step to make 
the state institutions more flexible and responsive to the society. 
Another central theme is the support for economic growth by attracting 
investments and new jobs. In this context the party program supports facilities 
for small and medium enterprises. The party considers that macroeconomic sta-
bility is achieved (if needed) by fiscal austerity.
PDL emphasizes the need to reform education, by encouraging merit 
and by connecting it with the requirements of the economy. After the perce-
ived failure of the radical projects for restructuring the healthcare (while also 
curtailing the expenditures in the field) during the party’s previous govern-
ments, “PDL vision for Romania” insists on the need for a gradual reform in the 
field of medical services. The themes of European integration and Romania’s 
European future, although present in the agendas of all the major Romanian po-
litical parties, were more accentuated in the public speeches by the representa-
tives of PDL, especially after the attempt dismissal of the Romanian president 
T. Băsescu by the USL in the summer of 2012 – attempt considered by PDL 
as being a coup. In terms of public policies supported by PDL – as major oppo-
sition party starting from 2012 – they continued to underline that the budgeta-
ry cuts from 2010 (25% of the salaries of the public employees), in a moment 
when the economic crises peaked in Romania, were the only viable solution 
and created the conditions for the recovery of the economy. As such, the party 
spokespersons emphasized the need to conserve the fiscal rectitude and critici-
zed the government for not having found any means for a real increase of the 
economic parameters.
UDMR/RMDSZ (Uniunea Democrată Maghiara din România/
Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség – Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania). The Union (Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din 
Romania) claims to be the political representative of the Hungarian minority 
from Romania, which, according to the official data of the last census (2011) co-
unts over 1.250.000 people (over 6,5% from the total population of Romania), 
making it one of the most important ethnic minority in Europe. UDMR is the 
only political organization in Romania which systematically uses the internal 
elections (US-inspired “primaries”) for designating, in an open manner its can-
didates for public office. It also reunites various social, cultural and even scien-
tific groups and organizations. In spite of its affiliation to the European People’s 
Party, another particularity of UDMR is that the Union as a structure presides 
over different ideological platforms – social-democrat, liberal and Christian-
democrat. This offered the party enough flexibility to repeatedly participate, 
and sometimes to be a pivotal minor coalition partner, in various right or left le-
aning governments, starting with 1996. In the field of ethnic and cultural rights 
UDMR was concerned in guaranteeing, for the Hungarian minority, the full ran-
ge of rights (the use of mother tongue in education at all levels, administration, 
justice, the protection of the own cultural and religious traditions). Since all 
these were secured, since mid-to late 1990 the union identified two concrete 
major objectives, which should improve the symbolical status and represen-
tation of the Hungarian community from Romania: a state-funded Hungarian-
language university (“Bolyai University”, which should reunite, under a com-
mon autonomous management, the already existing Hungarian lines of studies 
from the mixed faculties and colleges) and a larger ethnic-based autonomy for 
the so-called Szekler Land (Székelyföld/Ţinutul secuiesc), a region in Central 
Romania including two counties (Covasna and Harghita) and the Eastern part of 
a third one (Mureş), inhabited in majority by the Hungarian-speaking Szeklers/
Szekelys. The general, non-ethnic related issues on UDMR’s agenda indicate a 
social-conservative stance, emphasizing the role of the family, the community, 
the decentralization but also the importance of the free economical market, the 
democratization of the society and the country’s integration in the European 
and Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO, EU) – a process in which the Union cla-
ims to have performed an important role by enhancing Romania’s internal sta-
bility and external credibility through its participation in government. 
PMP (Partidul Mişcarea Populară – Popular Movement Party). 
The latest newcomer in the Romanian party politics, PMP (Partidul Miscarea 
Populara) is a recent (January 2014) splinter from PDL, based on a foundation 
created at the initiative of the Romanian president in office, T. Băsescu, and led 
by the controversial E. Udrea, a former member of the presidential administra-
tion and head of the Ministry of development in the PDL government, seen by 
the media as the protégée of the president, and the only woman to act as a head 
of a party in nowadays Romania.
The party describes itself as a modern, “different type of party, not a new 
party”, placed on the center-right of the left-right continuum and representing 
the middle class. The political agenda is quite similar to that of PDL (indivi-
dual freedom and autonomy, free economical competition and fiscal rectitude, 
a reformed, “slender” state and public administration, one-chamber Parliament 
with a reduced number of seats, European and Euro-Atlantic affiliation, etc). 
Some specific tones are given by programmatic stipulations such as the moder-
nization of the infrastructure in the rural areas and the introduction of the vote 
by mail, but the main distinctiveness of PMP resides in its claim to represent 
a non-mainstream political organization. 
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Apart from these themes, specific for each party, and according to which 
we can label them as being more or less typical members of their party family 
[von Beyme 1996: 21-24], there were several common themes that were shared 
by the parties’ discourse during, and around, the period of the European elec-
tions. The two most important of these were the Constitutional reform and the 
independence of justice. The debate about the Constitutional reform, with older 
roots in the Romanian public space, started in a more structured way as an or-
ganized debate in 2013, but faded away by 2014 because of the lack of consen-
sus. While USL (PSD and PLN) initially wanted a weaker president and more 
clearly stipulated and separated attributions for each of the two main figures of 
the executive, the prime-minister and the president, PDL insisted on the need to 
maintain the effective of a president possessing popular legitimacy and to legi-
slate the result of the 2009 referendum, in which people voted for a one-cham-
ber parliament and for a reduced number of legislators. Another issue at stake, 
connected to the Constitutional reform, was that of regionalization. UDMR/
RMDS understanding of the principle of regional autonomy as having ethnic/
cultural meaning was contested by the other (Romanian) political parties, and 
considered as incompatible with the national, unitary and indivisible character 
of the state as stipulated by the Constitution.
While all the major parties openly condemned corruption and were 
trying to capitalize on that, the disputations over the independence of justi-
ce opposed mainly PSD to PDL (and latter also to PMP). PSD accused DNA 
(The National Anticorruption Department, a structure created for combating 
the grand fraud and criminality) and some of the prosecutors of being depen-
dent to, and at the service of, president Băsescu (which, by his past decisions, 
has made them subservient), and constituting a part of his “regime”, while PDL 
and PMP maintained that DNA and the justice per se were on a path of conso-
lidating their independence precisely due to the politics in the field adopted by 
Băsescu and by the PDL government.
The 2014 European election campaign 
The campaign was categorized as uneventful [Mixich 2014; Parvu et 
al. 2014] and influenced by the split up of the governing coalition. 15 par-
ties and coalitions and eight independent candidates participated in the elec-
tions. Six parties and one independent candidate passed the electoral thre-
shold. The elections were organized just after the governing coalition just split 
up. The Social Liberal Union (USL) was formed in 2011 out of the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) and The National Liberal Party (PNL) and two 
small parties: The Conservative Party (PC) and The Union for the Progress of 
Romania (UNPR). At the 2012 parliamentary elections they secured 58,61% 
for the Chamber of Deputies and 60,07% in the Senate. In February 2014 the 
National Liberal Party decided to quit the coalition. 
There were several irregularities during the electoral campaign. First the 
center left governing coalition PSD-UNPR-PC used the former coalition name 
and messages such “USL is alive” without the former coalition partner, the 
National Liberal Party’s agreement. The messages were removed follow-
ing a court order. Secondly the messages of the PSD-UNPR-PC “Proud to be 
Romanians” was contested in court as discriminatory since it suggests that 
only voting with the governing coalition could one be proud to be Romanian. 
Thirdly, President Băsescu was an active supporter of the new political party 
the Popular Movement Party (PMP), which according to the Constitution is 
violating the principle of political neutrality of the president. 
The electoral messages focused more on defending the national interest 
in the European Union than on European issues and some messages were con-
fusing. For example the governing coalitions’ main messages were “Proud to 
be Romanians” and “Romania Strong in Europe”. The National Liberal Party’s 
first candidate on the party list, N. Nicolai, had the message “with dignity 
in Europe” and the political parties’ main messages “Euro-champions to deeds”. 
The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the main opposition party until USL split 
up confused their voters with “Europe in every Home”. The Popular Movement 
Party, a splinter from PDL had the message “We raise Romania”. The populist 
People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD) invited voters to “Vote PPDD with 
a Romanian soul”. The Hungarian Democratic Union from Romania messag-
es were “Hungarian Solidarity” and “Transylvania in Europe”. The extremist 
Great Romania Party used a word play “The only salvation: Vote the Greater 
Romania Party”. Some opinion leaders called for a boycott for the European 
elections and invited citizens not to participate to the elections for several rea-
sons and confirm the apathy and lack of interest in these elections by both po-
litical parties and citizens.
Besides the overall view of the European parliament elections as second 
order, the electoral process in Romania was vitiated by selection of candidates 
that political parties placed on eligible party lists. Parties seem to use the eli-
gible seats as a tool to offer selective benefits to their family and political cli-
entele. In 2009 and in 2014, the wife of the now-in-office Prime Minister Ponta 
obtained eligible places on the social democratic party list. The former presi-
dent of the National Liberal Party and former interim president C. Antonescu 
obtained in 2009 and in 2014 eligible places on the National Liberal Party. 
In 2009, the daughter of the incumbent president Basescu won a seat as an inde-
pendent candidate benefiting from the support of the Democratic Liberal Party. 
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M. Diaconu, the independent candidate that won an office in the European par-
liament claimed not to have been doing any electoral campaigning. He man-
aged to run for office despite allegations that claimed that the parliamentarian 
and actor was in a conflict of interest. His success might be explained by the ex-
tensive coverage he received on the most popular news TV station in Romania.
According to the Romanian Electoral Office (2014) political parties 
spent approximately 4.7 million euro for the electoral campaign. The two for-
mer coalition partners stand out in terms of debts and expenses, with both PSD 
and PNL spending each 1.5 million euro. The Election Day ran without sig-
nificant events. However there were some complaints about the high number 
of citizens who were voting on supplementary lists. At the European elections, 
Romanian citizens are allowed to vote in any voting station regardless of their 
domicile as in presidential elections. This is not possible at the parliamentary 
elections where citizens are allowed to vote only the candidates that run for of-
fice in districts where the citizens reside. Election polls were issued at 9 pm and 
pointed that the incumbent political alliance won with more than 40% of the 
votes yet the next the final results showed that surveys errors that were larger 
than 5 percent for some of the exit polls. The next section will detail on the im-
plication of the electoral results.
Table 4 provides a more precise image of the policy preferences among 
the supporters of each of the main party during the electoral campaign of the 
2014 EP elections. Data were collected by EuVox (www.euvox.eu), a EU-
wide voting advice application (VAA) for the 2014 elections to the European 
Parliament, conducted in Romania by a team from the Center for the Study of 
Democracy at Babeș-Bolyai University that included the authors of this article. 
Table 4. Relationships between policy preferences and party preferences in 
a Voting Application Advice (VAA) study conducted in Romania during the 
electoral campaign of the 2014 EP elections. 
Cells represent mean values [1 - strong agreement, ..., 5 - disagreement] among those who 
choose the party represented on the column as the one with highest chance to be voted.
PSD PDL PNL UDMR PPDD Total
Romania should never adopt the Euro 3.45 3.89 3.63 3.88 3.40 3.57
A single member state should be able to block a treaty 
change, even if all the other members states agree to it 3.16 3.35 3.24 3.43 3.13 3.21
The right of EU citizens to work in Romania should be 
restricted 4.14 4.43 4.35 4.42 4.05 4.26
There should be a common EU foreign policy even if 
this limits the capacity of Romania to act independently 2.61 2.21 2.39 2.01 2.81 2.45
The EU should redistribute resources from richer to po-
orer EU regions 2.07 2.54 2.47 2.39 2.19 2.38
Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for Romania 3.65 4.31 4.02 4.02 3.52 3.90
PSD PDL PNL UDMR PPDD Total
EU treaties should be decided by the national parliament 
rather than by citizens in a referendum 3.36 3.79 3.58 3.50 3.88 3.65
The EU should impose economic sanctions on Russia, 
even if this jeopardizes gas supplies to EU countries 2.63 2.13 2.27 2.63 2.74 2.39
International partners have the right to interfere in the in-
ternal affairs of Romania when they feel there is a threat 
to democracy
3.35 2.37 2.81 2.51 2.84 2.77
Free market competition makes the health care system 
function better 2.68 2.23 2.36 2.67 2.67 2.48
The number of public sector employees should be reduced 2.90 2.06 2.36 2.39 2.81 2.44
The state should intervene as little as possible in the 
economy 3.09 2.32 2.39 2.57 2.98 2.59
Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to 
the poorest 2.63 3.34 3.29 2.85 2.64 3.06
Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the 
economic crisis 2.53 2.26 2.46 2.59 2.14 2.40
It should be easy for companies to fire people 3.76 3.24 3.36 3.48 3.64 3.47
External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a 
good solution to crisis situations. 3.54 3.18 3.51 3.62 3.76 3.48
The Romanian state should allow the Canadian compa-
ny Gabriel Resources to continue its operation at Rosia 
Montana
3.73 3.90 4.09 4.18 4.19 4.00
The poorest citizens should pay a lower rate of income tax 1.88 2.65 2.50 2.15 2.01 2.30
A petrol price increase is acceptable if the money collec-
ted is invested in the construction of new highways 2.25 3.05 2.80 2.86 2.99 2.81
Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of 
Romania 2.00 2.11 2.09 2.61 1.98 2.12
Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to 
combat crime 3.43 3.53 3.65 3.57 3.22 3.48
To maintain public order, governments should be able to 
restrict demonstrations 3.93 4.17 4.24 4.33 3.99 4.13
Less serious crimes should be punished with community 
service, not imprisonment 1.86 1.98 1.90 2.01 1.89 1.97
Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as hete-
rosexual couples to marry 3.09 2.61 2.81 2.54 3.27 2.84
Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion 1.95 1.84 1.83 1.86 2.05 1.92
The recreational use of cannabis should be legal 3.58 2.93 3.17 2.92 3.39 3.26
Downloading copyright protected material from the in-
ternet should be allowed for private use 2.85 2.70 2.75 2.42 2.71 2.76
A territorial reform should include the creation of an au-
tonomous Hungarian region 4.45 4.18 4.37 2.16 4.44 4.18
Minorities should have the right to education only in the 
mother tongue, including in the university system 3.72 3.50 3.67 1.82 3.74 3.51
The constitution should diminish the role of the presi-
dent in the political system 2.10 3.51 2.75 2.55 3.20 2.88
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Election results
Politicians and analysts viewed the European Election as an impor-
tant test before the presidential elections. The main political parties postpo-
ned the nomination of a presidential candidate until after the European elec-
tions, as a test for the popularity of political parties. The socialists were hoping 
for enough votes to make them be optimistic about winning the presidential 
office in the first round. The Liberals, their former coalition partners, hoped 
for 25% electoral support that would make them the largest opposition par-
ty. PMP (Popular Movement Party), the party that supports president Basescu, 
wanted to gain more votes than the party from which they split. 
The results did not offer satisfaction to any of the hopes party officials 
had. The incumbent alliance PSD-UNPR-PC won the highest number of votes 
and a relative majority. They gained less than they expected. Most exit polls 
credited them with 41 to 43 percent (Table 5).
Table 5. The comparison between election polls and final results
 European parliament IRES CURS CSCI CCSB Results 
PSD-UNPR-PC 42.4%  41% 41.01% 43% 42.4% 37.60%
PNL 13.3% 14% 14.92% 14% 13.3% 15.00%
PDL  11.5% 10% 11.82% 12%  11.5% 12.23%
PMP 6.5%  6% 6.7% 7% 6.3%  6.21%
UDMR 6.2%  7% 7.1% 6% 6.2% 6.30%
Mircea Diaconu 4.3% 5% 5.91% 4% 4.3% 6.81%
Source: www.ziare.com
The discrepancy between the election results and the exit polls was wi-
dely debated in press. One of the main reasons for the errors was asserted to be 
the increased refusal rate that peaked to 20% and the surprisingly high rate on 
annulled votes (5.83%) [Stoica 2014]. 
The number of parties competing for offices has increased due to the 
fragmentation of the right wing political parties. In 2014, 15 parties entered the 
electoral competition, compared to only 7 parties in 2009, and 8 parties in 2007. 
Table 6. Results of the 2014 EP elections in Romania
 Results Seats European Party Family
PSD-UNPR-PC 37.60% 16 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)
PNL 15.00% 6 European Peoples’ Party (EPP)
PDL  12.23% 5 European Peoples’ Party (EPP)
Mircea Diaconu 6.81% 1 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
UDMR 6.30% 2 European Peoples’ Party (EPP)
PMP 6.21% 2 European Peoples’ Party (EPP)
Turnout 32,44%
Source: Romanian Electoral Authority.
In 2014, the turnout was higher than in 2007 (29.46%) and 2009 
(27.67%) and below the European average (42.54%). The number female can-
didates that won a seat (31%) is below the European average (37%) more than 
Poland (24%), Hungary (19%) or Bulgaria (29%) and slightly more than in 
2007 (29%) [European Parliament 2014]. 
The Social Democratic Party and the two smaller parties that allied with 
the social democrats won the elections with a plurality of votes. Compared to 
the 2009 elections, the socialist gained five seats and the liberals, the former co-
alition partners, gained one seat. On the other hand, PDL lost five seats and the 
extremist-populist PRM (Great Romania Party) and PP-DD (People’s Party Dan 
Diaconescu) failed to pass the 5% electoral threshold. UDMR (The Hungarian 
Democratic Alliance from Romania) lost one seat. One new party (PMP) en-
tered the European Parliament and the independent M. Diaconu won his first 
mandate with more votes than the Hungarian Party and the president supported 
new Popular Movement party. This lack of success indicates that PDL, the par-
ty that directly supported the president managed to gain electoral success despi-
te the fact that important political officials left the party to create a presidential 
political movement [Tapalaga 2014]. PSD won in almost all counties with the 
exception of Harghita, Covasna and Alba. PDL, lost in all the counties, except 
one, in which they won in 2009. UDMR preserved its majority in four coun-
ties and lost Bihor county to PSD. PNL won for the first time the majority in 
Calarasi county.
Romanian political parties belong to the two largest European party fa-
milies: the European Socialist and the European Popular group. Most manda-
tes went to the socialist European group followed by the European Populars. 
The Liberal group received only one mandate from independent M. Diaconu 
(formerly a member of PNL), after PNL (National Liberal Party) changed its af-
filiation to the Popular party group immediately after the elections. Once PRM 
and PP-DD lost their electoral support, the nationalist Eurosceptic group did 
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not receive any mandates from Romania. Laszlo Tokes who was an MEP that 
won independently a mandate in 2007 decided to run on the mandates allocated 
for Hungary.
The wider impact of the 2014 European elections 
One major aspect of the European elections in Romania was the quasi-
-absence in the public discourse and public policy area of the themes related 
to the new politics [Rohrschneider 1994] during the campaign. Some of them 
were present in the official manifestos of the parties, but were largely absent 
from their discourse (the protection of the environment), some others are pre-
sent only in one party manifesto (PSD: multiculturalism, pacifism, open poli-
cies towards migration, a foreign policy promoting democracy and democrati-
zation) but absent from the discourse, and some are absent from the manifestos 
and the public discourse altogether (LGBT rights, homosexual marriages, eu-
thanasia) – while they were major themes of debate in several, if not in most, 
EU countries. Nevertheless, some of them were exported from the civil society 
to the parties. Thus, the series of protests and rallies organized in Bucharest and 
other major cities starting with January 2012, besides particular subjects as the 
cyanide mining or the exploitation of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing, 
echoed more general themes as the protection of the environment, the repleni-
shment of the political and social elite, the participative democracy and the qu-
ality of education. However, few of these (if any) were treated by the political 
parties in a coherent on non-contradictory manner. The national issues take pre-
cedence over European issues when the European elections take place. Another 
notable aspect was that the nomination of candidates was very often subjected 
to clientelistic exchanges or for the benefit of the families of the party leaders. 
An important outcome of the 2014 European elections in Romania 
was that they generated the reshuffling of alliances within the party system. 
The socialists realized that they will not win the presidential office in one ro-
und in the upcoming presidential elections, so they made an offer to the for-
mer coalition partners the National Liberal Party and the Hungarian UDMR. 
The former declined the recreation of USL (Social Liberal Union), an alliance 
that achieved 65% of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The lat-
ter joined the governing coalition. Following the disappointing election re-
sults, the president of the National Liberal Party, and at that time the likely 
presidential candidate of that party, resigned. The new president of PNL, Klaus 
Werner Iohannis, an ethnic German who is the mayor of Sibiu, forged a coali-
tion with PDL (the Democratic Liberals) named the Liberal Christian Alliance 
(ACL). ACL decided to support Klaus Johannis’s bid to become the president 
of Romania. The initiative was aimed to gather support of all right wing parties. 
However, The Popular Movement Party refused and proposed its’ own candi-
date, E. Udrea, the president of the party and a close ally of president Basescu. 
Finally, the low turnout suggests that the European elections are still 
perceived to have very limited importance, and that a better communication of 
how European policies impact the lives of ordinary citizens would be needed.
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Abstract:
In the article the main characteristics of the European Parliament elec-
tions in 2014 in relation to the characteristics of the both previous elections to 
the Parliament were analysed. First, the legal framework is presented, followed 
by the presentation of candidate lists. As it is frequently the case, the authors for 
the analysis employed the analytical framework presented by Reif and Schmitt 
(1980). Following the framework, it is obvious the elections in Slovenia aga-
in demonstrated many elements of the second-order elections framework, 
for example in terms of the turnout, success of the governmental parties, suc-
cess of small parties, as well as almost complete absence of party programmes, 
Euroscepticism and European topics in the campaign. Since several important 
domestic events happened just before the EP elections (e.g. resignation of the 
government at the beginning of May and the fact the leader of the biggest oppo-
sition party was by the court found guilty of corruption activity and sent to the 
prison at the end of April) such developments did not come as a big surprise.
Key words: 
Slovenia, European Parliament, elections, Euroscepticism
Characteristics of the Party System and Parties 
When talking about the party system in Slovenia it is possible to see, 
in the context of the post-socialist European countries, its relative stabili-
ty for the most of the period since the first multiparty and democratic elec-
tions in 1990 [Lewis 2001; Haughton and Deegan Krause 2010; Fink-Hafner, 
Krašovec 2013], despite the fairly undemanding requirements for establishing 
a new party (only 200 voter signatures and some formal documents are ne-
eded). However, in spite of such formal openness to new parties, only one small 
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new party (either genuinely new or a breakaway from another party) entered 
the National Assembly following each election1 in the 1992-2008 period [Fink-
Hafner, Krašovec 2013]. The radical change in this regard came with the early 
elections in 2011 when two new parties, Positive Slovenia (PS) and the Civic 
List (DL), won as much as 37% of the vote; Positive Slovenia with its cha-
rismatic leader Z. Janković was also a relative winner of the elections with 
28.5% of the vote. For the second time, newcomers played a very important 
role on the early elections held in July 2014, when the relative winner of the 
elections, the Party of Miro Cerar (SMC) won 34.5%, while the United Left 
(ZL) coalition received 5.9%.
As claimed by Fink-Hafner [2012: 204], in Slovenia only occasionally 
has it been possible to detect elements of anti-system parties, while small (new) 
parliamentary parties have mitigated anti-party sentiments in the general public. 
The Slovenian party system can be described as dynamic despite the stability of 
the electoral rules [Fink-Hafner 2006: 222]. While at the beginning of the demo-
cratic transition a polarised party system was established, visible in the number 
of parties, the existence of bilateral opposition and ideological distance, later 
mainly elements of moderate pluralism can be observed. There was, however, 
a short period with an element of a predominant party system since in the 2000 
elections the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) obtained the biggest share 
of votes as an individual party in the system so far (36.2%) [Fink-Hafner 2012], 
and a similar situation happened in the 2014 elections with the SMC.
When speaking about ideological camps, it is usually said that a tripo-
lar (conservative, liberal and social democratic) ideological structure has been 
clearly visible in Slovenia (during periods of political pluralism) since the end 
of the 19th century [Prunk 2011]. On the other hand, Fink-Hafner [2012: 201] 
argues that, with the passage from the polarised to predominant elements of 
moderate pluralism, bipolar party competition has been established. 
Due to the country’s gradualist approach to economic transition, quite 
specific in the context of other post-socialist European countries, and the cle-
ar expectations of the population to retain the welfare state, all parliamenta-
ry parties advocated similar, social democratic socio-economic policies until 
the 2004 elections [Stanojević, Krašovec 2011; Fink-Hafner 2012], thereby re-
ducing the importance of the socio-economic component in the cleavage sys-
tem. Yet this situation changed during the 2004 elections when the economic 
component in the cleavage system became more evident largely because of 
the Slovenian Democratic Party’s (SDS) (a relative winner of the 2004 elec-
tions) final turn towards the conservative party camp. In the context of the great 
economic and fiscal crisis that Slovenia has faced since 2009, the question of 
1 The exception being the 2004 elections when no new party entered the parliament.
social democratic vs. (neo)liberal socio-economic policies became more evi-
dent. On the other hand, the liberal–conservative divide, usually in Slovenia 
referred to as an ‘ideological cleavage’ (mostly connected with questions over 
the role of the Catholic Church in society as well as in politics, the rights of 
minorities and, perhaps a bit strangely from the viewpoint of other countries, 
over developments during WW II – Partisans vs. Home Guard, or opponents 
of the occupation forces vs. their collaborators) has been always sharp, par-
ticularly because the cleavage has frequently been interwoven with others, 
for example, centre–periphery, state–church, rural–urban, traditionalism–mo-
dernism, and communism–anticommunism [Fink-Hafner 2001]. Based on the-
se cleavages, some parties are usually perceived as (centre-)left (for example, 
Social Democrats (SD), LDS, and Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia 
(DeSUS)) and some as (centre-)right parties (for example, SDS, New Slovenia 
(NSi) and Slovenian People’s Party (SLS)).
In Slovenia, naturally enough given the PR electoral system and low 
threshold (3 mandates or in fact 3.3% in the period 1992-2000, and 4% since 
2000 elections), all governments have been coalitions of several parties. Due to 
such characteristics of the electoral system, an almost complete absence of pre-
-electoral coalitions or electoral alliances in the party system can also be expec-
ted [Krašovec, Cabada 2013]. 
It seems a radical change took place in Slovenian politics with the 2008 
elections, which were held almost on the same day as the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The economic crisis provoked by the global credit crunch began 
to have a serious impact on Slovenia only in the first half of 2009. In 2009, for in-
stance, the GDP dropped by 8.1% and later continued to record negative trends. 
Unemployment rose from 6.7% in 2008 to 12% at the end of 2011. Borut Pahor’s 
(SD) coalition government was heavily criticised for being too slow in making 
decisions and for introducing inappropriate measures to respond to the crisis, al-
though some government measures to combat the crisis were received positively 
[Haughton, Krašovec 2013]. There was great disappointment with the ineffective 
2008–2011 government, and this was compounded by a long list of other chal-
lenging political issues that radically reduced trust in political institutions and 
reduced satisfaction with democracy [Krašovec 2013]. Political scandals and the 
sense of widespread corruption, along with a government unable to deal with the 
economic crisis, fuelled support for two new entrants into the 2011 elections.
The 2011 elections brought another break with long-standing tradition 
when it became clear that the relative winner of the elections, Janković and his 
PS, would not be able to form a governing coalition, therefore the formateur 
became J. Janša from the SDS. The Janša II government, which also included 
the DL, DeSUS, SLS and NSi-Christian Democrats), prepared radical austerity 
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measures, advocated by a positive response from various international orga-
nisations. However, the government faced considerable social discontent due 
to its unilaterally prepared and implemented policies, which led to the largest 
general strike of public sector employees in 2012. These developments were 
accompanied by evident corruption(-risk) activities and misuse of public funds 
by different politicians, as well as by a perceived lack of responsiveness from 
politicians; this led to a significant wave of protests at the end of 2012 and the 
beginning of 2013, which also, for the first time in the history of independent 
Slovenia, escalated into violent clashes with police [Krašovec 2013]. The pro-
testors, supported by 75% of the population [Politbarometer 2013], were not 
only concerned with the austerity measures of Janša’s government and his le-
adership style, but also with corrupt politicians and the unethical nature of poli-
tics in general [Krašovec 2013]. They therefore demanded the establishment of 
a new political elite and the return of the kidnapped state to its citizens.
Even though one of the key characteristics of the Slovenian political 
system since its transition to democracy has been relatively low levels of trust 
in political parties, in 2005, 11% of voters still trusted parties, while in 2011 
this share was only 2%, and in 2013, 1% [Politbarometer 2005; 2011; 2013]. 
Even though Slovenian voters have clearly preferred a democratic system over 
an authoritarian system [Toš et al. 1999; 2004; 2009; 2012], satisfaction with 
democracy has been declining since the beginning of the 1990s. This trend has 
been especially evident since 2005, while in the post-2009 period it is possible 
to speak of a collapse of trust in democratic institutions and in the present de-
mocratic arrangements in Slovenia in general [Vehovar 2012].
Figure 1. Levels of (dis)satisfaction with democracy in Slovenia (1996-2013) in %
NA - National Assembly elections, PR - Presidential elections
Source: Politbarometer, June 2013.
Taking all these developments into account, it was not a surprise that the 
Janša II government did not survive the parliamentary term; due to a construc-
tive vote of no-confidence linked to an anti-corruption watchdog’s revelations 
involving Janša himself in February 2013, he was replaced by the A. Bratušek. 
She, on the other hand, had become acting leader of PS after Janković stepped 
down from the leadership due to the findings of the anti-corruption commission 
which had pointed the finger of suspicion in his direction [Haughton, Krašovec 
2014]. Bratušek’s government, which was composed of the relative winner of 
2011 elections, PS, together with the DL, SD, and DeSUS, however, survived 
for little more than a year. Just prior to the European Parliament (EP) elections 
of 2014, Bratušek submitted her resignation (and thereby the resignation of her 
government). Slovenia’s first female premier had been successfully challenged 
for the leadership of the PS by none other than Janković himself. His desire 
to take back the party leadership not only engendered a split in the party, but 
provoked the governing coalition to collapse as the smaller parties in the gov-
ernment refused to work alongside PS with the charismatic but controversial 
Janković at the helm [Krašovec, Haughton 2014].
Table 1. Results of the parliamentary elections in Slovenia in December 2011 
and July 2014
PARTY
2011 2014
Votes 
(%) Seats
Votes 
(%) Seats
List of Zoran Janković–Positive Slovenia (PS) 28.5 28 3.0 0
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) 26.2 26 20.7 21
Social Democrats (SD) 10.5 10 6.0 6
Civic List of Gregor Virant-Civic List (DL) 8.4 8 0.6 0
Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) 6.9 6 10.2 10
Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) 6.8 6 3.9 0
New Slovenia–Christian Democrats (NSi) 4.9 4 5.6 5
Party of Miro Cerar (SMC) / / 34.5 36
United Left Coalition (ZL) / / 6.0 6
Alliance of Alenka Bratušek (ZaAB) / / 4.4 4
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) 1.5 0 / /
Zares 0.6 0 / /
Others 0 0
Bold: Party composition of the Janša II government February 2012 - February 2013; 
Italics: Party composition of the Bratušek government March 2013 – May 2014.
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The Importance of the EU arena in Slovenia
As some political scientists have noted [for example, Mair 2000; 
Ladrech 2002; Lewis, Mansfeldova eds. 2006; Szczerbiak, Taggart eds. 2008; 
Lewis, Markowski eds. 2011], in the last decade, the EU has begun to be ack-
nowledged as an environment that holds potentially significant consequences 
for the functioning of national parties and party systems, therefore many rele-
vant Slovenian parties have been interested in being part of it. Almost all parlia-
mentary parties have been formally entering the EU arena since the mid-1990s 
by establishing official contacts with their European counterparts.
Table 2. The evolution of formal membership of Slovenian parties 
in European parties
observer associate member full member
NSi (EPP) 2001 2003 2004
LDS (ELDR/ALDE) 1994 1998
SDS (EPP) 2001 2003 2004
(ZL)SD (PES/S&D) 1996 1999 2003
SLS (EPP) 2001 2003 2004
Youth Party of Slovenia (SMS) – 
European Greens (EFGP/EG)
2003 2006
Zares (ELDR/ALDE) 2008 2008
DL (ELDR/ALDE) 2013 2013
PS (ELDR/ALDE) 2014*
Source: Krašovec and Lajh (2009); ALDE data
* At the end of January 2014, the PS decided to apply for full membership in ALDE. Due to the 
split of the party after a battle over the party leader position at the end of April 2014, just before the 
ALDE congress at the beginning of May the PS withdrew its application for ALDE membership
Unlike some other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
[Lewis, Mansfeldova eds. 2006; Szczerbiak, Taggart eds. 2008; Haughton 
2009], it seems the EU environment has minimal impact on the Slovenian par-
ty system. Already in 1997 all parliamentary parties (except for the Slovenian 
National Party - SNS) decided to overcome their other differences and con-
flicts, and sign an Agreement on Co-operation in the EU Accession Process. 
This broad consensus on EU membership as an ultimate Slovenian goal inde-
ed meant that all major EU-related topics in Slovenia were defined as natio-
nal projects [Krašovec, Lajh 2009]. Taking into account the generally favoura-
ble public opinion towards the EU, only some small and/or non-parliamentary 
parties and occasionally the parliamentary SNS tried to play the Eurosceptic 
card, which however proved not to be a trump card in the electoral competition 
[Krašovec, Lajh 2009]. Based on these arguments, Krašovec and Lajh [2009] 
conclude that EU issues do not directly influence inter-party competition, sin-
ce the EU only limited party competition (which is unusual when we compare 
Slovenia to other countries). Therefore, EU issues held particular salience for 
national politics but little salience for party politics [Krašovec, Lajh 2009: 58].
Legal framework for the EP Elections
Slovenian legislation on EP elections offers all Slovenian citizens at le-
ast 18 years old the opportunity to vote and stand as a candidate. In addition, 
it allows EU citizens with permanent residence in Slovenia to vote or stand 
as a candidate. Even though the legislation remained, in the most important 
aspects, the same as it was for the EP elections in 2009, some smaller chan-
ges were, nevertheless, made before the 2014 EP elections. The EU demanded 
some changes in regulations concerning candidacy of an EU citizen in a coun-
try of which he/she is not a citizen. Besides this, the Slovenian government also 
proposed some of its own changes. According to new legislation adopted by the 
national parliament at the end of January 2014, names, abbreviations and logos 
of EU parties to which national parties are linked to can be officially used in 
electoral material as well as on ballots. Some of the parties took advantage of 
this opportunity (for example, SD, Zares and DL).
Candidates for EP elections can be proposed by parties (the candidate 
list for the EP election must be supported by four MPs or 1,000 voters) or vo-
ters (the candidate list for the EP election must be supported by 3,000 voters). 
The law establishes a proportional electoral system (using the d’Hondt method) 
with a single constituency and the possibility of a preference vote, which howe-
ver does not have an absolute. Slovenian legislation on EP elections interferes 
somewhat with the procedure of selecting candidates within parties since a cer-
tain list of candidates cannot comprise less than 40% of representatives of each 
gender and at least one representative of each gender must be placed in the top 
half of the list. If this gender equality norm is not respected, the list of candida-
tes is considered invalid. 
The election campaign officially starts 30 days before the date of the 
election and the Election and Referendum Campaign Act also determines the 
financial aspects of campaigns. The act sets the upper limit of election campa-
ign expenditure for both national and EP elections in the same manner. In 2004, 
each candidate list could spend no more than 60 Slovenian tolars (or 0.25 EUR) 
per voter, while the amount was 0.40 EUR in 2009 and 2014. Amendments 
to the Election and Referendum Campaign Act at the end of 2013 introduced 
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a prohibition on contributions by legal entities to political parties or lists of 
candidates. Nonetheless, in contrast to the prohibition on financing of candidate 
lists from abroad at national elections, such financing is allowed in the case of 
EP elections (although not by legal entities). 
The law prohibits the post of MEP being held simultaneously with the posi-
tion of MP, member of the government, or member of a local representative body.
According to the legislation, candidate lists had to be submitted to 
the National Electoral Commission by 25 April 2014, and from this day until 
24 May 2014, an electoral campaign was formally permitted. 
Candidate Lists and Candidates
The majority of competitors waited with submission of their candidate 
lists until the very last moment. Altogether as many as 17 candidate lists were 
submitted, but regarding one of the lists, the electoral commission found that it 
did not fulfil all the formal criteria and therefore could not compete in the elec-
tions (12 candidate lists competed in the 2009 EP elections and 13 in 2004). In all 
of the elections, all parliamentary parties offered their (own) candidate lists and 
some non-parliamentary parties also competed, as well as some independent lists.
All current MEPs except for two (both from the Slovenian Democratic 
Party (EPP) whose candidate list was led by a current MEP) ran in the elections. 
Usually no candidate selection process can avoid disagreements [Krašovec 
and Štremfel 2007] and this was the case with the 2014 EP elections. The fi -
nal formation of the joint New Slovenia and Slovenian People’s Party (EPP) 
candidate list (led by a current MEP) with inclusion of one particular person 
from New Slovenia to the list provoked huge dissatisfaction with one of New 
Slovenia’s local organisations and the whole leadership of this local organisa-
tion resigned in protest. The decision of the Social Democrats (S&D) that the 
party leader will be the first on the list, followed by both current MEPs, came as 
a surprise and some disagreements with this decision could be observed in the 
party. The candidate list of the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, 
which is not a member of any European party, was headed by a current ALDE 
MEP Ivo Vajgl who felt that his party Zares supported some Eurosceptic stanc-
es, therefore he decided to leave it. Even though four liberal parties, all ALDE 
members (LDS, Zares, DL and member to-be - PS), were engaged in discussion 
on formation of a joint candidate list for several months, all parties in the end ran 
in the elections independently even though the ALDE candidate for President 
of the European Commission Guy Verhofstadt tried to persuade them to form 
a joint list during his visit to Slovenia at the beginning of April 2014. After the 
EU Commissioner J. Potočnik (who would probably be accepted by all four 
parties as the joint candidate list leader) made a final decision not to run on the 
elections, the Civic List quickly formed its own candidate list, while three other 
parties (Positive Slovenia, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and Zares) tried 
to negotiate a joint list right until 24 April. It seems that two late developments 
that occurred in Positive Slovenia led to a decision that the three liberal parties 
would compete on their own. First, on 25 April, when candidate lists had to be 
submitted, a Positive Slovenia congress was held and Zares announced it was 
not going to form a joint list with this party with Janković on the top. Second, 
several days before the deadline for submission of candidate lists, PS announced 
it had selected J. Mencinger, a prominent non-partisan retired economist, who 
usually has critical stances toward the EU and its economic policies, as its lead-
ing candidate, also in the event of a joint three-party candidate list. The cur-
rent MEP J. Kacin (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) opposed the idea because 
he saw Mencinger as a Eurosceptic. On the other hand, PS explained it was 
not possible to form the three-party joint list since Kacin insisted on being the 
Spitzenkandidat of the list. At the end Kacin submitted his own list called List 
Kacin – Concrete, while Liberal Democracy of Slovenia was only its supporter. 
After all the above-mentioned turmoil and ‘popular demands’ in 2012 
and 2013, it was expected that some new parties and new faces would enter 
the political arena and fight for representation in the EP. Indeed, several (new) 
non-parliamentary parties submitted their candidate lists, including United Left 
which took part under the banner of the European Left, and Solidarity which 
had not decided which European party it would like to join (anyway the par-
ty supported Martin Schultz for the President of the European Commission), 
but selected eight candidates for the elections. A civil society organisation sub-
mitted its list under the name I Believe - List of Igor Šoltes. A candidate list 
formed by a citizens’ action or political experiment ran in the elections as well. 
Namely, a Facebook action called a Dream Job was organised and eight candi-
dates among people who expressed an interest in getting a dream job in the EP 
were selected by lot. As the organisers of the action explained, they wished to 
show that sometimes selection by lot yields better results than elections. In addi-
tion, the Pirate Party of Slovenia submitted its list (as the only party with just 
one candidate on the list) as did the Slovenian National Party, which after be-
ing in the national parliament for twenty years stayed out of the 2011 elections. 
The Greens of Slovenia and the Party of the Slovenian Nation submitted their 
candidate lists even though they had not expressed any interest in participating 
in the electoral competition. Forward Slovenia also submitted its list of candi-
dates but was rejected by the Electoral Commission due to formal defectiveness. 
The Youth Party – European Greens (EFGP/EG) started a candidate selection 
procedure but at the end it decided not to enter the election game.
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In 2014 as well, candidate lists were (as they were in 2004 and 2009) domi-
nated by men - women headed only two candidate lists (Zares and United Left). 
Since the law establishes incompatibility of the MEP position with sev-
eral other top political posts, we could expect that top-ranking politicians, es-
pecially those from parliamentary parties, would not run in the EP elections. 
These expectations were mostly proved right in the 2004 and 2009 elections 
[Topolinjak 2010], and also in 2014 only a few parliamentary parties’ leaders 
competed (SD, NSi and SLS) as well as several leaders of non-parliamentary 
parties (Zares, SNS, Greens of Slovenia; the United Left coalition was headed 
by the leader of one of the three parties which formed the coalition), while only 
one current minister ran in the 2014 elections (Civic List).
Programmatic Positions of Political Parties and Lists of Candidates 
that Entered the 2014 EP Electoral Race and the Electoral Campaign
The 2014 EP elections were in many ways comparable to the EP 2004 
and 2009 elections since they likewise relied heavily on the traditional tools 
of campaigning [Deželan 2005]. Consequently, the EP elections emerged as 
a separate type of election in the Slovenian political arena when compared to 
other elections in the country. As a rule, during the campaign competing parties 
and lists replace the otherwise popular practice of capital-intensive campaigns 
(TV commercials, ads, banners) with labour-intensive campaigning [Deželan 
2005]. This practice emerged in the past due to the lack of resources and/or ap-
proaching national elections [Krašovec 2005] and remained as a best practice 
example since this mode of campaigning was appropriated by the surprising 
first winner of the EP elections in Slovenia in 2004 – New Slovenia. 
One of the best ways to grasp the plethora of differences between com-
peting political actors in Europe and elsewhere is to examine their electoral 
manifestos. As manifestos are an “authoritative statement of a party reflecting 
its programmatic profile for an election” [Merz, Regel 2013: 149], it is clear 
that already at this point vast differences between political contestants are ex-
posed. To be precise, only six out of the 16 submitted lists of candidates broadly 
managed to satisfy electoral manifesto criteria [see Merz, Regel 2013] by nam-
ing the prepared documents appropriately, reflecting the position of the party 
together with its programmatic profile as a whole and relating them to the 2014 
EP elections specifically. In addition, the SD and SDS were the only parliamen-
tary parties that passed the above-mentioned criteria and even these two parties 
merely revised and/or upgraded manifestos prepared by their corresponding 
European party (PES and EPP). The rest of them promoted the programmatic 
documents of ‘their’ EU parties – either by translating them or merely referring 
to them – or just deliberated on election topics on the basis of their party plat-
forms, general viewpoints of the main party leaders or their individual positions 
on certain topics. The nascent state of the Slovenian party system – despite its 
two-and-a-half decade existence – is well indicated by the fact that the main 
government party (PS) did not even bother to draw up a programmatic docu-
ment for the elections and instead just relied on the views of the candidate head-
ing the list, who was not even a member of the party. 
Furthermore, Slovenian political parties habitually wait until the very 
last moment to launch their manifestos for EP elections. Their launch, if it hap-
pens at all, is very rarely in line with the official start of the election campaign 
(30 days prior to election day) and is also performed very tentatively. This was 
again evident in the 2014 EP elections since only a few lists of candidates man-
aged to draw up some sort of electoral manifesto only three weeks prior to elec-
tion day [see Hacler 2014] and even those that managed to do so appeared to 
validate the so-called ‘bandwagon effect’ – i.e. parties producing manifestos for 
the sake of having one and primarily preventing situations of being the only one 
not having a manifesto.2 This is reinforced by the fact that electoral manifestos 
are very evasive documents since two months after the elections only a few par-
ties still offer full-text versions of manifestos for citizens to read or download. 
As a result, despite manifestos being a rich source of information on the 
positions of parties and lists of candidates, it is quite difficult to systematically 
discern programmatic positions of the contesting actors due to the gaps created 
by candidate lists not having a manifesto or just translating programmatic posi-
tions from their European counterparts. Therefore, we supplemented information 
gathered from manifestos with information from other programmatic documents 
of parties or lists of candidates and statements of their leaders and frontliners. 
In general, the most important issue in the 2014 EP elections was the ques-
tion of the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties. While in many EU countries 
such parties recorded good electoral results, this was not the case in Slovenia. 
Slovenia was more or less marked by the absence of politicisation regarding EU 
matters, especially prior to EU accession and/or only marginal parties tried to ex-
ploit an electoral opportunity playing on the Eurosceptic card, but without (much) 
success, either in the national parliamentary or EP elections [Krašovec, Lajh 2009]. 
Nevertheless, the 2009 EP elections exposed some noticeable differences between 
parties in this regard, which had not been exposed during the 2009 campaign due 
to the nature of the campaign and the ability of the mass media to determine the 
main campaign themes. Namely, the 2009 EP elections revealed that some parties 
2 As reported by Kustec Lipicer and Bilavčič [2010], all parliamentary parties, except for 
the Slovenian National Party, prepared electoral manifestos for both previous EP elections. 
But, as a rule, they were relatively short documents and for the 2009 election were generally 
even shorter than those for the 2004 election.
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developed a critical, but at the same time still positive, stance toward the EU. 
This emerging scepticism was infused by concerns related to the global economic 
and financial crisis and a more responsible and socially-oriented market economy.
The elections in 2014 brought some new developments in this regard. 
Given the fact that Slovenia seemed to be on the brink of needing a Eurozone 
bailout on several occasions in the past few years, some critical stances on the 
EU and/or its policies could be expected. Not surprisingly, especially new and/or 
non-parliamentary parties allowed themselves to be more critical of the EU; how-
ever, only the radical left parties managed to base their criticism on a systemic set 
of ideological positions and arguments (Solidarity and United Left), but their fire 
has been directed more at the policies of austerity than the EU as such [Haughton, 
Krašovec 2014]. But the novelty was that for the first time, Euroscepticism could 
be observed in some mainstream parties. Among them, the most vigorously 
Eurosceptic at the time of the EP elections was the biggest government party 
(PS), whose candidate list leader Dr. Mencinger (a prominent economist with 
some political experience) expressed many Eurosceptic stances on EU economic 
policies. Other major parties, members of the EU parties (EPP, S&D, ALDE), 
borrowed or adapted programmatic documents from the EU level (action pro-
grammes or EU party election manifestos). As a result, their positions remained 
within the framework of ‘constructive criticism’ and mainly exposed the need for 
reforms of the Union (for example, the SD). The differences between them were 
manifested primarily along the ideological lines of their party families.
The only true newcomer whose bid for an MEP post was successful – Igor 
Šoltes (I Believe - List of Dr. Šoltes) – failed to produce more than a few vague 
lines on the urgency of better assertion of Slovenian interests in Europe and the 
need to change our mentality. In essence, his main cards were his track record as 
a former president of the Court of Audit and a novelty and anti-corruption ticket 
[Haughton, Krašovec 2014], and he played them well, which in fact was not par-
ticularly hard due to the already mentioned developments that have been shaking 
Slovenia in the past several years. On the other hand surprisingly, the leader of 
the Slovenian National Party, Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, who in the 2000 national 
parliamentary elections took a very critical stance towards the EU, while being 
more reserved in exposing his party’s Eurosceptic positions in the 2009 EP elec-
tions, did not ‹attack› the EU in his party political broadcasts, but rather castigat-
ed Slovenian representatives in Brussels for not doing anything for their country 
[Haughton, Krašovec 2014]. In sum, it is possible to say that in the 2014 EP elec-
tions Slovenia faced some soft Euroscepticism [see Szczerbiak, Taggart 2001] 
based exclusively on economic and not ethno-nationalist arguments. 
For many years, the EP elections have been described as elections where 
European issues are overshadowed by national concerns and issues [for example, 
Raunio 2002; Seoane Perez, Lodge 2010], and notable exceptions to the rule have 
been countries with electorally significant Eurosceptical parties [Raunio 2002: 
163]. But, it seems for the first time in 2009, the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the EP campaign was in general more visible, although it indeed varied consid-
erably in the member countries, with Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Italy and Slovenia 
having markedly national campaign frameworks [Seoane Perez and Lodge 2010: 
297-298]. As Krašovec and Lajh point out [2010], in Slovenia the first EP elec-
tions in 2004 also focused predominantly on national issues - this was very prob-
ably connected with parties’ interest or propaganda relative to the upcoming na-
tional parliamentary elections. In the 2014 campaign in Slovenia, in contrast to 
many other EU countries where European issues seemed to have been much 
more prominent in the campaigns for these EP elections than in previous elec-
tions, European issues were again marginal in the campaign (hardly surprising 
if we take into account Raunio›s observations on the importance of Eurosceptic 
parties in this regard), while Šabić et al. [2014] even concluded that the impor-
tance of European issues decreased in comparison with the 2009 EP elections.3 
This prominence of domestic issues in 2014 was clearly connected with 
three events. First, a lot of time and energy in the (pre-)campaign period had 
been devoted to a referendum on the Amendments to the Law on Archives and 
Archival Material. The referendum was initiated by the SDS and supported by 
voters. In February-March 2014 a battle erupted over the date when it would be 
held. While the initiator strongly demanded it be held simultaneously with the 
EP elections, the government parties strongly opposed the idea, and both insist-
ed on their stances due to their own political calculations. Second, as mentioned 
above, a battle over leadership in the PS culminated on the eve of the 2014 EP 
elections. Prime Minister Bratušek lost the party leadership elections and, as she 
had promised if such a scenario came to pass, resigned from the PM position at 
the beginning of May. After the resignation of the government, the main topic in 
Slovenia became the question of early parliamentary elections. Third, almost si-
multaneously with the leadership elections in the PS, the leader of the biggest op-
position party (SDS) and former PM Janša was sent to prison. Already in 2013 he 
was found guilty of taking payments from a Finnish defence contractor during his 
2004-2008 spell as Slovenia’s premier (Patria scandal), while at the end of April 
2014 the verdict was upheld by the Higher Court (the Court of Appeal). These de-
velopments almost completely overshadowed the upcoming EP elections. 
The focus of party campaigning was therefore logically oriented to-
wards domestic issues and domestic problems that may4 or may not be con-
3 According to van der Berge [2014: 4], this only happened in Slovenia and Cyprus.
4 As Krašovec and Lajh [2010] found, even in 2009 some primarily EU-related topics 
(financial and economic crisis, employment and social protection in Europe, and EU 
enlargement) were put almost exclusively in a national perspective in Slovenia.
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nected to the EU. And when the EU was finally discussed, this was normally 
linked to the high salaries of MEPs, lucrative positions connected to the EU’s 
political and bureaucratic milieus, and the (mal)distribution of EU funds. It is 
nevertheless fair to say that political actors competing for the job of MEP had 
few chances to properly present their programmatic standpoints due to the un-
availability of media space and poor knowledge of citizens about the structure 
and functioning of the EU. The shortage of media coverage originated from the 
rigid normative framework of public television, which has to provide balanced 
coverage of election race, as well as the virtual absence of the campaign from 
the private networks as EP elections proved to attract relatively small numbers 
of viewers and thus also low ratings. The citizen knowledge gap, on the other 
hand, is related to the low presence of EU-related content in formal curriculums 
as well as only sporadic attempts to inform and educate citizens about the EU 
(e.g. EP information campaigns conducted prior to every EP election).
Public Opinion Polls 
Several public opinion polls on the EP elections were conducted and 
their results presented to the public. First, there was a question about the voter 
turnout. According to the public opinion polls, approximately 30% of voters 
said they would vote for sure, while the same percentage of voters said they 
are very probably going to vote. Also, public opinion polls in the past predicted 
a relatively high turnout, but in both previous EP elections, the voter turnout 
was only 28%. In view of a decrease in the already relatively low level of trust 
in politics and political institutions in the last several years, it was estimated a 
turnout close to the 2004 and 2009 EP elections or lower would be more plau-
sible. The second question was connected to the importance of a party list’s 
leaders in voters’ electoral decisions. As many as 70% of voters said they were 
going to make their electoral decision based on the leader of the candidate lists. 
Finally, data on the expected election results for individual parties with the pre-
dicted leaders of their lists was presented by several mass media and/or pub-
lic opinion poll agencies. Actually, all of them predicted a victory for the SDS 
(when the EU Commissioner Potočnik at the beginning of March was men-
tioned as a potential candidate of the PS and/or a potential joint list of ALDE 
members, surveys showed this list would win), followed by the joint list of NSi 
and SLS. Soon after its decision to take part in the elections, the List of Igor 
Šoltes occupied the third position in the polls, while SD and DeSUS were also 
each expected to receive an MEP. 
Results of the EP Elections and Its Consequences
As the public opinion polls suggested, the winner of the 2014 EP elec-
tion was the SDS with three MEPs, followed by the joint list of NSi and the 
SLS with two MEPs (the leader of the SLS was elected by preference votes 
even though he was the last on the candidate list), while SD got one MEP. 
More importantly, in SD the party leader who insisted on heading the candidate 
list was heavily defeated by the current MEP Fajon – the latter received 11,681 
preference votes, while the party leader received only 6,882 such votes. For the 
first time, SLS and DeSUS received an MEP, while MEP Kacin after two man-
dates did not get enough votes to enter the EP for the third time.
Four of the six MEPs who ran in the elections were re-elected. Looking 
from the European perspective, the EPP with five seats was the winner of the 
Slovenian EP elections, while S&D received one MEP. ALDE also received one 
MEP since MEP Vajgl again joined the ALDE even though in 2014 he was elect-
ed on DeSUS’s list, whose programme is probably closer to the social democratic 
camp. But DeSUS has not been affiliated with any EU party, and therefore such a 
solution could be implemented. Although even right after the elections, it was not 
clear to which EU party/party group Šoltes from ‹his› Verjamem list would join, 
ALDE or EG, at the end the latter, with Šoltes becoming its first Slovenian MEP.
Looking at the EP election results, one can hardly avoid the famous sec-
ond-order national elections conceptual framework for analysing elections, in-
troduced by Reif and Schmitt [1980], even though it has been heavily debated 
throughout. For example, Koepke and Ringe [2006], but especially Clark and 
Rohrschneider [2009], have fiercely criticised the conceptual framework and its 
validity in the Central European countries. It seems the strongest criticism was 
directed at the observation by Reif and Schmitt on losses by government par-
ties and the importance of the national electoral cycle in this regard. As noted by 
Cabada [2010], analysis of the 2009 EP elections in these countries clearly shows 
some peculiarities and deviations from the second-order national elections frame-
work, but also confirms some of its elements. In Slovenia, all three EP elections 
were held at points in the national electoral cycle where governing parties are 
supposed to get, according to Koepke and Ringe [2006], the same or higher share 
of the vote in the EP elections as they did in the national ones – the 2004 and 2014 
EP elections was held in the later term, while the 2009 EP election was held in 
the honeymoon period. Nevertheless, all three senior government coalition par-
ties can be regarded as big losers of the EP elections – in 2004, the LDS lost 15% 
in the EP elections in relation to the previous national parliamentary election, 
in 2009 the SD lost 12% while in 2014 PS recorded even 22% lower support in 
the EP elections than in the previous national parliamentary elections. However, 
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the PS’s defeat (as well as the SD’s defeat in 2009 due to the economic and finan-
cial crisis and its unsuccessful handling of it) was somehow expected due to the 
fact that just before the EP elections, a battle over the leadership position between 
Janković and Bratušek led to the party’s split (and the fall of the government). 
The party list was therefore headed by prominent non-partisan Eurosceptic econ-
omist Dr. Mencinger, who had to fight the campaign literally by himself, because 
seven other candidates found themselves in different political groups after the big 
schism in the PS, which led to their complete inactivity.
All government parties together in case of three EP elections held in 
Slovenia also recorded significantly lower support in the EP election than in 
the previous national parliamentary election (in the 2004 EP election, govern-
ment parties altogether received only 36% in comparison to 53.3% of the vote 
in the 2000 national election; in the 2009 EP election, they received altogether 
46.9%, while less than a year before, in the 2008 national elections, they re-
ceived 52.4%; in the 2014 EP elections, the drop in support for government 
parties altogether was dramatic since they received only 23.9% in comparison 
with 54.3% in the 2011 national elections). Taking all this data into account, 
it is possible even after the 2014 EP elections to agree with Cabada [2010] that 
Slovenia represents the greatest deviation from the second-order national elec-
tion framework among CEE countries in this respect.
Table 3. Results of the 2009 and 2014 EP Elections in Slovenia
PARTY
2009 2014
Votes 
(%) Seats
EP Seats 
(%)
Votes 
(%) Seats
EP Seats 
(%)
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) 26.6 2(3)* 0.4 24.8 3 0.4
Social Democrats (SD) 18.4 2 0.3 8.1 1 0.1
New Slovenia–Christian Democrats (NSi) 16.5 1 0.1 16.6** 2** 0.2
Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) 3.6 0 0 16.6** 2** 0.2
I Believe - List of Igor Šoltes / / / 10.3 1 0.1
Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) 7.2 0 0 8.1 1 0.1
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) 11.5 1 0.1 / 0 0
Zares 9.8 1 0.1 0.9 0 0
Positive Slovenia (PS) / / / 6.6 0 0
United Left Coalition (ZL) / / / 5.5 0 0
Civic List (DL) / / / 1.1 0 0
Others 0 0
*After ratification of the Lisbon treaty, Slovenia received another MEP and according to the EP 
election results SDS got another MEP
** NSi and SLS in 2014 formed a joint list of candidates
Bold: Government parties at the time of the 2009 EP elections
Italic: Government parties at the time of the 2014 EP elections
Last but not least, Slovenia with a 24.5% voter turnout (in both the pre-
vious EP elections it recorded the same, namely 28.3%) had one of the lowest 
turnouts in the EU. Although the less-at-stake argument [Reif, Schmitt 1980] 
was offered to explain low(er) turnout for a long time, this can no longer be the 
case since the EP’s powers have been progressively increased while turnout re-
mained somewhat disappointing [Lodge 2010]. As Lodge [2010: 19] establishes, 
dissipating national electoral resources, enthusiasm and funding for the election 
of MEPs remained a low priority for top-level politicians, party activists and 
political journalists. Such characteristics have been obvious in all Slovenian EP 
elections so far [see Krašovec ed. 2005; Kustec Lipicer ed. 2005; Krašovec ed. 
2010; Krašovec, Lajh 2010; Krašovec, Malčič 2014; Haughton, Krašovec 2014]. 
When speaking about the consequences of the EP elections for the nation-
al arena, several things can be mentioned. First, even though EP elections are pre-
dominantly seen as second-order elections, they were fatal for three party leaders; 
two leaders of government parties, SD’s Dr. Lukšič and CL’s Dr. Virant resigned 
from their leadership positions due the bad results of their parties. In both cases, 
the EP election results were conclusive proof that due to declining public sup-
port, two government parties had ‘to deal’ with their unpopular leaders before 
the highly important race in July 2014 – early national parliamentary elections. 
Non-parliamentary Zares’s leader P. Gantar resigned. Second, the fact that con-
servatives (SDS and joint list of NSi and SLS) received ‘only’ 41.1% of the votes 
but five MEPs (62.5% of all Slovenian MEPs), together with the good experi-
ence with the NSi-SLS joint list and the fiasco of the ALDE members, on the 
other hand, who could not agree upon a joint list triggered many statements in the 
centre-left camp on the need to overcome divisions to fight the much more united 
conservative camp in the upcoming national parliamentary elections. The need to 
prepare a joint list even became a kind of slogan. The result can be best described 
by quoting Shakespeare’s words - much ado about nothing since only the SD and 
Solidarity found enough common ground to form a joint candidate list under the 
SD’s name, while the completely marginalised Zares and LDS ran under the ban-
ner of the Alliance of Alenka Bratušek. Third, even though the big majority of 
votes were assigned to established parties, the EP elections empirically confirmed 
that voters indeed (still) long for new parties and faces in politics – not only 
Dr. Šoltes with his List (10.3%), but also the United Left (5.5%), the ‹provocative 
experiment› Dream Job (3.5%) and the Pirate Party (2.5% confirmed this (in the 
national parliamentary elections the newcomer Party of Miro Cerar convincingly 
won the elections with 34.5%, while UL received 6%). Fourth, the EP elections 
were a good predictor or even confirmation of the already expected failure of 
government parties in the national parliamentary elections – PS with only 3% 
(as well as the PM›s Alliance of Alenka Bratušek formed after the schism with 
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only 4.4%), with SD (6%) and CL (0.6%) where even the new (acting) leaders 
could not prevent their parties from suffering a big defeat. Only one government 
party, DeSUS, recorded better results. Fifth, European success on the other hand 
‹beheaded› the SLS and the new Šoltes party (I Believe), whose leaders felt very 
comfortable with their MEP positions and both only under certain pressures de-
cided to run in the national elections - and lost. SLS as a continually parliamen-
tary party since the first multiparty elections in 1990 did not reach the threshold, 
while I Believe proved to be a mayfly completely dependent on its leader (it re-
ceived only 0.8% on the national elections).
Due to all the described characteristics, it is possible to agree with 
Haughton and Krašovec [2014] that the “EP elections were a dress rehearsal 
for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The stage was set, the parties were 
donning their costumes and new actors were frantically learning their lines, al-
beit no one was quite sure when the performance would begin”.
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Abstract:
The aim of the article was discuss the elections to the European Parliament 
in Poland in 2014, taking into consideration the political situation before the elec-
tions in particular. The influence of the parliamentary elections in 2011 on the 
Polish political scene, and the activity of governmental coalition of the Civic 
Platform and the Polish Peasant Party, as well as the emergence of new political 
entities actively participating in electoral competition, has been analysed.
A detailed analysis was done regarding the course of election campaign, 
paying attention to the elements of negative campaigning as well as the course 
of the elections themselves. The final reflections were dedicated to the election 
results and their influence (consequences) on the Polish party system.
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Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) is one of its kind forum where it comes 
to both confrontation as well as cooperation of almost all major political forces 
in the European Union (EU). Despite the fact that at the beginning of its exi-
stence the PE had only consultation rights, now, after a series of institutional 
reforms it can, in some extent, influence decisions of the EU which have great 
importance for millions of European citizens [Domagała 2010: 11-13]. The PE 
elections are not, however, a European event par excellence. They take place in 
particular member states, they are held in local languages and are participated 
politicians known in a particular country, not in the whole EU. Additionally, they 
do not take place on the same day and according to the same electoral system 
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[Wiszniowski 2008: 131-141]. The PE election campaign is controlled by do-
mestic political parties, the role of European issues is only symbolical and it 
revolves around those issues which concern domestic political affairs. The elec-
tions held in such a manner do not foster looking from the political perspective 
at problems of the EU as a whole, as well as European community integration.
As noticed by Jacek Kucharczyk and Melchior Szczepanik, „the elec-
tions, which are European only by their name, and are the most noticeable ex-
ample of the weakness of the European Union as a political institution. There is 
a lack common political identity, which should be manifested by the European 
institutions. Until now no common political space has been created but there 
are 27 separate such spaces [since 1st July 2013 the number of member states is 
28. Croatia, as the first Balkan state, has gained EU membership –D.S], which 
are connected only in a limited area. To put it in a nutshell –if a European 
demos [in bold as in the original – D.S] exists – it remains latent, not giv-
ing the ones ruling the EU clear directives concerning the future of Europe” 
[Kucharczyk, Szczepanik 2010: 7-8]. A partial solution in this matter was to 
prepare a Constitution Treaty, which did not improve the position of the PE. 
The improvement occurred on 1st of December 2009 with the legislation of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which enforced the role of the EP.
The enforcement in question concerned the two areas: material and in-
stitutional. Within the material dimension the enforcement of the EP role relied 
first and foremost on including the new areas into the so-called ordinary legis-
lation procedure, the obligation for making most international agreements to 
be approved by the EP, as well as a series of changes in comitologic and bud-
get procedures. The second dimension –the institutional one –has a significant 
role with regards to the elections perspective, as the changes introduced by the 
Lisbon treaty concerned the composition of the EP itself and the role of this in-
stitution in choosing the President of the Council of the European Union. Except 
this change, the Lisbon treaty gave the EU legal personality, it liquidated the 
European Community, abolished a system of three legal pillars and made reorga-
nization of EU legal institutions. The citizens gained the laws of (indirect) initia-
tive in legislating the new EU law [Barcz 2009: 6; Wojtaszczyk 2013: 183-187].
It should be mentioned that despite a series of the reforms made, the EP 
is first and foremost the EU institution which meets the conditions of enforcing 
democracy in EU. Since 1979 it is elected in direct elections by the total popu-
lation of the member states, but despite this the elections to this institution do 
not arouse great interest of European citizens, which is indicated by low turnout. 
The elections in 2014 as well as two previous elections did not enjoy great pub-
lic interest. In the first, historic EP elections in June 2014 the turnout amounted 
only 20,87% of the entitled to vote. Among the 25 countries lower turnout was 
only in Slovakia (16,66%). In Poland it was accounted for not preparing the citi-
zens for elections, lack of attractive election offer and poor information cam-
paign. In 2009 during the next elections to EP the turnout among Poles was only 
slightly higher than in 2004 and amounted just 24,54% of the entitled to vote. 
At that time Poland was at the 25th place among 27 member states with regards 
to the turnout, ahead of Lithuania (24,54%) and Slovakia (19,63%).
The aim of the following analysis is to discuss the EP elections in 
Poland in 2014, considering the political situation in Poland before elections, 
the course of election campaign and elections themselves, as well as the results 
and their influence (consequences) and the Polish party system 
The political situation in Poland before elections
The Polish political scene was shaped after the parliamentary elections 
held on 9th October 2011, which were won by the centre-right Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska –PO). The government, headed again by D. Tusk was 
entered by Polish Peoples Party (aka Polish Peasant Party – Polskie Sronnictwo 
Ludowe – PSL), a moderate pheasant party. In both governments PSL got 3 re-
sorts; these included: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, as well as Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. The newly elec-
ted parliament entered: PO, PiS (Law and Justice – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), 
Palikot’s Movement that was later transformed into Your Movement (TR – 
Twój Ruch) and Democratic Left Allience (SLD) as well as opposition parties. 
The primary objective of PO-PSL coalition was to continue actions initiat-
ed in the Parliament of the 6th term of office (2007-2011). Announcing the action 
programme, D. Tusk pointed out to the necessity of providing the citizens with 
security and welfare, and as for the economy issues he announced „abandoning” 
in „2012 the procedure of excessive deficit and reaching at the end of the year 
about 3% PKB deficit of public finances sector, decrease of the public debt to the 
value of 52% of the GDP in 2012 with its systematic decrease to 47% in 2015” 
[Expose 2012: 2-3]. Besides that the Prime Minister also assured rationalising 
public administration by its „reduction” and making it more friendly and useful. 
Another point was the reform of KRUS (Agricultural Social Insurance Fund) re-
lying on the change in a system for collecting health contribution from farmers, 
as well as the change in granting family allowances and child relief.
Important actions undertaken by the government were rising the pen-
sion contribution by 2% on the side of the employers; introducing changes in 
the valorization amount of pensions and annuities and rising retirement age 
for men and women to 67. Tax advantage for copyright work contracts was 
reduced, internet and bank deposit allowances were abolished, which enabled 
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to avoid capital gains tax (the so-called Belka tax); the expenditures for army 
remained at the same level (1,95% of GDP) and the basic salary for uniformed 
services workers was risen in 2012 by 300 PLN.
It is noteworthy that since the beginning of the parliamentary elec-
tions PO has maintained high support despite decreasing trust to government, 
which indicates „consolidation of anxiety against the possibility of the return-
ing PiS (Law and Justice) and the conviction that PO is an alternative for that” 
[Fuksiewicz, Szczepanik 2009: 15]. In April 2014, when one of the most cru-
cial issues was war in Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation, the government of D. Tusk was supported by every fourth person 
interviewed (25%) by CBOS (Centrum Badania Opini Społecznej - Centre for 
Public Opinion Research); against the government were 43% of the interviewed, 
and indifference for PO-PSL coalition was declared by 29% of the people in-
terviewed. This attitude towards D. Tusk cabinet was mostly influenced by the 
size of the place of residence, socio-economic status, or interviewed views and 
ideas. The negative scores of the government concerned only the area of econo-
my, where 66% of the interviewed marked government activities in these areas 
as bad. The prime minister was rated well by young people with higher education 
and by people who evaluated their economic condition as good. The definite op-
ponents were young people in the age between 18 and 24. Disapprovement was 
expressed by PiS –supporters with un-defined party preferences [BS/49/2014].
In the period preceding the EP elections there occurred several transfor-
mations on the Polish political scene. As a result of a split in PiS, 15 members 
of parliament and 1 senator of this party founded on 7th November 2011 United 
Poland Parliamentary Club, which leader became A. Mularczyk. Then an ini-
tiative was undertaken within the party to form a political party now listed as 
Zbigniew Ziobro United Poland (Solidarna Polska Zbigniewa Ziobro – SPZZ), 
which occurred on 24th March 2014. Its leaders are Z. Ziobro (the leader), 
B. Kempa (vice-leader) and T. Cymański, A. Dera, M. Golba, P. Jaki, J. Rojek, 
M. Wójcik, J. Ziobro, K. Ziobro or J. �aczek (members). In 2012 the party list-
ed about 5 thousand members.
Palikot Movement, a liberal left-wing political party, which in 2011 elec-
tions introduced 40 MPs, transformed into Your Movement (Twój Ruch) group-
ing, associating except for Palikot Movement members also some of the members 
of Europa Plus Social Movement (aka Europa Plus), some of the leaders from the 
Polish Labour Party –August 80 (PPP- August 80), a group of activists of Social 
Democracy of Poland (SDPL) and Reason Party (Racja PL). The foundation of the 
previously mentioned Europa Plus association should also be mentioned. The ini-
tiator of its foundation was Member of the European Parliament from SLD party, 
M. Siwiec, who after leaving the party in 2012 set cooperation with J. Palikot. 
Europa Plus was founded in 2013 and a month later a common programme by 
the participation of Palikot Movement, SDPL, Labour Union, the Reason Party 
and the Left Union (UL – Unia Lewicy) was compiled. The face of this project 
became A. Kwaśniewski, who together with J. Palikot and M. Siwiec announced 
the formation of the new centre-left association. SLD (Democratic Left Allience) 
refused to involve in cooperation for this undertaking and made electoral reg-
isters together with UP. In May and June 2013 Europa Plus was joined by the 
new political parties: the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne – SD), 
PPS- August 80 and the Democratic Party demokraci.pl. UP eventually resigned 
from participating in the project. The association was headed by M. Siwiec, 
A. Kwaśniewski and J. Palikot, and the vice leaders became K. Iszkowski and 
R. Kwiatkowski. The coalition ended up on 26th May 2014.
The final example of shaping Polish political scene was founding, on 7th 
December 2013, the centre-right political party with conservative incline – 
Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together (PRJG – Polska Razem Jarosława Gowina). 
The make-up of the new formation, founded by a former PO politician, J. Gowin, 
included members of the Poland Comes First party (P. Kowal – the leader), the 
‘Republicans’ association (headed by P. Wipler, who quite soon left the party 
together with his association members), as well as a part of former PO politi-
cians. PRJR was soon joined by Conservative People’s Party (Stronnictwo 
Konserwatywno-Ludowe) under the leadership of M. Zagórski. The party au-
thorities included J. Gowin (the leader) P. Dardziński, K. Iglicka-Okólska, 
M. Zagórski and P. Zając (vice-leaders). The leader of the national council be-
came P. Kowal. Currently, the party enlists about 4,5 – 5 thousand members.
The additional background for all the events connected with the EP elec-
tion campaign was the previously mentioned military conflict in Ukraine pre-
ceded by a series of protests and manifestations that began in November 2013 
as a result of postponing by the Ukrainian President, W. Janukowycz, the de-
cision about signing association agreement with the EU. This led, eventually, 
to the removal of the president from his office and then his fleeing from the 
country. The numerous protests and manifestations were being brutally sup-
pressed and the participants demanded signing the association agreement with 
the EU. In January and February 2014 the separatists began a military upris-
ing against the newly elected Ukrainian authorities and declared the forma-
tion of self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s re-
public, supported by the Russian Federation. Together with seizure of Donbas 
key cities the separatists proclaimed in May 2014 the Russian Federation of 
Novorossiya. The only actions undertaken against the growing conflict by the 
international community was providing Ukrainians with support, as well as 
laying embargos on Russia by the European Union. Poland actively involved 
103
European Parliament Elections in Poland in 2014Dominik Szczepański
102
in the situation in Ukraine. Its main purpose was first and foremost providing 
material support, especially blankets, medicines and medical equipment. These 
actions positively influenced the scores of D. Tusk government [BS/49/2014].
The election campaign
According to the electoral law in force Poland has been divided into 
13 election districts, which by no means do not overlap the Voivodships (provinc-
es) borders, by the method of their connection „with varied population, from 2 mln 
in Subcarpathian area to almost 5 mln in Silesia […] indicates how significant is 
the influence of current situation of political parties in support ranking on the cur-
rent solutions with regards to electoral laws” [Glajcar 2010: 59]. Such electoral 
law legislated by the government of Leszek Miller does not meet the formal re-
quirement of equality, as some regions are overrepresented and some underrepre-
sented. The table 1 shows areas of electoral districts to the EP in Poland.
The main axis of Polish politics before PE elections in 2014 was the 
conflict between PO and PiS, especially criticism of D. Tusk actions; the oth-
er parties (PSL, SLD-UP, SPZZ, PRJG, Congress of the New Right or Self-
Defense) were only a background of the conflict, sustaining the polarization 
during the electoral campaign. 
Table 1. Areas of electoral districts to the European parliament in Poland
Number of the 
electoral district
Area of the electoral district and the headquater of the election 
committee
1 Pomearian Voivodship – Gdańsk
2 Kuyavian-Pomearian Voivodshi – Bydgoszcz
2 Podlaskie and Warmian-Masurian voivodship – Olsztyn
4
Warsaw and 8 countries of the Masovian voivodship (grodziski, legionow-
ski, nowodworski, otwocki, piaseczyński, pruszkowski, warszawski za-
chodni oraz wołomiński) – Warszawa
5 4 urban districts (Płock, Radom, Ostrołęka i Siedlce) and 29 countries of the Masovian voivodship – Warsaw
6 Łódź voivodship – Łódź
7 Greater Poland voivodship – Poznań
8 Lublin voivodship – Lublin
9 Subcarpathian voivodship – Rzeszów
10 Lesser Poland and Świętokrzyskie voivodships – Kraków
11 Silesian voivodship – Katowice
12 Lower Silesian and Opole voivodships – Wrocław
13 Lubusz and West Pomearian voivodships – Gorzów Wielkopolski
Source: self study on the basis of: Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Dz.U. 
2004 nr 25 poz. 219. z późn. zm.
The domestic campaign did not by any means encourage to voting. 
There were neither educational aspects nor factual discussions. The basic tool, 
which was used most often, were election spots shown in TV and in internet. 
The topics of the campaign concerned almost exclusively domestic issues and 
they revolved around previously mentioned conflict between PO and PIS and 
concentrated on the achievements of the current coalition with regards to in-
ternal policy. The criticism concerned mainly the Prime Minister, not fulfilling 
the electoral promises from 2011, inefficiency and caring about self-interest of 
PO and PSL members, or too moderate approach towards the Ukrainian crisis.
The beginning of the election campaign was dominated by the approval 
and public announcement of the candidates to run for office from the first plac-
es at electoral registers to EP. This phenomenon concerned almost all election 
committees and lasted till 2nd February 2014. Europa Plus and Your Movement 
announced their candidates as the first committee. The lists included, among 
others, K. Szczuka, R. Kalisz, W. Nowicka, A. Celiński, M. Siwiec, J. Hartman 
or K. Kutz. Presenting famous and popular in left-wing circles people was 
aimed at drawing not only Your Movement electorate, but also SLD-UP (rival 
parties), feminists, and young people weary of the division into PO supporters 
and PiS antagonists.
PO, PiS, PSL, SLD-UP, SPZZ and PRJG put their trust in well known and 
prominent politicians coming from their own political formations; these includ-
ed, among others: J. Buzek, J. Lewandowski, E. Łukacijewska, B. Kudrycka, 
D. Hübner (PO); A. Fotyga, K. Karski, Z. Krasnodębski, M. Piotrowski, 
R. Czarnecki (PiS); E. Kłopotek, S. �elichowski, J. Kalinowski, W. Kosiniak-
Kamysz, J. Fedak (PSL), L. Pastusiak, J. Zemke, T. Iwiński, W. Olejniczak, 
A. Kalata (SLD-UP); L. Dorn, M. Golba, Z. Ziobro, T. Adamek, B. Kempa 
(SPZZ); J. �alek, P. Kowal, J. Godson, D. Lipiński, K. Jaworski (PRJG). 
Except for the previously mentioned formations the parties that took part in 
elections included also National Movement, J. Korwin-Mikke’s Congress of 
the New Right, Self-defence, Greens Party and Direct Democracy [PKW data 
from 2014].
A significant role in the creation of domestic campaign played previ-
ously mentioned election spots, among which the ones of Your Movement and 
PiS included definitely the greatest amount of negative views. The aim was to 
discredit political rivals. Your Movement began to broadcast spots connect-
ed with criticising PiS and warning Poles before return of the party to pow-
er, which was referred to as „political hogs”. PiS, on the other hand, concen-
trated on presenting scandals made by the drunk J. Protasiewicz (PO) at the 
airport in Frankfurt, criticising J. Rostowski (the former minister in the PO-
PSL government who „got Poland into debts more than Gierek, rose taxes and 
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retirement age”), M. Boni (reducing freedom of the information transfer in inter-
net) and M. Kamiński (the former PiS spin doctor, listed at the first place of elec-
toral register in Lublin, who was presented as the greatest lazybones in the EP). 
The electoral spots of PO and PSL were of milder tone. The faces of PO 
were J. Buzek, J. Lewandowski, R. Sikorski and D. Tusk, and, what is impor-
tant, the spots omitted the aspect of competition with PiS. The focus was only 
on encouraging the voters to vote for PO and on the attempt to convince the 
society about the possibility of conducting difficult negotiations about the new 
EU budget which would be beneficial for Poland. PSL on the other hand con-
centrated on the future and on things that connect Poles, namely house, street 
and people we meet on our way. These values were supported by the main ob-
jectives from the programme: tradition, modernity and Poland. The other par-
ties strongly referred in their spots to the political rivals, indicating the things 
differing them from the present political class [Grochal, Kondzińska 2014: 3].
The key issue discussed in the campaign was the healthcare. The de-
bate in this field was organised by PiS. In the last moment D. Tusk resigned 
from participation which met with immediate reaction of J. Kaczyński who 
described the Prime Minister as „coward”. Representatives of other groups, 
especially D. Gardias, a nurse who was on the first place of the electoral list of 
Your Movement, W. Elsner (YM), or T. Latos (the head of the parliamentary 
committee for healthcare from PiS) had not been invited to the debate. The de-
bate showed clearly that PiS, which demanded increasing funds for healthcare, 
was not able to indicate the source of financing [Nowakowska 2014: 5].
Another point which should be mentioned is the lack of any debate con-
cerning economic issues. Almost all the committees presenting electoral pro-
grammes and spots avoided referring to the economic issues. The reason for 
this was, supposing, cautious attitude towards introducing Euro currency in 
Poland. The leader of PRJG party, J. Gowin called upon the Prime Minister 
D. Tusk to present the plans of government in this area. The leader of PiS, 
J. Kaczyński advocated the idea to organise referendum before accepting the 
new currency. In other words, the economic issues, that appeared frequently in 
previous campaigns, did not meet with interest among EP candidates.
An evident element of the campaign was previously mentioned affa-
ir in Ukraine. The debate in this matter was organise in Hybryda student club 
in Warsaw. The leaders of Greens, PRJG, SPZZ, National Movement, SLD, 
PO and PiS. The most discussion revolved around the issue of Polish foreign 
policy and how effectively stop actions of V. Putin and was completely domi-
nated by PiS and PO politicians who accused the other leaders of no action and 
submissiveness towards Russia.
It should be noted that lack of factual discussions and political debates 
participated by the leaders of electoral registers, which was noticeable during 
the EP campaign in 2014, was transferred into electronic media. It was by the 
means of political parties internet websites or blogs of particular candidates 
and politicians running for an EP office, or social networks such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Nasza Klasa, Youtube, Flickr or Pinterest, that most materials reflec-
ting the attempt to win the support of voters was presented. These materials 
were exclusively dedicated to EP elections.
A relatively new approach towards making campaign turned out to be ac-
tions initiated by J. Korwin-Mikke, the leader of the New Right, who publicly 
stated that his participation in elections was dictated by the attempt to ridicule and 
show the whole „evil” of the EU from the inside. He also added that in case of 
winning an office his MPs will use all the privileges of the EU in order to „over-
throw the system”. The electoral programme of this group was radical, which was 
reflected, among others, by the slogan „we are not going to fight with poverty, 
but we are not going to prevent the poor ones to get richer”. It should also be men-
tioned that on the electoral lists of the New Right there were no prominent politi-
cians of this party, but only the local activists. The only exception was J. Korwin-
Mikke himself, who ran for an office in Silesia. During the period preceding the 
EP elections the party gained from several to over a dozen thousand supporters on 
Facebook page alone, only because it was heavily reported and because its lead-
ers were in the media. When answering the question whether it could be planned 
in advance, Mikołaj Cześnik, the head of the Social Sciences Institute at the 
University of Social Sciences and Humanities stated that „perhaps J. Korwin-
Mikke has clever advisors, who decided that it would be best to show him when 
he is in his elements, when he seems great, authentic and reliable in what he is 
saying” [Kublik 2014: 5]. The New Right campaign was, in his opinion efficient, 
mainly because of the frankness and truthfulness of the opinions presented.
When it comes to political conflicts that became evident during the cam-
paign it should be noted that they concerned more the party divisions than per-
sonal issues. The previously mentioned conflict between PO and PiS feuded since 
2005 should be mentioned here, as well as electoral spots of Your Movement, 
in which PiS was being attacked directly and the society was warned against 
the return of this party to power. Except that one could notice conflicts between 
Europa Plus Your Movement and SLD-UP, where the SLD leader, L. Miller criti-
cised directly A. Kwaśniewski who supported with his own name the coalition. 
A dispute was also caused by the transfer of the previously expelled SLD politi-
cian, R. Kalisz, who supported the Europa Plus Your Movement coalition.
Most conflicts could have been seen in PiS alone and they concerned the 
candidates supported by the Toruń community connected with father confessor 
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T. Rydzyk. The dispute, which divided PiS voters, revolved around the demands 
made by Rydzyk to place on PiS electoral lists people connected with the Toruń 
broadcasting agency1. The conflict grew stronger to such an extent that the par-
ty leader had to ‘anoint’ the electoral lists leaders himself and to indicate who 
should be voted. Such a situation occurred in several Polish cities, especially 
in Lublin (W. Paruch, a political scientist, the leader of PiS electoral list com-
peted with M. Piotrowski), in Rzeszów (the EP member, T. Poręba, compete 
with his party colleague S. Ożóg) and in Łódź (where the TV Trwam proté-
gée, U. Krupa was in the 3rd place on the list), or Kuyavian-Pomerian district, 
the „den” of the Toruń broadcasting institution (where instead of A. Jaworski 
PiS chose A. Zybertowicz) [Kondzińska 2014: 4]. Eventually, the head of the 
Toruń radio station announced the split with PiS and the cessation of further 
cooperation; this concerned also visiting Radio Maryja and Trwam TV by the 
politicians of PiS who remained loyal to the leader.
Election
A couple of days before the vote, the electoral committees of the two lar-
gest rival political parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, were carefully 
analysing the election polls from the last few days, which clearly showed that 
the difference between the parties will be only 2-3%.
Table 2. Poll results showing support for the parties/committees
Date of 
polling PO PiS E+ TR PSL SLD-UP SPZZ PRJG KNP RN
April 30th 29% 21% 2% 4% 6% 1% 4% 6% 0%
May 14th 21% 20% 2% 3% 6% 2% 1% 6% –
May 20th 26% 21% 2% 5% 8% 1% 2% 4% 0%
Source: Own elaboration based on CBOS polls. (Centre for Public Opinion Research)
As Table 2 shows, the greatest disparities between PO and PiS were vis-
ible on April 30th and May 20th, where the advantage of PO over PiS was in turn 
8 and 5%. Other election committees, with the exception of PSL and SLD-UP, 
were below the electoral threshold of 5%. It was also surprising that a few days 
before the election, public support had decreased for almost the majority of the 
parties supporting the polarity during the election campaign.
According to surveys carried out by OBOP, the elections to EP did not 
enjoy excessive interest among the public. A discernible decline in their im-
portance was much greater than in relation to the elections of 2009 and was 
1 Radio Maryja - religious and political socially conservative Polish radio station. The Radio 
Maryja Family is a religious movement led by Rydzyk
explained by not only their specificity, but also as a result of a more general 
trend, namely „a generally decreasing sense of meaning and importance of any 
elections to representative institutions” [BS/24/2014].
Table 3. A comparison of the results of the elections to the European 
Parliament in 2014 and 2009
Party/committee
2014 2009
Seats Number of votes
Number 
of votes % Seats
Number 
of votes
Number 
of votes %
Civic Platform 19 2 271 215 32,13 25 3 271 852 44,43
Law and Justice 19 2 246 870 31,78 15 2 017 607 27,40
Democratic Left Alliance – 
Labor Union 5 667 319 9,44 7 908 765 12,34
New Right of Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke 4 505 586 7,15 - - -
Polish People’s Party 4 480 846 6,80 3 516 146 7,0
United Poland of Zbigniew 
Ziobro 0 281 079 3,98 - - -
Europa Plus Social Movement 0 252 699 3,58 - - -
Poland Together of Jarosław 
Gowin 0 223 733 3,16 - - -
National Movement 0 98 626 1,40 - - -
Green Party 0 22 481 0,32 - - -
Direct Democracy 0 16 222 0,23 - - -
Self-Defence 0 2729 0,04 - - -
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of PKW (National Electoral Commission).
It is worth noting that the sense of political alienation phenomenon pre-
sent in society as well as boredom by the Polish political scene, critical asses-
sment of politicians, the quality of the entire class and political elite, did not 
help improve the quality of democracy at all and, what is more, did not contri-
bute to the improvement of the voter turnout in the vote.
On the day of the election, that is May 24th 2014, the committees were 
receiving information about the voter turnout and the anticipated outcome of 
the election. Fractional data indicated that the difference between PO and PiS 
was small [Wroński 2014: 2]. Additionally, tension grew when TV first released 
the news about the victory of PO. On the next day, the victory shifted in favour 
of PiS who defeated PO by winning 21 seats, which is one seat more that PO. 
The National Electoral Commission presemted the results of the election only 
after 24 hours from the moment all polling stations closed, and in accordan-
ce with them, announced the victory of PO over PiS by 0.35% [Czuchnowski, 
Górecki 2014: 3]. Detailed results of the election are summarised in Table 3. 
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Other election committees, especially SLD-UP and PSL, despite the 
expected crossing of the threshold visible in the polls, won respectively 5 and 
4 seats to the EP, which means they were not able to either maintain or incre-
ase the number of MEPs when compared with the year 2009. The real surpri-
se of the election was, first of all, crossing the electoral threshold and second, 
winning as much as 4 seats by KNP. Similar electoral success was noted by the 
environment centred around J. Korwin-Mikke in elections in 1991, when 3 can-
didates from the list of Real Politics Union entered the lower house of the Polish 
parliament. The remaining committees did not cross the required 5% of the 
electoral threshold.
The impact of the results of the elections to the European Parliament 
on the Polish party system
It is worth noting that the results of the elections to the European 
Parliament have significantly influenced the evolution of the Polish party sys-
tem. First, they once again confirmed the bipolarity of the system and highlight-
ed even more the scale of divisions and mutual rivalry between PO and PiS. 
Despite the victory of PO who won by 0.35%, both parties received the same 
number of seats that is 19. So, it was just apparent victory. Second, the parties 
and committees who were previously referred to as the ones skilfully maintain-
ing the polarity during the election campaign showed that in the process of po-
litical rivalry such things as mediality and motivating their own electorate play 
a significant role. This state of affairs led to the situation when despite the re-
luctance of people and weariness by both politics and politicians, the elections 
to the EP showed that in Poland we are dealing with a variety of political forces 
able to cross the electoral threshold.
The third important aspect related to the influence of the elections to the 
EP on the Polish party system was the initiation of the integration processes on 
the right and on the left. The first to take the initiative was J. Kaczyński who said 
that before the general election in 2015 it would have been necessary to unite the 
right wing who „wanted realistic changes”. The talks concerned only three par-
ties PiS, PRJG and SPZZ and ended with signing an agreement on 19th July 2014. 
It was specified in the document that a strong alternative to „the disgraced gov-
ernment of PO and Polish People’s Party who are hurting Poland” must be creat-
ed [Agreement 2014: 1]. In fact, what they did can be partly called „the cleaning 
up” of the political scene because when PiS united the right wing, they actually 
meant taking over the electorate of the parties they became involved in. 
In the face of the established agreement on the right wing, the politi-
cians belonging to SLD and TR expressed their willingness to form a similar 
initiative for the sake of the local elections in 2014 and the parliamentary elec-
tions in 2015. In the long term, they did not create a direct cooperation and the 
negotiations did not bring the expected results.
The fourth important result of the elections to the EP was showing the 
weakness of the domestic political parties, especially PRJG, SPZZ, National 
Movement, Self-Defence, Europa Plus Your Movement committee and Green 
Party. The cause of their weakness could be appealing to a similar electorate, 
lack of attractive political programme as well as inability to reach a broader 
electorate than their own. What could also lead to their failure was for sure lim-
ited financial resources which prevented them from organising a professional 
campaign and, as a result, getting better results in the election.
Summary
To sum up, it should be noted that of all the national direct elections that 
the citizens of the Republic of Poland participate in, that is presidential, parlia-
mentary and local elections, the elections to the European Parliament are con-
sidered to be least important, which can be seen in the low voter turnout. From 
the point of view of the actions taken by the national electoral committees of 
political parties, it is still hard to adequately encourage people to take an active 
part in and make a conscious choice during Euroelection.
Despite the relatively low turnout, the elections to the European 
Parliament in 2014 were of special interest to those groups of voters who 
chose their favourite politicians to represent the interests of Poland in Brussels, 
among them the members of PO and PiS (19 seats each), SLD-UP (5 seats) 
and PSL and KNP (4 seats each). In the case of the last formation, we could 
observe a kind of „a phenomenon” comparable with the results obtained by 
Freedom Union in the elections to the EP in 2004 – a party who after the pe-
riod of governance was put aside the mainstream of social life. Its appearance 
in the European Parliament, as in the case of KNP, could be thought of as, 
on one hand, the opportunity to show their political platform to a larger group 
of people and, on the other hand, it can lead in a short spectrum of time to the 
alienation from the political life. This can be seen in the forthcoming local and 
parliamentary elections which are a test of political maturity.
An additional aspect connected with the elections to the EP was the ac-
tions taken by the right wing and led by J. Kaczyński to unite itself as well 
as the talks about unification undertaken on the left. For committees who won 
mandates to the EP, those elections were, for sure, on one hand, a confirmation 
of their effectiveness in influencing the voters, and on the other hand, a forecast 
before the next national elections that is the local and parliamentary elections. 
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In this respect, the national committees of political parties can make estimates 
on how possible it is to form their own mandates of trust and decide if they had 
better form ad hock coalitions. The forthcoming elections will be the best ex-
ample of that.
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Abstract:
European Parliamentary election 2014 were the third elections for coun-
tries that joined European Union in 2004, including Poland. As we may obse-
rve from the very beginning of the EP’s history, elections suffer constant drop 
in voter turnout, and since 1999 the turnout total for less than 50%. There are 
many theories explaining this state of affairs, with most notable “second-order 
elections” and democracy deficit theories. Polish profile of voter turnout in EP 
elections seems to fit into frameworks of these theories, and is positioned among 
EU’s members with the lowest turnout. What is specific for electoral behaviour in 
Poland is stability: the turnout and support for political parties seems to stable and 
even petrified. This assessment seems to be supported by the results of election 
within past four years, both on aggregate and individual levels of data.
Keywords:
EP elections, voter turnout, electoral behaviour in Poland, petrification of 
political scene.
Introduction
European Parliamentary (EP) election, held on 25th May 2014, were 
third European elections since Poland joined European Union. Poland parti-
cipated in EP elections for the first time in 2004, just after joining European 
Union, second EP elections took place in 2009. The main feature of these elec-
tions was exceptionally low voter turnout. In the 2004 EP elections voter turno-
ut in Poland equalled only 21% and it was the second lowest rate among the EU 
countries in the 2004 EP elections (the only country with lower voter turnout 
was Slovakia, with 17%). In the 2009 EP elections voter turnout was also rela-
tively low (25%), and it was again one of the lowest turnouts in Europe.
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Voter turnout in Polish EP elections is also substantially lower than 
participation in other types of elections held in Poland. On the whole, Polish 
elections are characterised by rather low voter turnout rates, especially taking 
into account European standards [Cf.: Markowski 2006; Cześnik, Zerkowska-
Balas, Kotnarowski 2013]. Average voter turnout in national (parliamentary 
and presidential) elections vary between 40 and 50%, therefore voter turnout in 
the EP elections is substantially lower.
The 2014 EP elections were held in a specific political context. They were 
the first elections in Poland after three-year period without any elections (with 
exception of early local elections or local referenda held in a couple of districts). 
The last nation-wide elections (held before the 2014 EP elections) were the par-
liamentary elections in autumn of 2011. Moreover, the 2014 EP elections were 
the first in the “four-election marathon”, which will last from spring 2014 to 
autumn 2015. Next are the local elections, scheduled for 16th November 2014, 
presidential election in the late spring 2015 and the parliamentary elections in 
autumn 2015. This timing must have had an impact on the 2014 EP elections 
campaign, on political parties’ strategies and voters’ preferences and behaviours 
(both parties and voters define this election as a “rehearsal” or “warm-up” before 
the most important elections, i.e. presidential and parliamentary ones).
This article aims to address the issue of voter turnout in the 2014 EP 
elections in Poland. In the first section we briefly discuss theoretical backgro-
und of our analysis and provide rudimentary facts and data. This section sum-
marises also previous studies on voter turnout in EP elections, providing main 
explanations of observed trends. The second section investigates spatial disper-
sion of voter turnout in Poland, in case of EP and other elections. We analyse 
similarities/dissimilarities in voter turnout rates existing between geographical-
ly defined entities (constituencies). In the third part we investigate, using mi-
cro-level data, determinants and correlates of voter turnout. Discussion of the 
findings and conclusions end this paper.
Tendencies in European Parliamentary elections
The European Parliament was created in 1958, but the first elections 
to the EP took place in 1979, and since then it is the only European institution 
elected directly by the citizens of European Union. Together with The Council 
of European Union and European Commission, EP holds legislative power. 
It consists of 751 members (MEPs) and represents the second largest democra-
tic electorate in the world (after India) and the largest international electorate in 
the world – 375 million voters [The EU and the World. Facts and Figures 2012].
In spite of growing importance in the law-making in the EU, both on 
trans-national and national level1, EP elections suffer constant fall of voter tur-
nout since the first elections in 1979. Since 1999 the turnout felt below 50% and 
reached the level 42,54% in the last, 2014 elections.
Figure 1. EP elections turnout, 1979-2014
Source: TNS/Scytl in cooperation with the European Parliament.
There are different theories and hypotheses explaining the reasons of 
this trend. Probably the most notable explanation is the second-order elections 
theory [V.: Reif, Schmitt 1980]. The voters seem to be much less interested in 
the EP elections, because they perceive that there is less at stake, in compa-
rison to national elections. They do not perceive the imminent effects of EP 
elections on their lives, as it can be easily noticed in case of national elections, 
resulting in formation of a national government. It is also argued that the lower 
turnout caused by lesser interest in European affairs, gives an overrepresenta-
tion to small protest-parties [European Parliament elections and EU governan-
ce]. It happens because EP electoral campaigns focus mainly on national issu-
es and voters of protest parties use EP elections as an opportunity to express 
dissatisfaction with national governments and their policies2. Following graph 
(figure 2) shows the earlier mentioned discrepancy in turnout between national 
and EP elections in time.
1 Different estimates shows that the quantity of laws introduced in states originating from 
Brussels varies between 15% and 50%. V.: [How much legislation comes from Europe?].
2 This thesis can serve as a partial explanation of relative success of Eurosceptic parties in 
2014 elections.
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Figure 2. Comparison between EP elections and national legislative elections 
turnouts
Source: www.idea.int/uid
Another explanation of declining turnout is connected with the process 
of demographic change. Previously observed higher turnout in EP elections 
was identified with the generation of baby-boomers and its commitment to 
European affairs [Bhatti, Hansen 2014]. The aging of this generation and its 
dropping activity (previously supporting high turnout) effects today in lower 
political involvement and turnout. Following generations seems to be more in-
dividualistic, and less interested in the public affairs in general, especially in 
European affairs that tend to be seen as vague [V.: Harris 2003].
Next major, structural theory trying to explain falling turnout is the demo-
cracy deficit theory [Moravcsik 2008]. Democratic deficit manifests itself in lack 
of politicians’ accountability and European institutions, as they are rather appoin-
ted than elected. Structural changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty gave more po-
wers to the directly elected EP, but still the structure of power’s delegation within 
the hierarchy of EU’s institutions seems to be very complicated for voters – it ma-
kes those institutions less accountable for them. The complexity of the structure 
alienates voters further, as they do not understand the links between these institu-
tions and their everyday lives. In spite of ongoing process of empowering democra-
tic accountability of the EU’s institutions, the issue remains problematic. The main 
question behind democratic deficit seems to be the transfer of legislative and even 
executive power to trans-national bodies of the Union [Follesdal, Hix 2006]. It gi-
ves the voters an impression that the center, where the most important decision are 
made, is taken further away from them (from the national government).
More current explanations of low turnout focus on the economic situ-
ation, which have deteriorated significantly due to the world economic crisis. 
Some scholars connect turnout with trust in public institutions [Grönlund, 
Setälä 2007] − the higher the trust in the institutions, the higher the voter tur-
nout. The theory adapted and modified for European circumstances, focuses 
on the public trust in the economic institutions, like European Central Bank. 
In this case EBC is perceived by European voters as the main responsible actor 
for the economic policy, ergo responsible for fighting against the economic cri-
sis [McDougall, Mody 2014]. As the economic situation deteriorates, the trust 
in EBC falls, resulting in lower turnout in EP elections.
Empirical analysis: aggregate-level data
The aim of macro-level analysis is to determine similarities and diffe-
rences between different types of elections. More specifically, we investigate 
spatial dispersion of voter turnout on commune (gmina) level. We use offi-
cial electoral data, delivered by the State Election Commission (Państwowa 
Komisja Wyborcza, PKW). The dataset used in the article contains the official 
results of the EP elections in 2009 and 2014, the parliamentary elections of 
2011 and the presidential elections of 2010. The data is operationalised on the 
commune level. We omit these communes that underwent changes impeding 
comparisons in analysed period, i.e. administrative changes involving shifting 
boundaries of communes, creation of new commune etc.
Table 1. EP 2004/2009/2014 in constituencies
 Turnout
Voivodeship EP2004 EP2009 EP2014
Constituency no 1 Pomeranian 24,04% 28,05% 26,70%
Constituency no 2 Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship 18,70% 23,36% 22,59%
Constituency no 3 Podlaskie and Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship 17,62% 20,20% 19,34%
Constituency no 4 Warsaw 31,53% 38,92% 35,33%
Constituency no 5 Masovian (without Warsaw) 18,00% 19,74% 20,08%
Constituency no 6 Łódź 19,50% 23,55% 23,72%
Constituency no 7 Greater Poland 21,20% 24,13% 22,42%
Constituency no 8 Lublin 20,67% 22,04% 23,49%
Constituency no 9 Podkarpacie 21,60% 22,28% 23,99%
Constituency no 10 Lesser Poland and Świętokrzyskie 21,14% 26,11% 25,74%
Constituency no 11 Silesian 20,84% 25,26% 23,75%
Constituency no 12 Lowersilesian and Opole 19,30% 22,77% 21,73%
Constituency no 13 Lubusz and West Pomeranian 18,07% 20,84% 20,42%
TOTAL  20,87% 24,53% 23,83%
Source: own calculations based on PKW (State Election Commission) data.
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We start our analyses with an overview of voter turnout in EP elections 
in Poland. Table 1 shows relevant information, i.e. general turnout in all EP elec-
tions in Poland. As one can see the constituencies with highest and lowest turno-
ut are relatively stable, with Warsaw (the city) as the ‘top student’ in this field. 
Warsaw is the biggest, richest and most developed city in Poland, attracting espe-
cially young urban professionals, who tend to present more pro-active (than the 
rest of the citizenry) stance in public sphere. At the other end, with the lowest 
turnout one finds constituencies consisting of most rural voivodeships with lower 
GDP per capita, aging population and less educated population. The example of 
the Masovian Voivodeship (constituency number 5) is interesting, as its capital 
is Warsaw, but the capital forms separate constituency. Without the capital city, 
the whole province resembles the least developed voivodeships in Poland.
Figure 3. Voter turnout in 2009 and 2014
Source: own calculations based on PKW data.
Then we proceed to analysis of voter turnout stability (on macro-level). 
Figure 3 shows a simple comparison of voter turnout in the EP elections of the 
2009 and 2014. Given the instability of voting behaviour in Poland, often ad-
dressed in the literature [Cf.: Markowski 2006; 2008; Cześnik 2006], the stabi-
lity of voter turnout observed at the local level is striking: Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient R between voter turnout in the 2009 and 2014 EP elections equals 
0,89. In other words, the level of turnout in the 2009 EP election explains circa 
80% of voter turnout variance in the 2014 EP election.
Figure 4. Voter turnout in 2011 and 2014
Source: own calculations based on PKW data.
Figure 5. Voter turnout in 2010 and 2014
Source: own calculations based on PKW data.
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Figures 4 and 5 show the relationship between voter turnout in the 2014 
EP elections and voter turnout in the last parliamentary (2011) and presiden-
tial elections (second round, 2010). The comparison includes the level of voter 
turnout in 2014 and 2011 (Figure 4), and the level of voter turnout in 2014 and 
2010 (Figure 5). Again, in both cases strong positive relationship (the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients R equal 0.90 and 0.81) can be identified.
Figure 6. Voter turnout in 2014 and support for PiS in 2014
Source: own calculations based on PKW data.
Figures 6 and 7 report the relationship (at the commune level) betwe-
en support for the dominant Polish political parties in 2014 (Civic Platform 
[Platforma Obywatelska, PO] and Law and Justice [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 
PiS]) and voter turnout. These relationships are much weaker, in fact they sug-
gest that electoral participation is rather weakly associated with support for the-
se political parties and does not have a strong impact on their electoral perfor-
mance. In both cases, higher voter turnout is associated with a higher support 
for parties (and this relationship is statistically significant, though quite small): 
in the case of PiS, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient R between the two va-
riables equals 0.184, and in the case of PO it equals 0.132.
Figure 7. Voter turnout in 2014 and support for PO in 2014
Source: own calculations based on PKW data.
The results presented above contradict previous findings about the stabi-
lity of electoral behaviour in Poland [Cześnik 2007]. Earlier studies of this phe-
nomenon showed very high, one of the highest in the world in fact, instability of 
voter turnout in Poland [Cześnik 2008]. Similarly, analyses of electoral volati-
lity of Poles [V.: Markowski, Cześnik 2002; Markowski 2008; Jasiewicz 2008; 
Millard 2009] pointed to the exceptional ‘shakiness’ of Polish citizens. In a nut-
shell, these studies suggest that Poles quite easily transit from voting to absten-
tion (or vice versa), and/or change their voting preferences between elections. 
Such assertions are at odds with the results of the analyses presented above.
Thus this macro-level stability observed in the empirical material, can be 
a signal of a fundamental change taking place on the Polish political scene, a si-
gnal of its petrification, when support for parties does not change even with chan-
ge in voter turnout. These results require cross-checking, especially given the fact 
that they are in conflict with other existing data. It is interesting to what extent 
they indicate a general, durable, long-lasting pattern of increasing macro-level 
stabilization of voting behaviour. It might be expected that the identified effect 
can appear to be entirely episodic and idiosyncratic. Therefore further analyses, 
exploring individual-level data are necessary, to shed more light on this issue.
Unquestionably, the above analysis suffers from certain shortcomings. 
Firstly, the threat of ecological fallacy. Changes that might have happened on 
the individual level are not controlled. Additionally, one cannot reject the thesis 
that the shift in patterns of electoral behaviour are visible at the individual level, 
but not at the aggregate level, because it took place within the units of aggrega-
tion (i.e. within communes, municipalities).
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Empirical analysis: individual-level data
This section investigates individual-level correlates and determinants of 
voter turnout in the 2014 EP elections in Poland. Relevant literature [Cześnik 
2007] suggests that we should observe significant effects of gender, age, edu-
cation, religiosity, place of residence, ideological preferences (e.g. Left-Right 
scale). Previous studies [Cześnik 2011] conducted in Poland, addressing the 
question of differences in electoral participation among groups defined in terms 
of the key socio-demographic variables (determining the position of an indivi-
dual in a social structure), reveal quite significant and rather stable impacts of 
these variables on voter turnout. They demonstrate convincingly that (at least 
in years 1997-2007) electoral participation in Poland has been significantly re-
lated to gender, age, educational level and church attendance. Data from parti-
cular years provide a surprisingly similar picture and the impact of particular 
variables is more or less the same over time.
In the following analyse we employ post-election survey data, gathered 
within the framework of European Election Study (the 2014 edition). The EES 
2014, in addition to the ‘classical’ post-electoral cross-section survey, also inc-
ludes (for the first time) a panel component based on a series of country-speci-
fic online studies, administered in several EU member countries. The research 
aim behind this initiative is to compare the voting behaviour of respondents in 
the EP election of May 2014 with the subsequent first order national election 
vote. The first wave has been carried out right after the 2014 EP elections (these 
data are used in the analyses reported beneath) and the second wave will be car-
ried out after the subsequent national elections.
Table 2. Voter turnout and gender3
Gender
Total
Female Male
I did not vote in the European Parliament elections
N 435 372 807
% 28,4% 26,8% 27,6%
I thought about voting this time, but didn’t do it
N 279 269 548
% 18,2% 19,4% 18,8%
Usually I vote, but not this time
N 362 292 654
% 23,7% 21,0% 22,4%
I’m sure I voted in the European Parliament elections
N 453 457 910
% 29,6% 32,9% 31,2%
Total
N 1529 1390 2919
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Pearson’s Chi-squared test
Value df Asymptotic signifi-cance (two-sided)
6,005a 3 ,111
Source: EES 2014.
According to our findings the differences in voter turnout between men 
and women in the 2014 EP elections in Poland are negligible. There is a sli-
ght over-representation of females in the group of non-voters (those who say 
“I did not vote in the European Parliament elections”), but this difference is mi-
nor and statistically insignificant. The same pertains to the over-representation 
of males in the group of voters (those who say “I’m sure I voted in the European 
Parliament elections”). The difference is rather small and lacks statistical si-
gnificance. In the two intermediary groups (respondents who choose answers 
“I thought about voting this time, but didn’t do it” and “Usually I vote, but not 
this time”) the differences are even smaller.
3 The question was phrased: “On the 25th of May this year election to the European Parliament 
were held. Many people did not vote, because they were ill, didn’t have time, or they are 
simply not interested. Which of the below statements best describes your?”. In the table the 
“Don’t know” answers are omitted.
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Table 3. Voter turnout and age
Age
Total
18 - 24 25 - 39 40 - 59 60≤
I did not vote in the European Parliament 
elections
N 107 268 256 176 807
% 31,2% 30,7% 26,8% 23,6% 27,6%
I thought about voting this time, but didn’t do it
N 78 173 155 142 548
% 22,7% 19,8% 16,2% 19,1% 18,8%
Usually I vote, but not this time
N 65 178 237 174 654
% 19,0% 20,4% 24,8% 23,4% 22,4%
I’m sure I voted in the European Parliament 
elections
N 93 255 309 253 910
% 27,1% 29,2% 32,3% 34,0% 31,2%
Total
N 343 874 957 745 2919
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Pearson’s Chi-squared test
27,153a
Value df Asymptotic significance (two-sided)
9 ,001
Source: EES 2014.
Age is one of sociodemographic characteristics which indisputably influ-
ences voter turnout. In general, the relationship between age and voter turnout 
is curvilinear: turnout is the lowest among the youngest voters, then it gradually 
increases to pick among middle-aged and then slowly decreases among elder-
ly voters. Our analyses (reported in table 3) confirm this notion at least partly. 
In the 2014 EP elections in Poland we observe a statistically significant rela-
tionship between age and voter turnout, but this relationship is not curvilinear. 
Coding of the age variable – it is not continuous, but it contains age categories 
– might have produced this result4. According to our findings young people are 
least likely to vote. Then leves of electoral participation increases monotoni-
cally with age; voter turnout is the highest in the categories of middle-aged and 
elderly citizens. Due to stronger community attachments, greater participation 
in organizations, greater church attendance and higher income, they are more in-
terested in politics and more prone to vote. Young people on the other hand pro-
bably have other than political concerns. Once they pass through various trans-
ition points (including leaving home, finishing education, getting a job, settling 
down and getting married) their propensity to vote increases. We do not find 
any decrease of voter turnout among the oldest voters, obstacles such as health 
problems, increasing disability and decreasing income do not seem to influence 
the propensity to vote in the group of citizens who are above 60 years of age.
4 Curvileanarity of the relationship is ‘hidden’ in the group of 60+ citizens; probably the cutting 
point is ‘higher’, among 70-75 years of age. Due to this fact we cannot see it in the analysis.
Table 4. Voter turnout and place of residence
City 
over 200 
thousand 
City 
50-200 
thousand 
City up 
to 50 
thousand.
Village Total
I did not vote in the European 
Parliament elections
N 148 147 181 331 807
% 26,3% 25,1% 27,5% 29,7% 27,6%
I thought about voting this time, 
but didn’t do it
N 110 107 111 220 548
% 19,5% 18,3% 16,9% 19,7% 18,8%
Usually I vote, but not this time
N 116 134 158 246 654
% 20,6% 22,9% 24,0% 22,1% 22,4%
I’m sure I voted in the European 
Parliament elections
N 189 197 207 317 910
% 33,6% 33,7% 31,5% 28,5% 31,2%
Total
N 563 585 657 1114 2919
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Pearson’s Chi-squared test
12,086a
Value Df Asymptotic significance (two-sided)
9 ,208
Source: EES 2014.
The relationship between voter turnout and place of residence is less clear 
and may be puzzling (table 4). Typically, in previous elections in Poland, there 
was a clear trend: the bigger city of residence, the higher turnout. According to 
our findings there are some slight differences in voter turnout between the cate-
gories of this variable, but the relationship observed is not statistically significant. 
There is a slight over-representation of voters in the group of urban residents 
(those living in the cities over 200 thousand inhabitants) and slight over-repre-
sentation of non-voters in the group of rural residents (those living in the villa-
ges), but these differences are quite small and – more importantly – lack statisti-
cal significance. Thus we can plausibly conclude that in the 2014 EP elections 
in Poland the relationship between voter turnout and place of residence is rather 
negligible.
Due to lack of relevant data we are unable to analyse the relationships 
between voter turnout and other important sociodemographic variables, which 
often influence significantly electoral participation, i.e. education and religiosi-
ty (like church attendance). But it is plausible to expect, especially taking into 
account (typical) impacts of other sociodemographics (analysed in this article) 
on electoral participation in the 2014 EP elections, that their effects were “usu-
al”, i.e. similar to the effects they exerted on voter turnout in previous elections. 
Therefore we can quite plausibly claim that voters in the 2014 EP election in 
Poland differ in terms of education and religiosity from non-voters: they are – 
on average – better educated and more religious.
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Figure 8. Voter turnout and position on Left-Right continuum5
Source: EES 2014.
Our analysis is not limited to sociodemographics, as we take closer look 
at political differences between voters and non-voters. In figure 8 we present 
differences in Left-Right positioning, existing between voters and non-voters 
(and the two intermediary groups). The mean value of this variable is close to 
the centre of the scale, with a slight skew towards the right side of the conti-
nuum. The only significant difference observed exists between voters and non-
-voters (voters are more “rightist”, non-voters are more “leftist”); the two in-
termediary groups (respondents who choose answers “I thought about voting 
this time, but didn’t do it” and “Usually I vote, but not this time”) do not differ 
significantly from voters and non-voters (and from one another).
5 The question was phrased: “In politics we sometimes talk about the “left” and “right”. How 
would you define your political views? On a scale of 0 to 10, on which ‘0’ is “left” and ‘10’ 
is “right” please mark the number which best describes your political views”. In the analysis 
the “Don’t know” answers are omitted.
Figure 9. Voter turnout and position on Liberalism-Solidarism continuum6
Source: EES 2014.
Figure 9 provides further information about (potential) political diffe-
rences between voters and non-voters. It presents the relationship between voter 
turnout and positions on “Solidary Poland vs Liberal Poland” scale. According 
to our analysis the differences between the groups are small and statistically 
insignificant. The mean value for both voters and non-voters falls close to the 
centre of the scale; it is slightly skewed towards the “Solidary Poland” end of 
the continuum. In a nutshell, “Solidary Poland vs Liberal Poland” an impor-
tant aspect of Polish politics, does not relate significantly to voter turnout in the 
2014 EP elections. 
6 The question was phrased: “In politicians sometimes talk about the split into “Solidarity 
Poland” and “Liberal Poland”. Where would you place yourself on that scale?”. In the 
analysis the “Don’t know” answers are omitted.
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Figure 10. Voter turnout and attitudes towards European integration7
Source: EES 2014.
The same pertains to the European integration issue (often regarded as 
an important determinant of voter turnout in the EP elections). In figure 10 we 
compare mean positions (of the four groups under scrutiny) on the 0-10 scale, 
related to this question. The differences observed are rather small and statisti-
cally insignificant; consequently, we can conclude that in the 2014 EP election 
in Poland the impact of attitudes towards European integration on voter turnout 
is limited or negligible.
Conclusions
The main objective of this study is to discuss the issue of voter turnout in 
the 2014 EP election in Poland. It provides the results of preliminary analyses, 
which address empirically this topic. More specifically, we investigate macro-
-level spatial dispersion of voter turnout in Poland (and analyse similarities/dis-
similarities in voter turnout rates existing between geographically defined enti-
ties), and we also study micro-level determinants and correlates of voter turnout.
The paper concludes with three main assertions. Firstly, our findings 
support the thesis that Polish political scene has somewhat petrified in the last 
years. Macro-level stability of spatial dispersion of voter turnout, observed 
7 The question was phrased: “Some believe that Europe should go further in the unification 
process. Others believe that the unification process has gone too far. What is your opinion? 
On a scale of 0 to 10, on which ‘0’ is “unification” and ‘10’ is “gone too far”. Where would 
you place yourself on that scale?”. In the analysis the “Don’t know” answers are omitted.
across geographically defined entities (communes) in Poland, can signalise im-
portant processes occurring in the political system. They might indicate an on-
going consolidation of the system, which materialises – inter alia – in incre-
asing (macro-level) stabilization of voting behaviour.
Our second major conclusion pertains to the individual level. According 
to our findings voter turnout in the 2014 EP election in Poland is quite predict-
able and unsurprising. Patterns of voter turnout are similar to those observed 
in earlier Polish elections. Electoral participation in Poland is determined by 
factors which usually have impact on voter turnout in general8. This observa-
tion corresponds with our first conclusion, indicating an ongoing consolidation 
of the Polish political system – consolidating, maturing electoral democracy 
should be in fact characterised by stabilising patterns of voting behaviour, iden-
tifiable on both aggregate and individual level.
Our third conclusion is of a more general type. The main characteristic of 
the previous elections in Poland (including EP elections) was low voter turnout. 
After the 2014 EP elections nothing has changed in this regard. Again extensive 
electoral abstention was the main idiosyncrasy of this election. This fact shows 
that the EP elections became, ten years after the accession, a normal aspect of 
the Polish politics, which does not generate any extra tensions, does not pro-
duce much of political mobilisation and is not a source of political disorder and 
turbulences. Therefore – quite paradoxically and ironically – low voter turnout 
in the EP elections can be perceived as a sign of painless and unproblematic 
‘Europeanisation9’ of Polish politics.
References:
Bhatti Y., Hansen K. M. (2014), Turnout at European Parliament elections is likely to continue 
to decline in the coming decades, London School of Economics European Politics and 
Policy blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/07/25/turnout-at-european-parliament-
elections-is-likely-to-continue-to-decline-in-the-coming-decades/, (16.09.2014).
Cześnik M. (2006), Voter Turnout and Democratic Legitimacy in Central Eastern Europe, 
„Polish Sociological Review”, vol. 156: 449-470.
Cześnik M. (2007), Partycypacja wyborcza w Polsce. Perspektywa porównawcza, Warszawa: 
Scholar.
Cześnik M. (2008), Polish ‘Exceptionalism’: Voter Turnout in Poland in light of CSES data, 
paper presented at the CSES Conference and Planning Committee Meeting, Warsaw, April 
2008.
8 Poland is quite ‘unexceptional’ in terms of voter turnout determinants, i.e. voter turnout 
in Poland is usually determined by factors which also influence turnout in other countries; 
gender, age and education have an impact on turnout in majority of modern democracies.
9 Understood here as an incorporation of the European-level procedures and mechanisms 
(such as the EP elections) into the Polish political life.
129
Mikołaj Cześnik, Karol Chwedczuk-Szulc, Mateusz Zaremba
128
Cześnik M. (2009), Voter Turnout Stability – Evidence from Poland, „Polish Sociological 
Review”, vol. 165: 107-122.
Cześnik M. (2011), Uczestnictwo wyborcze a struktura społeczna w świetle badań PGSW. 
Czym różnią się głosujący od niegłosujących, „Studia Polityczne”, nr 28: 7-28.
Cześnik M., Zerkowska-Balas M., Kotnarowski M. (2013), Voting as a habit in New 
Democracies – Evidence from Poland, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies”, vol. 
46: 95-107.
Follesdal A., Hix S. (2006), Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to 
Majone and Moravcsik, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, vol. 44(3): 533–562.
Grönlund K., Setälä M. (2007), Political Trust, Satisfaction and Voter Turnout, „Comparative 
European Politics”, vol. 5: 400–422.
How much legislation comes from Europe?, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 
10/62, 13.10.2010.
Jasiewicz K. (2008), The New Populism in Poland: The Usual Suspects?, „Problems of Post-
Communism”, vol. 55: 7-25.
Markowski R. (2006), The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or Restructuring of the Party 
System?, „West European Politics”, vol. 29: 814-832.
Markowski R. (2008), The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election: Some Structuring, Still a Lot 
of Chaos, „West European Politics”, vol. 31: 1055-1068.
Markowski R., Cześnik M. (2002), Polski system partyjny: dekada zmian instytucjonalnych 
i ich konsekwencje, [in:] R. Markowski (ed.), System partyjny i zachowania wyborcze. 
Dekada polskich doświadczeń, Warsaw: ISP PAN and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Marsh M., Mikhaylov S., European Parliament elections and EU governance, Living Reviews 
in European Governance, http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/ (16.09.2014).
McDougall O., Mody A. (2014), Will voters turn out in the 2014 European Parliamentary 
elections?, VOX, http://www.voxeu.org/17.05.2014 (16.09.2014).
Millard F. (2009), Poland: Parties without a Party System, „Politics and Policy”, vol. 37(4): 
781-798.
Moravcsik A. (2008), The Myth of Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”, „Intereconomics”, 
November/December 2008.
Reif K., Schmitt H. (1980), Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual. Framework 
for the Analysis of European Election Results, „European Journal of Political Research”, 
vol. 8(1): 3–44.
Ulrich J. M., Harris A. L. (2003), GenXegesis: Essays on Alternative Youth (Sub)Culture, 
Madison: Popular Press.
Abstract:
The article presents the determinants of creating candidate lists in 
European Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation 
of importance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the 
election. The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating can-
didate lists in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving 
the combined occurrence of several determinants. The first of them is the ten-
dency to fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well-
-known in the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The se-
cond factor is territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district 
where they stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is 
the territorial form of the candidate list. The last important element of analysis 
is the concentration of support, determined by the position on the candidate list.
Keywords:
party candidate selection, European parliamentary election, candidate list 
position, Polish party system
Introduction
One of the most important procedures defining elections in democratic 
states is the way of appointing candidates standing for election, often having 
a greater impact on the ultimate result of the elections than the applied electo-
ral system. As William Cross [2008: 615] writes concerning the selection pro-
cess, “party candidate selection processes may be equally or more determina-
tive of who ends up in the legislature than are general elections”. Regardless 
of the applied electoral system, the institutionalization of the electoral process 
in contemporary democracies means that receiving a political nomination is 
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the preliminary stage in the process of selection of political elites. The selec-
tion carried out by parties may have two main dimensions: the substantive one 
and the political one. The substantive demand assumes that the candidate sho-
uld have the relevant qualities, which on the one hand can facilitate generating 
support and as a consequence, selection, and on the other hand, predestine them 
to correctly fulfil their role resulting from the potential election. The political 
dimension of candidate selection may assume the necessity of party member-
ship or at least ideological identity with the key values which constitute the 
axiological and policy foundation. Apart from these, nomination can be ob-
tained among others by way of coalition bargaining between political parties 
or family-and-friends connotations. The practical dimension of candidate lists 
selection is the process of appointing candidates to run for election. It adopts 
four basic types: non-regulated appointment, appointment by local authorities, 
appointment by central authorities, and primary election (appointment by party 
members) [Sokół 2003: 73-75]. 
The execution of the selection function involves the choice and strategic 
appointment of candidates to stand for election. The candidates are then veri-
fied in the voting procedure. Krister Lundell [2004: 27-30] mentions centrali-
zed and decentralized ways of candidate selection and points out the size of the 
party as the main determinant. Large parties prefer the application of decentra-
lized model, and small ones adopt more democratic ways. In the way of selec-
tion, regional patterns are also important, as part of which he indicates prefe-
rences for the centralized model among south European political parties and the 
opposite among Scandinavian ones, where the selection is rather decentralized. 
An important consequence of the application of a certain way of selection is 
the possible differences in the candidates’ political subjectivity level. The cen-
tralization of selection may contribute to reducing the candidates’ subjectivity, 
and decentralization may increase it instead [Shomer 2009: 953].
The article presents the specificity of creating candidate lists in European 
Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation of impor-
tance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the election. 
The temporal context is the 2014 election. The subjective aspect includes the 
analysis of the structure of candidate lists in two largest parties – Platforma 
Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice). 
The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating candidate li-
sts in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving the com-
bined occurrence of several determinants. The first of them is the tendency to 
fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well-known in 
the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The second factor is 
territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district where they 
stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is the territo-
rial form of the candidate list. The last important element of analysis is concen-
tration of support.
Candidate selection procedure in European Parliament elections
Although there have only been three European Parliament elections in 
Poland so far, they have already managed to leave their imprint on political par-
ties and the party system. Their institutional dimension and the character of par-
ty competition mostly make them similar to parliamentary elections, but with a 
lower rank. Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt [1980: 6-11] called EP elec-
tions second-order elections, mainly because they are carried out on the basis of 
internal political determinants which marginalize the meaning of divisions and 
conflicts of the European environment. In addition, although EP elections are or-
ganized in all EU states at the same time, their importance is largely reduced by 
the fact that they occur at different stages of internal (national) electoral cycles. 
The presented conclusions were confirmed in the research by Michael Marsh 
[1998: 595]; however, in some cases he formulated them in less absolute terms. 
Additionally, the researcher confirmed the connection between EP elections and 
national elections taking place subsequently, referring in practice to their tempo-
ral correlation and national parliamentary elections [Gabel 2000: 54]. 
Taking into consideration the case of Poland, it is a little difficult to clas-
sify European Parliament elections, mainly due to the fact of electing represen-
tatives for a supranational authority. This fact, despite its undeniably prestigious 
character, determines different strategies executed by political parties. Polish and 
European experiences in this regard show that parties treat these elections diffe-
rently, regarding them as second order elections, which is also partly contributed 
to by the low public interest (concerning participation) [de Vreese, Banducci, 
Semetko, Boomgaarden 2006]. Radosław Markowski [2009: 31-32] observes 
that: “... the difference between parliamentary elections and EP elections is that 
in these elections the national issues are more important than the European ones, 
also, that people vote in a way which shows it is according to their sincere and 
first preference, so small parties get the advantage …”. The place and character 
of exercising the mandate of MEP, which for obvious reasons makes it harder to 
engage fully in domestic politics and thus positions one far behind the national 
party leaders in the political hierarchy, is also important. 
The presented determinants result in the fact that the process of creating 
European Parliament candidate lists in the key parties is strongly centralized, 
and the appointments, unlike in any other elections, mainly depend on the party 
authorities. It is so for strategic reasons as part of which the decentralization of 
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selecting candidates for the lists might cause the decrease of electoral potential 
of the whole party [Katz 2001: 290-291]. Dieter Nohlen [2004: 92] underscores 
that the form of a candidate list indicates both the voter-candidate relation and 
the candidate’s attitude to their own party, which is reflected in parties’ intere-
sts that might be harmed by individual ambitions of particular members. It does 
not mean, however, that the strategies of creating candidate lists of particular 
parties are identical, nor that they are not subject to any modifications during 
the election preparation phase. The dynamics of political situation even requires 
the creation of alternative scenarios that might potentially be used in the case of 
changing conditions of the conducted campaign. Simon Hix [2004: 199] also 
observes that the degree of centralization of candidate selection in EP elections 
affects their later relations with the parent parties. Strong centralization leads to 
the deputy’s greater dependence on their party in the future. Finally, the attempt 
to centralize the way of creating candidate lists gives various effects, including 
a very limited ultimate result. It is so especially in the case of the states where 
the democratic procedures of candidate selection are deeply rooted (e.g. Ireland) 
or where these procedures are even legally regulated [Katz 2001: 291]. 
The process of candidate selection for the lists is also determined by the 
existing electoral system, both its general character and individual components 
[Hazan, Rahat 2006: 109]. The proportional electoral formula, especially com-
bined with the relatively low number of seats to apportion, forces the parties to 
fill the candidate lists, which may be a considerable challenge taking into con-
sideration the preferences for the national parliament among the key activists. 
And the problem is not the quantitative aspect, which is easy to manage for 
large parties, but the political position of the nominated candidates. The most 
significant party leaders execute their objectives at the national politics level, 
and treat the opportunity to participate in the EP as a risk of degradation or a 
loss of political influence. That is why, somewhat analogously to elections to 
second chambers of the parliament, it can be noted that the lists of the main par-
ties include persons not engaged in the processes of current party management.
The high importance of candidate selection mechanisms in EP elections 
is also the result of combination of relatively big electoral districts (in terms 
of territory) and relatively low number of seats to be assigned in each district. 
It contributes to preparing candidate lists in a way which allows for party au-
thorities considerably controlling the direction of seat allocation. The descri-
bed mechanism results from two key factors. The first of them is geographic 
segmentation of support and the possibility to predict quite precisely the future 
number of achieved seats in particular districts. The second is empirically ve-
rifiable preference to support number one candidates from party lists, although 
obviously the fact of typically placing party leaders there also plays a role. 
All this means that EP elections do not occur in a political vacuum but are sub-
ject to processes of transferring the patterns of internal party relations from the 
national level to the European platform [Meserve, Pemstein, Bernhard 2009: 2].
An important determinant of creating EP candidate lists is nominating 
persons weakly associated with politics or even having no political connota-
tions. This mechanism is also present in parliamentary elections but its ran-
ge is relatively smaller. Such actions, although often effective (in the case of 
very popular candidates), from the point of view of political party’s interest 
may evoke some doubts about treating voters subjectively and cause conflicts 
with local structures of parties which may want to promote their representati-
ves on the lists. So-called celebrities present on candidate lists are supposed to 
increase the interest in party’s electoral offer, to warm up the technocratic ima-
ge and to reduce the political distance to the voters. The previous experiences 
show, however, that only few candidates from beyond the party mainstream can 
expect election success and EP seats, although greater preference in this regard 
is noticeable in Central and Eastern Europe [Andretta, Chelotti 2012: 12]. 
 The third important aspect of creating candidate lists in EP elections is 
the possibility to use the potential of first positions on the lists. It is connected 
with the voters’ tendency to vote for persons from the top of the list, although 
– obviously – the fact of typically placing party leaders there also plays a role. 
In the 2009 election, among number one candidates from the 4 parties which 
participated in seat distribution, the leaders lost to party rivals with farther po-
sitions only in 8 cases (15.4%). This may prove the supposed relation between 
the position on the candidate list and the achieved support, although it does not 
fully explain the character of the phenomenon [Wojtasik 2010: 394]. 
Candidate lists in the 2014 EP election
The key element of creating the lists in European Parliament election 
was the attempt to find balance between three factors. The first of them is the 
general tendency to place persons the most popular in the media on the first po-
sitions of candidate lists, as they attract voters by their public visibility. The se-
cond element of this balance is taking territorial bonds into consideration. Polish 
electoral districts in European Parliament elections are big and most of them 
are territorially diversified. Other studies on the behaviours of Polish voters, 
in turn, show that the territorial bond is an important factor influencing their 
decisions and hence the tendency to take this diversity into consideration when 
constructing candidate lists [Flis 2011]. But in this case the additional element 
was the wish to influence the personal composition of party representation in 
the European Parliament election. This wish is not so obvious, as is proved by 
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the fact that the Warsaw district had an excess of candidates with a strong po-
sition in the media or inside the party who were interested in acquiring seats 
in relation to the number of available seats. Hence the clear tendency to put up 
candidates from Warsaw in other districts. 
In both main parties the phenomenon of putting up candidates in districts 
other than the places of residence had a similar extent. From PO (Civic Platform), 
8 candidates stood in other districts, 6 out of whom were registered in Warsaw 
or the agglomeration. From PiS (Law and Justice), 9 candidates stood in other 
districts, 8 out of whom were registered in Warsaw or the agglomeration. In PiS, 
2 of them had the first position on the lists, and 3 of them, the second position. 
In PO, there were five number-one candidates in that group, and one candidate 
from the second position. In PO, four of the positions were seat-ensuring posi-
tions, which means that they would give the candidates seats if the apportion-
ment only depended on the order on the list. All of them were the first positions 
of the lists. In PiS, four places taken by “parachute candidates” were also seat-
-ensuring positions defined this way: two first positions and two second ones.
In the group of so-called “parachute candidates”, two persons in each 
party were candidates who had been born and raised in the districts from which 
they stood but later moved to bigger centres. Al these four persons had previo-
usly acquired seats standing in those districts in European or national elections. 
The same was typical of the other four candidates – two from each of the di-
scussed parties. Among the first position candidates, three persons from PO and 
two persons from PiS had no previous connections with the electoral districts. 
A clear tendency is noticeable here: if candidates from outside the districts ap-
peared on the lists, they were more often placed on top positions, although it 
was not a 100% rule. 
Eight out of the 17 candidates standing for election in places other than 
the places of residence – nearly a half – received the EP seats. This means 
a higher percentage of success than in the whole candidate group (in each of the 
main parties, fewer than 15% of candidates obtained seats). Two of such candi-
dates placed on seat-ensuring positions were beaten by candidates from farther 
positions – the losers were Jacek Rostowski (according to the National Electoral 
Commission database, Jan Vincent-Rostowski) from position no. 1 on the PO 
list in Bydgoszcz, and Hanna Foltyn-Kubicka from position no. 2 on the PiS list 
in Warsaw. Three candidates acquired seats despite having completely no pre-
vious relations with the districts where they stood for election. All of them were 
candidates from the top list positions – Dariusz Rosati from PO as well as Karol 
Karski and Ryszard Czarnecki from PiS. The other candidates who received 
seats, especially the three candidates from positions other than first (Kazimierz 
Ujazdowski and Beata Gosiewska from PiS and Tadeusz Zwiefka from PO) are 
persons who had previously obtained seats in the districts where they were put 
up. These were the seats of: an MP, a senator and an MEP, respectively. Putting 
up a candidate from another district on the first position in Lublin by PO did not 
pay off, because the party lost the seat it had obtained there before. 
The attempts to ensure seats for the chosen candidates by putting them 
up in other districts were generally limited to a small scale and had even more 
limited effects. Even placing a candidate at no. 1 position on the list did not gu-
arantee the seat if the candidate had not had anything in common with the par-
ticular district. Still, 3 out of 5 main party candidates received the seats. As for 
registration outside the district, it does not seem to be a particularly great bur-
den if the candidate has clear relations with the district – either historical or re-
sulting from previously obtaining a seat in that district, even if the success had 
been the result of having the first position on a sejm election list (Kazimierz 
Ujazdowski, Julia Pitera).
Territorial construction of the lists
The next stage of the analysis was to verify the degree of relevance of 
the final form of candidate lists of the two main parties to the territorial di-
visions in particular districts. Only the cases of Platforma Obywatelska and 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość were chosen for analysis, because in the other parties, 
only one seat was received by a candidate from a position other than first. In ad-
dition, PiS obtained seats in all the districts, and PO in twelve out of the thirteen 
districts. In a considerable number of districts, these parties obtained two se-
ats each. So in the case of these parties, the territorial diversity was significant. 
Not only first position candidates and not only candidates who managed to beat 
them had a chance to receive the seats but also persons from farther positions.
So the electoral district applied in senate elections was adopted as a ter-
ritorial diversity unit. This choice was motivated by the fact that the number of 
senate districts after the reform is similar to the number of candidates put up 
by the parties in the European Parliament elections. Neither the division into 
voivodeships, nor sejm election districts, nor even the division into poviats 
had this feature. A hundred and thirty candidates theoretically could be even-
ly distributed in a hundred senate districts. It should be remembered, however, 
that European Parliament electoral districts have different sizes and – as a result 
– cover different numbers of senate districts. Hence, ideal allocation of candi-
dates in this division was impossible. 
For the purpose of the analysis, some of the senate districts were com-
bined so that the number of units in none of the EP electoral district exceeded 
ten. In addition, the metropolises which are split into several districts in senate 
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elections were treated as entire units. It was assumed that divisions of metropoli-
ses into senate districts are not based on deeper territorial differences. 
Apart from metropolises, there was only a problem with the fit in Śląskie 
Voivodeshipi: thirteen senators are elected there, whereas only ten European 
Parliament candidates can be put up. For the purpose of the analysis, two ad-
jacent districts were combined in three cases. Two Częstochowa districts were 
combined, as were Rybnik and Jastrzębie Zdrój districts as well as Katowice 
district and the one including Tychy and Mysłowice towns and the Bieruń and 
Lędziny poviat. 
This way, 91 units were isolated for analysis: from 3 in Warsaw I district 
up to 10 in Kraków, Katowice and Wrocław districts. For each unit it was com-
puted what percentage of votes cast for a given party in the 2009 election in 
each district came from this particular unit. This allowed to estimate the signi-
ficance each part of the district should have for the candidate list created accor-
ding to such a conjecture.
In order to determine the importance of the territorial factor for the can-
didate lists, the significance of particular positions on the EP candidate lists 
was also estimated. The result of the 2009 election was adopted as the point 
of reference, calculating for both parties what percentage of votes obtained in 
the whole country was obtained by the candidates from particular positions on 
the lists. The objective was to determine a general pattern with the greatest po-
ssible averaging of effects resulting from the candidates’ individual qualities. 
Importantly, the patterns resulting from this calculation were very similar to 
those concerning other (smaller) parties. There were some deviations, especial-
ly in the case of small or very specific parties, such as PSL (Polish Peasants’ 
Party), but in the majority of parties the same division occurred. Number one 
candidates received approximately half the votes, and then the vote participa-
tion of candidates from the next positions successively decreased, although at 
the end it grew again. The results averaged for both parties are presented in 
Chart 1.
Chart 1. Participation of candidates from particular positions in votes cast for the list 
on the 2009 election and the estimated significance of the position on the list
Source: Own study based on information from the National Electoral Commission.
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Individual candidates’ results in the system of open list are distributed 
in accordance with the power law probability distribution, which suggests the 
multiplication of various kinds of advantage of the candidates. And as rese-
arch shows, the position on the list is only one of such advantages [Raciborski, 
Rakocy 2009]. That is why not the empirically determined percentage of votes 
obtained by each candidate but rather the root of such participation was adop-
ted as the weight of the position. Such rescaling led to the first position losing 
nearly half of its weight at the expense of the other positions. Values assumed 
this way are also presented in Chart 1.
In the next step, the candidates coming from particular senate districts 
and their weights resulting from the positions on the list was determined for 
each senate district. Thus the significance of each senate district from the per-
spective of the particular party’s list was attributed to that district. This signifi-
cance was compared with the significance of the district for the result of voting 
for the given party in the previous European Parliament election. 
Very high correlation indices were obtained for both parties. Generally, 
the index was 0.75-0.76, but even when ignoring the extreme case of Warsaw 
I district, where one town clearly dominates over the rest of the district, the 
correlation coefficients still exceeded 0.6. In social sciences, such correlations 
are regarded as very strong. Such a strong correlation indicates the dominant 
pattern, as part of which the territorial bond is one of the key elements of can-
didate list construction. Candidates from particular parts of districts are pla-
ced on the lists in the order resulting from the weight these parts have for the 
general result of the party. We can suppose that each of them is to “serve” the 
relevant part of territorial identities making up the whole district in European 
elections. This observation follows the phenomena also occurring in countries 
where closed candidate lists are used [Rahat, Hazan 2001]. This issue might be 
seen from the perspective of general mechanisms of representative democracy: 
such a construction of the list would then be expected to ensure possibly com-
plete representation of individual parts of the country. The problem is that even 
in the largest parties the list of each party receives only one seat in most elec-
toral districts. Hence, logically it is impossible to provide such representation. 
So putting up excessive numbers of candidates has a purely marketing charac-
ter. “Serving” the voters gives them slight chance for real representation, whe-
reas it ensures additional votes for the list – cast for candidates who are known 
in advance to be losers. 
However, this correlation – incomplete anyway – shows that there is no 
absolute consistency between the construction of the list and the weight of par-
ticular parts of the district in European elections. At a closer look, a number of 
senate electoral districts, sometimes important for the election result, had no 
representatives from those districts on the lists, while in the neighbouring di-
stricts there were a few such representatives. The examples of electoral districts 
with no local candidates on either of the two main lists were e.g. the Tarnów 
district in Małopolskie Voivodeship or the Pińczów district in Świętokrzyskie 
Voivodeship. 
Concentration of support
The importance of this factor is observed when the results of first posi-
tion candidates are compared to the best of the remaining candidates in particu-
lar senate districts. The results for both parties are presented in Table 1. For each 
senate district (with the modifications described above) it shows what percenta-
ge of votes was cast for the candidate from no. 1 position and for the best of the 
remaining ones. The first candidate received on average 53% in PO and 45% in 
PiS. The best one of the rest received on average 26% in PO and 30% in PiS. 
The lighter background indicates the cases when support for the candidate was 
at least 1/3 higher than the mean for that candidate type. The darker background 
indicates the cases when support for the candidate was 1/3 lower than the mean.
Table 1. Results of no. 1 candidates and their strongest rivals in EP election 
divided into senate electoral districts
EP Senate main town PO 1 PO other PiS 1
PiS 
other
1 62 Słupsk 49% 23% 40% 23%
1 63 Chojnice 43% 18% 46% 20%
1 64 Gdynia 55% 25% 40% 36%
1 65 Gdańsk 49% 31% 55% 24%
1 66 Starogard Gd. 45% 24% 54% 11%
1 67 Malbork 52% 23% 59% 12%
2 9 Bydgoszcz 31% 49% 57% 36%
2 10 Inowrocław 27% 40% 48% 25%
2 11 Toruń 42% 43% 24% 65%
2 12 Grudziądz 26% 43% 32% 46%
2 13 Włocławek 30% 36% 40% 34%
3 59 Suwałki 70% 12% 49% 28%
3 60 Białystok 82% 8% 42% 45%
3 61 Bielsk Podl. 72% 16% 35% 28%
3 84 Elbląg 43% 27% 73% 6%
3 85 Ostróda 43% 25% 46% 34%
3 86 Olsztyn 46% 44% 55% 16%
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EP Senate main town PO 1 PO other PiS 1
PiS 
other
3 87 Ełk 48% 28% 55% 11%
4 40 Wołomin 69% 10% 31% 32%
4 41 Pruszków 71% 10% 40% 37%
4 42.45 Warsaw 74% 10% 49% 29%
5 38 Płock 51% 21% 47% 25%
5 39 Ciechanów 53% 22% 37% 25%
5 46 Ostrołęka 47% 35% 20% 36%
5 47 Mińsk Maz. 49% 31% 19% 22%
5 48 Siedlce 50% 25% 17% 34%
5 49 Grójec 51% 33% 11% 66%
5 50 Radom 47% 25% 6% 77%
6 23.24 Łódź 67% 18% 73% 15%
6 25 Łęczyca 68% 20% 76% 12%
6 26 Zgierz 64% 24% 73% 10%
6 27 Sieradz 61% 16% 76% 10%
6 28 Piotrków Tryb. 62% 19% 82% 4%
6 29 Skierniewice 62% 16% 79% 12%
7 88 Piła 22% 65% 71% 8%
7 89 Szamotuły 28% 48% 65% 12%
7 90 Swarzędz 39% 27% 53% 26%
7 91 Poznań 42% 31% 48% 29%
7 92 Gniezno 34% 29% 61% 15%
7 93 Konin 24% 31% 72% 11%
7 94 Leszno 35% 28% 66% 12%
7 95 Ostrów Wlkp. 34% 39% 61% 15%
7 96 Kalisz 27% 42% 43% 46%
8 14 Puławy 41% 16% 30% 37%
8 15 Kraśnik 39% 31% 27% 49%
8 16 Lublin 33% 41% 36% 53%
8 17 Biała Podl. 44% 17% 25% 43%
8 18 Chełm 21% 66% 24% 43%
8 19 Zamość 38% 33% 15% 40%
9 54 Tarnobrzeg 33% 28% 58% 24%
9 55 Mielec 38% 47% 64% 22%
9 56 Rzeszów 66% 20% 58% 32%
9 57 Krosno 78% 6% 42% 30%
9 58 Przemyśl 65% 23% 65% 13%
10 30 Chrzanów 53% 14% 37% 37%
10 31 Olkusz 50% 19% 27% 45%
EP Senate main town PO 1 PO other PiS 1
PiS 
other
10 32.33 Kraków 65% 19% 32% 47%
10 34 Bochnia 42% 25% 25% 34%
10 35 Tarnów 56% 15% 24% 28%
10 36 Nowy Targ 48% 29% 25% 25%
10 37 Nowy Sącz 53% 13% 25% 29%
10 81 Pińczów 37% 51% 17% 56%
10 82 Sandomierz 49% 41% 18% 50%
10 83 Kielce 37% 52% 19% 54%
11 68.69 Częstochowa 76% 12% 24% 68%
11 70 Gliwice 84% 5% 60% 15%
11 71 Zabrze 82% 6% 63% 14%
11 72.73 Rybnik-Jastrzębie-Zdrój 72% 14% 71% 19%
11 74 Chorzów 79% 8% 59% 16%
11 75.8 Katowice-Tychy 74% 12% 62% 16%
11 76 Dąbrowa G. 83% 5% 53% 25%
11 77 Sosnowiec 79% 7% 51% 18%
11 78 Bielsko-Biała 67% 17% 36% 41%
11 79 Cieszyn 59% 32% 36% 43%
12 1 Bolesławiec 67% 11% 52% 22%
12 2 Jelenia Góra 75% 7% 37% 29%
12 3 Legnica 68% 9% 62% 21%
12 4 Wałbrzych 60% 23% 26% 48%
12 5 Kłodzko 76% 8% 27% 29%
12 6 Oleśnica 78% 15% 52% 33%
12 7.8 Wrocław 75% 18% 48% 40%
12 51 Nysa 51% 37% 40% 20%
12 52 Opole 24% 66% 30% 32%
12 53 Kędzierzyn-Koźle 34% 55% 34% 23%
13 20 Zielona Góra 54% 34% 37% 39%
13 21 Gorzów Wlkp. 60% 18% 34% 51%
13 22 �agań 51% 36% 42% 30%
13 97 Szczecin 46% 41% 79% 7%
13 98 Stargard Sz. 53% 16% 65% 8%
13 99 Kołobrzeg 65% 10% 28% 58%
13 100 Koszalin 52% 27% 34% 54%
Source: Own study based on information from the National Electoral Commission.
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The cases of list leaders who obtained the greatest participation in par-
ticular electoral districts (exceeding 80%) have one thing in common. The ma-
jority of them are persons closely connected with the particular electoral di-
stricts and at the same time popular in the media. In the case of Civic Platform, 
Jerzy Buzek is such a person, and in the case of Law and Justice, it is Janusz 
Wojciechowski. Each of them achieves similar results in several neighbouring 
senate electoral districts. This way, media visibility and the bond with a larger 
area may give such a cumulated effect and a very high support index. However, 
if we look at the cases when no. 1 candidates had the poorest results, the huge 
significance of local rivals is noticeable. In the case of PO, Chełm and Piła were 
such districts, and in PiS, Radom and Zamość. These cases are similar because 
none of these senate districts includes the central town of the EP electoral di-
stricts. In territorial opposition of this kind, internal competition within the list 
is the most clearly seen.
The poor result on the list does not necessarily mean that the candidate 
is weak. In the Opole district, previous MEP Danuta Jazłowiecka, coming from 
that district, received two thirds of the votes cast for PO – more than twice as 
many as the person from no. 1 position on the PO list, the Minister of Culture 
Bogdan Zdrojewski, a person present in the media and commonly recognisable. 
On the other side of the district, in Jelenia Góra, the same Bogdan Zdrojewski 
received ten times greater support than the strongest of his rivals. 
Even greater relations of this kind occur on the lists of PiS, where 
Zbigniew Kuźmiuk standing from a far position obtained more than a dozen 
times greater support in the Radom district than the no. 1 candidate, Wojciech 
Jasiński, residing in Płock. But there are cases in which the weakness of num-
ber one candidate results from the dispersion of support among a group of other 
candidates, where the sum of candidate number one and the best candidate 
in the district does not exceed 50%. 
To sum up, it may be said that the ordinance in which a voter is forced to 
choose one candidate on the list and districts cover geographically and histori-
cally varied areas activates a very complicated game among parties, individual 
candidates, their position in the media and local connections. All that leads to 
the fact that a considerable part of attention of political actors themselves and the 
media coverage is focused on this game. The game has an important impact on 
the personal composition of Polish representation in the European Parliament. 
The advantage of the candidates placed on the first positions on the lists is clear-
ly visible. However, it must be said that the advantage is not overwhelming and 
can be eliminated by territorial bonds or the advantage of the incumbent.
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Abstract:
The paper refers to the essential problem of the European political space, 
namely the insufficient implementation scale of accountability standards, which 
has a direct effect on the democratization of the European political system, spe-
cifically on the democracy deficit. The paper was presented the accountability 
standard on the background on the EP election in 2014, with the strong focus on 
the relations between the voters and the EP candidates. In the analyses the factors 
characterizing the quality of political discourse were considered taking into ac-
count both, the electorate political activity (principal – in the meaning Principal-
Agent-Theory), as well as the offer of the running politicians (as the agents).
Key words:
accountability, principal, agent, political system, European Parliament. 
Accountability is a politological category that becomes particularly re-
levant during election campaigns. This is mostly visible in how political actors 
allow voters to review their actions and how intensively they interact with the 
electorate. Throughout the campaign and during the election itself, political 
representatives are subjected to a particularly thorough assessment, as voters 
are given an opportunity to effectively express their approval (or disapproval). 
This, of course, should not imply that accountability is related only to the elec-
toral process. On the contrary – it is a permanent and inherent feature of every 
democratic political system. However, (free) election constitutes the one me-
chanism of democracy which absolutely guarantees the voters a chance to hold 
their representatives accountable for their actions. While democratic systems 
provide for various tools of ongoing evaluation, such tools are passive in na-
ture and their scope is somewhat narrower. As one might say, they amount to 
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indirect, rather than direct assessment of political activity. Most of all, though, 
the act of voting ends with a specific result: a politician is (re-)elected or is not. 
Thus, voters give their sanction to particular candidates, who can be rewarded 
or criticised for their previous actions. Moreover, the campaign is a time when 
candidates are eager to interact (often directly) with the electorate – something 
they are far less likely to do in between elections.
The issue of accountability is relevant most of all to those bodies within 
the political system that are formed as a result of a direct election. This is so 
because such election determines who will represent the society and legitimises 
the newly chosen representatives to act on a broadly understood political scene. 
As such, the question of accountability is relevant also to the supranational le-
vel – for instance, to the European Parliament, which is the only representative 
institution within the EU chosen through direct election. Like in case of other 
elections, the period prior to the election day sees intense activity on the part of 
candidates, as they attempt to garner support of the voters by presenting their 
previous achievements and proving their responsibility. They also face the task 
of showing how they kept promises made earlier on, or explaining why they 
failed to do so. Some candidates fight for re-election, while others make their 
first attempt at earning the seat in the European Parliament. Still, both groups 
are subjected to an assessment of their previous activity. In case of the former, 
it is ex-post in nature (and comes down, broadly speaking, to legitimising the-
ir output). For the latter, it is mostly an ex-ante judgement, albeit it may entail 
some evaluation of their prior public activity in other areas.
Largely insufficient scope of accountability standards substantially hinders 
their implementation in the European political sphere. Numerous scholars have 
emphasised the democratic deficit that can be observed in several key (closely in-
terconnected) dimensions, such as accountability, legitimacy and/or representa-
tion [Bovens et al. 2010; Hobolt, Tilley 2014; Majone 1996; Majone 1998; Majone 
2009 (1); Majone 2009 (2); Menon, Weatherill 2002, Mulgan 2014; Ruszkowski 
2010; Scharpf 1996; Sroka 2011; Wojtaszczyk 2011]. If the European political 
system suffers from a chronic deficit of accountability, it might be an interesting 
academic challenge to answer the question of why direct elections to the EP, 
and debates preceding them, have not eliminated the aforementioned democratic 
deficit. For the purpose of this paper, I have formed a hypothesis that accounta-
bility associated with EP elections is inefficient because principals are not fully 
principals, while agents cannot be considered as 100 per cent agents. Hence, what 
we have here is a certain political illusion as to the relations between the electora-
te and its representatives. The purpose of this article is to examine the quality of 
relations occurring between principals (voters) and agents (candidates to the EP 
and/or MEPs) against the background of political accountability.
The considerations presented in this paper are founded upon the premise 
that certain conditions are necessary for the accountability to function:
a) (…) there are legal and formal institutions and mechanisms to hold 
governments to account; 
b) there are clearly defined agents who demand government action; 
c) there are clearly defined agents who are responsible for government 
action; 
d) there are legally established and effective sanctions for those who are 
not accountable [Acosta et al. 2013: 12].
The electoral process - including the one on the supranational level, 
in case of the European Parliament - occurs in all the above circumstances. Most 
of all, there is a mechanism allowing for accountability: the institution of direct 
election itself. We also have agents: politicians who wish to be (re)elected MEPs, 
and hence have to garner the support of the electorate. Candidates are not novices 
on the political scene - they have operated on it for some time and have fulfilled 
certain duties as public officials. There is an effective sanction: a candidate may 
succeed or fail in garnering sufficient support. Finally, there are principals empo-
wered to sanction the actions of their representatives. Therefore, there is a plane 
upon which relations of accountability may occur and be analysed. The examina-
tion presented below is based on three theoretical pillars - theory of democracy, 
theory of political system and the principal-agent theory (PAT). The first one has 
allowed me to focus on issues that are essential to the functioning of democratic 
political systems. The second has provided a tool for placing political entities in 
the framework of cyclical political activity. The third one, in turn, has facilitated 
the analysis of relations between the key actors of a political system.
As this paper has a well developed theoretical framework, it is based 
largely on the existing academic literature on the functioning of democracy (as 
well as accountability) and the European political sphere. A part of the analy-
sis is accompanied by data from Eurobarometer, as well as two Polish organi-
sations: the CBOS research agency and the Institute of Public Affairs, which 
monitors how Polish representatives operate in the European political system. 
Wherever possible, I have also utilised large-scale data referring to other EU 
member states. However, most of the empirical data presented here refers exc-
lusively to Poland. Still, this does not diminish the value of the research, since 
Polish political system is largely representative of most systems that currently 
exist in Central and Eastern Europe.
The article consists of three parts. the first one presents particular types 
of accountability. This allows me to connect this concept to the other part of the 
subject - European Parliament elections. The second part constitutes an analy-
sis of how principals (voters) execute accountability to sanction the political 
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activity of agents (candidates to the EP). The final part is focused on the (poten-
tial) representatives and their readiness to be held accountable.
Due to the limited scope of this paper, a number of issues have been only 
briefly mentioned, while some others were omitted altogether. Among the most 
relevant subjects that are not discussed here one can note the question of syste-
mic determinants governing the work of an MEP. Such determinants unquestio-
nably have a certain impact on how MEPs act (in the formal context). Another 
issue left out of this article is European multilevel governance, which deter-
mines the structural and functional character of the European political system 
and shapes relations between all actors on the European scene, where MEPs 
function as they execute their mandates. Both these subjects are fairly broad 
and well covered in the existing literature. Thus, readers willing to reach for 
additional knowledge should not have any trouble with finding sufficiently in-
formative sources.
Accountability and its forms
The concept of accountability is of ancient provenance. It derives from 
the Latin terms accomptare (to account for), computare (to sum up) and putare 
(to judge, to assess). Although etymology and history place it as a term related 
to accounting and financial administration [Bovens 2006: 6], in modern times 
it is most often associated with public and political activity. It signifies transpa-
rent and fair management of the public sphere, and the mechanism of holding 
politicians and public officials responsible to the electorate, public opinion and 
representative democratic bodies.
The essence of accountability lies in one’s obligation to account for one-
’s actions - to take responsibility for the activity one undertakes when acting 
on behalf of the society, as a part of an entity that has been legitimised by the 
voters to perform certain tasks and fulfil certain promises. Accountability can 
be thought of as (1) a mechanism that encompasses a system of procedures and 
institutions; (2) a virtue that characterises the attitudes of people participating 
in political processes; or (3) a standard of how the public sphere functions. 
The concept can be viewed in a narrow or broad sense. The narrow perspective 
shows accountability as, primarily, a mechanism, while attitudes and standards 
are treated as additional aspects. Hence, following Mark Bovens [2006: 6], 
we can define accountability in this sense as an interaction that encompasses 
the following key elements:
1. a relation between the decision-making body (an actor, agent, politician) 
and the forum that evaluates its actions (a principal, voter),
2. in which actors are obliged to
3. explain and justify their conduct,
4. where the forum may pose questions
5. and pass a judgement,
6. while actors may face consequences.
In such view, the occurrence of the abovementioned stages testifies to the 
fact that accountability functions as a specific instrument of a political process.
The broad perspective pictures accountability as a category without spe-
cified borders and scope - a concept which encompasses a number of similar 
categories such as transparency, efficiency, democracy, effectiveness, responsi-
veness, responsibility, openness and coherence. All these terms de facto consti-
tute criteria, or even indicators with which we can measure how advanced the 
process of accountability is. Both perspectives depict the complex, multi-level 
nature of accountability which results from the complicated composition of 
contemporary political systems and the extent of network-like connections be-
tween their actors. This means that any analysis of accountability has to factor 
in the position of each entity in the system, as well as the purpose and comple-
xity of the system itself (and/or its sub-systems). As a consequence, literature 
of the subject names several types of accountability: horizontal, vertical and 
diagonal; direct and indirect; external and internal; social, legal, professional, 
ethical, electoral, peer, political, public and many others.
One criterion by which accountability can be classified is the source of 
interaction between entities participating in the political system. In such di-
vision, we can distinguish three types of accountability: horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal. [O’Donnell 1998; The Anti-Corruption... 2009; Bovens 2006]. 
The first type refers to situations when public officials are limited in their ac-
tions and supervised by other public bodies (courts, ombudsman, central bank, 
audit agencies, etc.) which may demand explanations and, ultimately, punish an 
official for improper conduct [The Anti-Corruption ... 2009: 2]. In other words, 
it describes control mechanisms and the balance of power within the system of 
public institutions. Horizontal accountability is therefore typical for inter-in-
stitutional relations stemming from standard administrative procedures (for in-
stance, vote of confidence or supervisory control) or from a call for intervention 
on the part of one actor. The most typical example of horizontal accountabil-
ity is Montesquieu’s tripartite model of separation of powers [Łukomski 2004: 
119-122], complemented with control and supervisory institutions. This model 
of accountability dominates the literature on the functioning of public adminis-
tration [Bovens et al. 2014: 4]. However, horizontal accountability also includes 
administrative accountability, which may take the form of external accountabil-
ity (that exists parallel to legal supervision and encompasses a number of ju-
diciary, quasi-judiciary or independent institutions) and internal accountability 
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(based on internal regulations, statutes, codes of conduct, common practices, 
etc.). Horizontal accountability is also described by constitutional law schol-
ars, who analyse legal accountability - that is, the obligation to face legal con-
sequences of one’s own or other people’s actions. Legal accountability is most 
commonly associated with infringements of the law.
Accountability can also take on a vertical form which has its source in 
external influence - namely, in a hierarchical relation between the person held 
accountable and the forum. The essence of this dependence lies in the fact that 
the forum (a voter, principal or superior body) is formally entitled to hold its 
representatives (agents, politicians) responsible for their actions. This type of 
accountability is based on existing regulations, including the act of voting as 
a kind of external influence exerted by the electorate over politicians. According 
to standards described by Transparency International, vertical accountabili-
ty enables the public to execute its right to hold public officials accountable 
through the procedure of election, independent media, active civil society and 
other, similar channels [The Anti-Corruption... 2009: 33]. Vertical accountabil-
ity is typically used by political scientists, who believe that ‘(...) accountability 
generally denotes a relationship between elected politicians and their voters, 
sometimes mediated by parties, government representatives, or bureaucrats’ 
[Bovens et al. 2014: 5]. The most common variants of vertical accountability 
are political and, even more narrowly, electoral accountability.
The third type is the so-called diagonal accountability, which occurs when 
citizens use public institutions to improve supervision of the activities of the au-
thorities, but also when they engage directly in political processes (for example, 
through social consultations, budget proposals, monitoring of public spending or 
other such actions) [The Anti-Corruption... 2009: 33]. Diagonal accountability is 
facultative and functions without any formal pressure stemming from organisa-
tional or legal requirements. Its quintessence rests in the participative model of 
public policies [Bovens 2006: 20-21]. The nature of this type of accountability is 
well reflected in democratic accountability [Acosta et al. 2013], social account-
ability [Ackerman 2005] and public accountability, which emphasise citizens’ 
involvement in the process of holding authorities and administration responsible 
for their conduct. At the same time, diagonal accountability can be considered 
a form of direct accountability, since it relies on actions undertaken directly by 
the principal. As indicated by Herbert Simon (et al.), this form is also important, 
as the mere existence of control institutions (and procedures they execute on a 
daily basis) is not sufficient to make the process of accountability comprehen-
sive and effective. Simon emphasises that if accountability is to be truly im-
plemented, law-makers should act to eliminate passive attitudes in the society 
by designing control mechanisms that would include individual stakeholders 
in the process of monitoring and evaluating public authorities and administra-
tion [2005: 561]. Following this approach, Transparency International interprets 
diagonal accountability as “(...) a domain between the vertical and horizon-
tal dimensions. It refers to the phenomenon of direct citizen engagement with 
horizontal accountability institutions when provoking better oversight of state 
actions. Citizens by-pass cumbersome or compromised formal accountability 
systems to engage in policy-making, budgeting, expenditure tracking and other 
similar activities” [The Anti-Corruption… 2009: 33].
The catalogue of accountability types can be complemented with several 
other forms of cross-sectional nature. One such form is moral (ethical) account-
ability which shows politicians as subjects responsible for judging their own con-
duct and establishing an appropriate relationship with their. Such accountability 
is a part of political culture understood as a set of patterns of rational behaviour 
[Łukomski 2004: 147]. It is also a virtue expected of our political representatives. 
Peer accountability is also a cross-sectional type of this phenomenon. One dif-
ferentiation worth making here is that in its horizontal dimension, peer account-
ability is initiated and executed by institutions, while in vertical and diagonal di-
mensions it is the society at large that acts when certain norms are being violated.
The examination of accountability presented in this paper is focused on 
the narrow understanding of this concept - that is, on direct relations that occur 
between the key actors of the (European) political system, or, if one considers 
the problem of democratisation, between principals and their representatives. 
Still, I find compelling the conclusion presented by Hanna Pitkin, who stated 
that “(...) in a democratic environment, government officials are account giv-
ers and most of their actions are open to public scrutiny. It would not be realis-
tic, however, to expect all officials to respond to every citizen for every one of 
their actions” [1967...]. This is why the subjects of the following analysis are 
such mechanisms of accountability as enforcement (analysed in the context of 
elections) and answerability (understood as deliberation and responsiveness to 
stakeholders, customers and clients) [Boström, Garsten 2008: 6]. These mecha-
nisms occur in specific moments of the political cycle and refer to interactions 
between specific actors.
The Principal’s Perspective
As indicated in the introduction, accountability can only occur in an exi-
sting, effective system and depends on certain criteria with regard to the func-
tioning of the agent. However, our understanding of this issue is incomplete 
unless we also consider the subject of accountability - the principal, the voter. 
Voters are the ones who decide which politicians and parties will function on 
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the European scene, and who delegate agents and grant them certain decision-
-making competences. Voters are also the ones who control the agents’ output 
and determine their further political fate [Ruszkowski 2010: 26].
This paper begins with a somewhat provocative hypothesis that European 
voters cannot be considered principals in the full meaning of this term. Hence 
the question: what behaviours should they exhibit if we are to classify them as 
truly responsible principals? There are two simple, frequently used criteria we 
can use to assess their involvement in political life: turnout for elections and 
their attitude toward a given institution (measured by their knowledge about 
candidates and the institution itself). In part, this is about voters’ participation, 
as it is understood by Sartori in his concept of democracy: “Participation, in its 
proper sense, relies on one’s willing, active personal involvement. Therefore, 
it is not about being merely a part of something (which usually comes down 
to being embroiled in some events), and it is definitely not about unwilling, 
compulsory engagement in something. Participation is a spontaneous action 
- the exact opposite of being mobilised” [1994: 148]. In case of the EP elec-
tions, participation is a secondary manifestation of political activity, as seen in 
Schumpeter’s vision of procedural democracy. As such, it stems from and at the 
same time crowns the primary manifestation - one’s attitude toward a given in-
stitution and the system as a whole [Schumpeter 1995: 336-337].
Even though the European Parliament is the only body in the European po-
litical system that is chosen by citizens in direct election, voters seem to have lit-
tle interest in influencing its structure and composition. Since 1979, when the first 
direct election was held, the turnout rate has been constantly declining (Figure 1). 
In 2014, it fell to 42.52 per cent - nearly 20 per cent less than in the first election. 
Worse still, if one disregards countries where voting is compulsory (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg), the result is even lower: 38.96%. When ana-
lysing turnout rates for each country, it is clear that the citizens of “old” EU coun-
tries vote much more frequently than those from the “new” ones. With the excep-
tion of Lithuania, where turnout was calculated at 47.35%, none of the Central and 
Eastern European states exceeded the average ratio (not even its lower “bound”) 
for the entire Union (as presented in the figure below). The two countries that 
came closest were Estonia (36.52%) and Bulgaria (35.84%). Nearly one third of 
all eligible voters went to the polls in Romania (32.44%) and Latvia (30.24%). In 
Hungary (28.97%), Croatia (25.24%), Slovenia (24.55%) and Poland (23.83%) 
only about one in four citizens chose to vote. The lowest turnout rates were re-
corded in Czech Republic (18.20%) and Slovakia (13.05%).
Among the “old” EU member states, the lowest numbers of people 
cast their votes in Portugal, UK and the Netherlands: 33.67%, 35.40% and 
37.32% respectively. The country most active in the election was Malta, with 
approximately three in four citizens showing up at the polls. Other nations that 
clearly exceeded the overall EU average were the Italians (57.22%), the Danes 
(56.30%), the Swedes (51.07%) and the Germans (48.01%). In all other mem-
ber states, the turnout rate was close to the average.
The gap between the “old” and “new” member states proves that the 
Union lacks political and cultural coherence. As it turns out, despite substan-
tial structural support (and the accompanying promotion of the European struc-
tures) which the EU has provided to its Central and Eastern European members, 
and which has directly translated into improved living standards and economic 
growth, societies of these countries have so far failed to strengthen pro-European 
and civic attitudes. This conclusion is corroborated by the comparison of turnout 
rates in EP and national parliamentary elections. Firstly, societies identify much 
more with their national political scenes and consider the EP elections as second-
ary in importance. Secondly, Central and Eastern Europe still suffer from less 
developed civil societies, although Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania are worth 
pointing out as exhibiting the lowest divergence in turnout rates between EP and 
national parliamentary elections. Among the “old” EU member states, the British 
emerge as the nation most stable in its attitudes - they show consistently low 
interest in both types of elections discussed here (with 7 per cent difference in 
turnout rates). Across Europe, the divergence in turnout rates varies from about 
a dozen per cent (France: 15%; Italy: 17%) to over 30 (Finland: 30%; Denmark: 
31%; Sweden: 33%). Greece provides an interesting example of a country where 
even the obligation to vote is not enough to mobilise citizens, regardless of which 
type of election is considered (59.97 and 62.47% turnout rate respectively).
In Central and Eastern Europe, the divergence was higher than 25%, 
with the exception of the three countries mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
In Poland, it was recorded at 25%, in Estonia and Hungary at 28%, while 
in Latvia at 29%. Next, there is a large gap and even higher differences: 40% in 
case of Slovenia and Czech Republic, 41% in Croatia, and as much as 46% 
in Slovakia. Interestingly, the turnout rate for national parliamentary election 
in the latter states in comparable to that observed in most “older” democracies 
(still lower than in Scandinavia or Malta, though).
The data referred to above indicates that the mechanism of election is 
only used as a tool of accountability to a limited extent. This is particularly vis-
ible in case of the European Parliament elections, which all around Europe draw 
noticeably less attention among voters than national parliamentary elections, re-
gardless of how old a given democracy is. This, however, corresponds to and 
reflects the results of research conducted by Eurobarometer before the most re-
cent EP election, in which people from EU member states were asked about their 
identity. 39 per cent of respondents described themselves only as citizens of their 
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respective countries (Germans, Danes, Poles, etc.). 51 per cent expressed a “dou-
ble” identity - primarily, they referred to themselves as nationals of their coun-
tries, but they also identified themselves as Europeans. Only 6 per cent of re-
spondents considered themselves most of all Europeans, and secondarily, citizens 
of a given state.
The second element indicated here as a criterion for verifying the soci-
ety as the subject of accountability is our knowledge about and attitude toward 
the EU’s institutional order (in a broader sense) and the EP itself (in a narrow-
er sense). Research conducted by TNS Opinion one year before the 2014 EP 
election brought rather encouraging results. As it turns out, more than half of 
all respondents (53 per cent) pointed to the European Parliament as the one in-
stitution in the EU’s system they are most familiar with - a result that puts the 
EP far ahead of any other European body. The second and third most frequent-
ly mentioned institutions were the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission, both named by 27 per cent of respondents. However, nearly one 
third of the people who participated in the research were unable to name any 
EU body [One Year to... 2013: 35]. A number of other research projects re-
vealed that we tend to confuse European institutions with one another, and it is 
a trend observed not only in the “old” EU member states.
An interesting picture of European voters emerges if one juxtapos-
es the turnout rates and levels of knowledge about the EP in particular coun-
tries (Figure 2). The two statistics are often inversely proportionate - the lower 
the turnout rate, the more knowledge we declare to have about the institution. 
This has been true in case of all Central and Eastern European member states: 
Slovakia (13.05 vs. 79%), Czech Republic (18.2 vs. 69%), Romania (32.44 
vs. 81%), Bulgaria (35.84 vs. 75%), Hungary (28.97 vs. 67%), etc. Among 
the “old” EU countries, Portugal provided the most striking case of the same 
phenomenon (33.67 vs. 67%). In several states, the tendency is quite the oppo-
site: the percentage of those who voted was larger than of those who declared 
familiarity with the EP (Malta: 74.8 vs. 63%; UK: 35.4 vs. 24%; in Sweden, 
France and Spain the trend was the same, but the divergence between the two 
numbers was fairly small). It is difficult to state with certainty what the cause of 
such differences in the levels of knowledge about the EP among European na-
tions is. Any attempt at doing so is rather a speculation than a firm conclusion. 
One possible reason, especially with respect to the “new” member states, is the 
combination of cultural factors and a certain uncertainty people feel as to their 
knowledge on the subject. It can also stem from the fact that European bodies 
were strongly promoted among these societies as their countries underwent the 
accession process (which took place in fairly recent past, after all, especially in 
case of Romania and Bulgaria).
50 per cent of Europeans who took place in the abovementioned re-
search consistently identified the European Parliament as the body which rep-
resented European interests the best. Still, nearly half of them (46 per cent) did 
not know when the next direct election would take place. The date of the next 
election was known to 34 per cent of respondents, which indicates that societies 
were basically aware of the event and, thus, could be considered a conscious 
electorate. Once again, however, if the results are considered separately for 
each country, it turns out that our knowledge as to the date of the election did 
not translate into proportionately high turnout rates - a fact clearly visible with 
regard to Central and Eastern European states [Ibidem: 48].
After the 2009 EP election, Eurobarometer conducted a research in or-
der to find out why so many Europeans did not vote. The results revealed three 
main categories of reasons: those stemming from general opinions on politics, 
personal and, finally, those related directly to the EU itself. The first category 
was the most frequent one - 53 per cent of respondents said they did not partici-
pate in the election because they were generally unhappy with politics (they did 
not trust politicians), they thought their vote would not change anything or were 
simply not interested in politics. 30 per cent of citizens pointed to reasons relat-
ed strictly to the EU: lack of knowledge about its structure, discontent with the 
activity of the EP, as well as overly limited public debate and/or insufficiently 
informative election campaign [Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2009].
When analysing European political sphere, Robert Wiszniowski com-
piled a review of the existing literature on behaviours and motives of the elector-
ate. In it, he pointed out a variety of factors that determine our activity as voters. 
He discerned two perspectives - that of voters as individuals, and that of the en-
vironment in which they function. From individuals’ point of view, the elements 
that shape our activity at the polls are related to our knowledge and attitudes to-
ward politically significant issues. These are: trust toward the EP, the sense of 
empowerment, interest in elections, approval for the government, political pref-
erences, the level of general knowledge about politics, etc. One additional inter-
nal factor comes in the shape of our own perception of the European elections 
as being secondary in importance. The elections we find primarily important are 
those on the national level: parliamentary and presidential. The environment, 
in turn, encompasses elements such as the voting system, timing of the election 
(including the question of whether more than one election occurs in a short space 
of time), geographical factors1, etc. [Wiszniowski 2008: 188-214; 226-235].
In his comments on our involvement in European elections, Janusz 
Ruszkowski explains our lesser interest in them through several key factors: 
1 Geographical factors are those related to the administrative division of a country and spatial 
distribution of constituencies (e.g. their size).
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(1) the election does not take place on the same day in all EU countries and, 
hence, appears less prestigious; (2) voting systems differ across Europe, which 
means we lack foundation to build a stronger European identity; (3) election 
campaigns are dominated by national political parties; (4) the debate preceding 
elections revolves mostly around respective national perspectives; (5) European 
structures are too distant and hence abstract to most citizens; (6) election cam-
paigns are not particularly intense and (7) not well funded; (8) EP elections 
attract little interest from the media; (9) the EP lacks a clear position and role 
within the European political system [Ruszkowski 2010: 124-125]. What is 
interesting about this catalogue is that it focuses on shortcomings of the envi-
ronment rather than voters. It points to shortcomings on the part of politicians 
and parties, problems of the voting system and institutional order, as well as the 
role of the media which shape the public opinion. This, of course, should not be 
an excuse for all the passive citizens. To the contrary - it signals how much the 
system is detached from the voters, or, looking from the opposite perspective, 
how much the voters are detached from the system. Having in mind such cir-
cumstances, one can hardly expect accountability to be truly effective.
The Agent’s Perspective
In the framework of interactions described here, an MEP is an agent di-
rectly legitimised by a principal (a voter) to act on the political scene. His posi-
tion within the system is, however, somewhat complex. In fact, he enters into 
various relations of accountability: electoral accountability, political accounta-
bility, direct accountability, internal accountability, external accountability etc. 
Moreover, one needs to remember that MEPs operate in a peculiar environment 
of multilevel governance, which blurs the structural and functional clarity of 
the system. Still, although all this background is important, it should not derail 
us from the analytic perspective adopted here, whereby the one crucial element 
of accountability is agents’ readiness to be held responsible for their actions. 
The key moments in the process are the election and the campaign preceding 
it. In principle, the campaign should be the time when our representatives will-
ingly subject themselves to judgement. The question that arises here is: how do 
politicians account for their activities? What exactly do they do to this end? 
How do they try to garner or maintain the support of the electorate? How is 
their input and output evaluated? In other words - how deep is our assessment 
and what is its nature (is it ex-ante, ongoing or ex-post)?
Most of all, the actions of candidates are shaped largely by their respec-
tive political parties. This refers to both the possibility of running for re-elec-
tion and the debate preceding the election. It is worth noting here that national 
parties are strongly involved in evaluating the actions of their MEPs. It can be 
perceived as an expression of internal or, to some extent, horizontal account-
ability (as it occurs within a certain political structure). This means that voters’ 
power to hold a candidate accountable is limited right from the outset of the 
entire process. Even before the electorate determines the fate of candidates, 
all MEPs are assessed by decision-making bodies of their respective parties 
[Schmitt et al. 2010: 223]. This process constitutes an internal verification of 
loyalty, effectiveness, political strategies and further plans. As a result, a given 
politician is, or is not, allowed to run for an EP seat. One other element that de-
termines a candidate’s chance for (re)election is his/her place on the list, also 
decided on by partisan organs. As Ruszkowski pointed out: “(...) potential re-
election of an MEP depends much more on his popularity within his national 
party than on his previous achievements as an MEP. It is determined by the 
leaders of the national party, not his political group in the EP (...)” [2010: 103].
In the 2014 EP election in Poland, as much as 80 per cent of MEPs 
(41 people) were cleared to run for re-election2. This means they were subject-
ed to both ex-post and ex-ante evaluation from the voters. Of 51 elected peo-
ple, nearly half (24) was re-elected for the first time, while 11 were re-elected 
for their third term-of-office in the EP. The abovementioned politicians proved 
effective either due to their previous actions on the European and/or national 
venue, or thanks to an attractive agenda they presented for the future. One other 
possible explanation is that they simply benefitted from their partisan affilia-
tion3. High number of re-elected candidates testifies to the fact that experience 
in European politics is an asset highly regarded by the voters. This view is cor-
roborated by the results of research conducted on EP elections in Poland. As it 
turns out, the percentage of people who make a decision based on the candi-
date’s name, rather than on his partisan affiliation, has increased with every 
successive EP election held so far (in 2004, it was 50%; in 2009 – 54%; in 2014 
– 58%) [BS/96/2014: 9]. Apparently, the name and the public image that comes 
with it are not without importance. This is particularly true in the light of an-
other statistic - 46 per cent of respondents declared that MEPs had a substan-
tial impact on Poland’s image in Europe (while only 38 per cent said MEPs 
2 Interestingly, out of those 10 first-time candidates, 9 were registered by one party - Platforma 
Obywatelska (PO, eng. Civic Platform). However, such personal shift in the ranks of its EP 
candidates is less surprising when one considers the fact that PO was by far the biggest 
winner of the previous EP election, when its members had obtained 25 seats.
3 Among those who won the EP seats were also well-established politicians, seasoned in 
working in important positions (for example, B. Zdrojewski, who prior to the election had 
been a minister in the government; M. Boni - also former minister; A. Kozłowska-Rajewicz 
- government’s plenipotentiary for equal treatment), as well as two new MEPs without any 
experience in politics (Z. Krasnodębski and B. Wenta).
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determined how well Polish interests were represented in the EU) [Ibidem: 4].
Another element of some significance to accountability is the election 
campaign (most of all, its quality) - the particular time when politicians are 
supposed to subject themselves to assessment by the electorate. Unfortunately, 
most candidates who base their strategy on ex-ante evaluation make a vital 
mistake right at the start - they fill their agendas with declarations which are 
impossible to implement. Moreover, such agendas are frequently vague and 
noncommittal. This, of course, is a safe choice if one has in mind the need to 
account for one’s activity before the next election. Another problem concerns 
the debate that occurs throughout the campaign. Since it is conducted primarily 
by national parties, it is usually dominated by national rather than European is-
sues. Furthermore, it is full of impractical, infeasible proposals and declarations 
that have nothing to do with the competences of an MEP. One example was 
provided by J. Kalinowski who, in a rather crude manner, (especially consider-
ing his position as an MEP and the standard we expect of the European political 
debate) addressed the voters, saying: ‘What about regional roads? What about 
local roads? Don’t we need them? These are the issues we’re handling now, 
and the issues I’m sure we will be handling in the future!’ Of course, the mes-
sage is far from reasonable, as it completely misses the scope of issues tackled 
by MEPs. It stems from a populist approach, but also from the expectations 
expressed by the electorate of PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, eng. Polish 
People’s Party). Still, even though such agenda was clearly shaped by a calcula-
tion of votes, the candidate referred both to his previous activity, and the actions 
he intended to undertake in the next term-of-office.
Another significant shortcoming that hinders accountability is related to 
information policy adopted outside the close circles of candidates. Research in-
dicates that the media fail to fulfil their educational and informational functions. 
Numerous respondents stated that the media provided insufficient coverage of 
the European Parliament and its work, or that information given on the subject 
was biased (excessively negative) - there was not enough positive message and 
first-hand information on what the role of the EP in the European political sys-
tem is. Moreover, respondents complained that media focused on dominant co-
untries such as Germany and France [Wstrzymujący się od głosowania... 2012: 
6]. Finally, they believed media made insufficient effort to mobilise the electorate 
[Wiszniowski 2008: 347-348]. All the above-mentioned criticism is particular-
ly relevant in the light of another research which revealed that during the cam-
paign, the media (or more specifically, TV programmes) were the major source 
of information about parties and candidates for 58 per cent of voters. Slightly 
lower number of respondents pointed to TV spots and advertisements (53 per 
cent). On the other hand of the spectrum were meetings and direct conversations 
with the candidates - 5 and 2 per cent of all answers, respectively. Internet provi-
ded information to 16 per cent of respondents. Interestingly, 27 per cent gained 
some knowledge from their families and friends. As much as 23 per cent did not 
come across any information on any of the parties or candidates [BS/97/2014]. 
The same research examined voters’ opinions on the effectiveness of the cam-
paign. 39 per cent of respondents stated that the campaign did not provide them 
with any relevant information about the candidates running for EP seats in their 
constituencies. 19 per cent said they only learned very little [Ibidem]. Such num-
bers force me to conclude that the conduct of the election campaign does not sup-
port the process of accountability. As it turns out, neither politicians and parties 
nor the media provide a viable platform for genuine accountability to exist on.
Many politicians and analysts emphasise that the campaign starts the day 
after the election, when the chosen representatives begin their work and, at the 
same time, their effort to be re-elected the next time around. The reality of the 
job forces MEPs to be constantly on the move. They perform a part of their du-
ties in Brussels, where they participate in committee sessions and meetings of 
political groups and additional plenary sessions. They also work in Strasbourg, 
where they sit on twelve several day-long plenary sessions per year. MEPs are 
also “spokesmen” for the EU in their respective constituencies4. Although they 
are not legally obliged to follow the instructions of their voters, they should take 
their opinions into consideration. One also needs to remember that MEPs are 
given funds to set up their offices, which means they are given means to con-
stantly stay in contact with the voters. Hence, the shape of the system in which 
MEPs execute their mandate provides a convenient ground for them to sub-
ject themselves to ongoing evaluation. However, there are two conditions that 
need to be met if such evaluation is to actually occur. Firstly, MEPs have to do 
some work which they can later be proud of in front of their voters. Secondly, 
they have to keep the electorate constantly informed of their actions. Here, we 
can refer to a qualitative research conducted in Poland, which indicates that 
MEPs are not widely recognisable, and “(...) even if they are, it is due to reasons 
different than their activity in the EU structures. The Poles do not distinguish 
MEPs from other Polish politicians who work in various other institutions (...)” 
[Dudkiewicz et al. 2013: 8]. According to analyses presented by the Institute 
of Public Affairs, “(...) in both the current and the previous term-of-office, not 
all Polish MEPs managed to execute their mandate in a satisfactory manner. 
Some were focused too much on national politics and, consequently, neglected 
their actual workplace - the European Parliament. Others engaged in work on 
4 MEPs gather in political groups based on their views, regardless of their nationality. They 
execute their mandate independently. Since their prerogatives have increased over the 
years, their activity now influences of spheres of citizen’s daily life: environment, consumer 
protection, transport, education, culture, health care, etc.
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issues which are not particularly relevant to the future of the European Union 
and Poland’s role in it. Others still did not possess sufficient knowledge, abilities 
and contacts to be able to influence decision-making processes. All such man-
dates cannot be considered well used. Informing citizens about the functioning 
of European institutions is equally important to being effective in influencing the 
decisions made by the EU” [Łada, Szczepanik 2013: 2]. Analysis of work done 
by MEPs also shows the extent of their accountability. “(...) MEPs are subjected 
to less control by the public opinion – the media do not follow the events in the 
European Parliament, so it is easier to remain anonymous and not attract any in-
terest with one’s statements and behaviour (...). The accountability of MEPs is 
different due to (...) lesser external control and, secondly, the complexity of is-
sues tackled by the EP (...)” [Dudkiewicz et al. 2013: 48].
As indicated by the presented data, candidates’ readiness to answer 
for their actions to the electorate is relative and depends on external factors. 
Most of all, current and/or future candidates are strongly dependant on the will 
and decisions made by their political parties. This refers as much to the turning 
point in the electoral process - a decision to allow a given person to run in the 
EP election - as to the information policy adopted by parties and imposed on 
their members. Hence, accountability is strongly determined by internal rela-
tions between politicians and their formations - an aspect which is beyond the 
influence of voters. This means that the electorates’ decision-making powers 
are limited right from the start of the process.
The second factor that weakens the election as a tool of accountability 
is the shape and content of the debate preceding the elections. As the campaign 
is focused on national or even local issues and dominated by empty promises, 
voters have little to no reference points by which they could evaluate and verify 
a given politician’s performance before the next election.
Finally, (Polish) MEPs show insufficient activity in fields which are vi-
tal and relevant to the functioning of the European Parliament. They also fail 
to keep voters well informed of their actions. Therefore, even though most of 
them have been positively verified in the last election (as they were re-elected 
for another term-of-office), the effectiveness of their work remains doubtful.
Conclusions
Acting through the European Commission, the European Union has made 
accountability one of the most important standards for the functioning of the 
public sphere. The European Governance White Paper [European Commission 
2002] enumerates five basic principles of good governance: openness, partici-
pation, effectiveness, accountability and coherence. Although these principles 
clearly fall within the multilevel governance model, they also emphasise the sig-
nificance of including citizens in the process of formulating, implementing and 
evaluating public policies. This can be inferred from the abovementioned list. 
Firstly, it provides for relations based on open conduct of political process and 
inclusion of individuals (also through implementing standards of accountabil-
ity). Then, it postulates ensuring effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the 
system. None of these criteria leave out citizens, although in every case, their 
participation can be considered from two perspectives: infrastructure and imple-
mentation. The former is related with how the system is organised - for instance, 
with the existence of appropriate regulations, solutions and standards. The latter 
refers most of all to the activity of political actors: various administrative bod-
ies, politicians participating in direct elections and ultimate beneficiaries of all 
public activity - citizens. If the system guarantees the first aspect (that is, the in-
stitutional framework), the second one depends on the activity of institutional 
actors and voters. Implementing good European governance requires several 
key elements: 1) transparency of decision-making processes and access to pub-
lic information (which are the essential factors of openness); 2) mechanisms 
for inclusion of social (and sectoral) actors in decision-making processes; 3) 
a responsive model for making decisions (which is a virtue of every effective 
and coherent system). Such structure for European governance unquestionably 
forms a framework and possibility for limiting the democratic deficit observed 
so far. Still, the existence of standards, or even their fairly broad promotion5, 
does not by itself make the system more democratic. This is clearly reflected in 
the picture of the electoral process described earlier in this paper.
In practice, European societies exhibit a very limited willingness to hold 
their representatives (current or potential) accountable. Their participation in 
the elections - a crucial element of any democratic system - is incidental. Barely 
over 30 per cent of European eligible to vote regularly go to the polls. Societies 
of Central and Eastern Europe stand out us particularly passive. Moreover, vot-
ers possess a limited knowledge of the European Parliament - the institution 
in which they put their representatives through direct election. One particu-
larly striking tendency is their propensity to confuse various European institu-
tions. Furthermore, their knowledge about their representatives’ activity at the 
European level is far from satisfactory. In the context of the subject discussed 
here, a closer look at those citizens who do cast their votes is also revealing - 
most of them make their decisions without proper reflection and analysis of 
5 One example of such promotion in Poland in the period from 2007 to 2013 was a dedicated 
„Human Capital” Programme funded from the European Social Fund. „Human Capital” 
provided support for, among many other projects, public administration, to assist it in 
implementing standards of good governance (one of the Programme priorities was titled 
„good governance”).
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what each candidate has done so far, and/or intends to do in the future. Rather 
than that, they follow the overall image of a given politician. Although the 
causes of this „laziness” are actually quite complex and include many other fac-
tors, the fact is that such attitude is not conducive to the process of democratis-
ing a system through mechanisms of accountability.
The quality of debates conducted during the election campaign indi-
cates that MEPs are not willing to subject themselves to judgement from vot-
ers. First of all, the subjects (and with them, the entire dialogue) touched on by 
current and/or potential MEPs are not particularly relevant. Secondly, it is hard 
to speak of an actual dialogue, since candidate limit their efforts to simply in-
forming the electorate about their actions and intentions, without engaging in 
a true discussion. Still, even if it is narrowed down to passing information, the 
mechanism could be used for the purpose of accountability, if only candidates 
were ready to provide information most useful to the voters (for instance, about 
their previous achievements in European politics, or about how they fulfilled 
promises made earlier on) and formulate agendas adequate to their prerogatives 
as MEPs (rather than focused on national issues). Finally, candidates to the EP 
seats are dependent - both formally and informally - on internal political systems 
of their countries. This fact is reflected in a number of factors: (1) dominant posi-
tion of national parties; (2) varying national voting systems; (3) national charac-
ter of the electorate; (4) focus on national issues during the campaign; (5) focus 
on national issues during the work in the EP [Ruszkowski 2011: 164].
As indicated above, the relation between MEPs and their principals do 
not entail evaluation of their political activity, regardless of whether one con-
siders ex-ante or ex-post assessment. Deputies’ daily work is also not easily 
subjected to judgment - it is either poorly reported to the electorate, overly fo-
cused on national context, or, quite simply, insufficient. This means the MEPs 
do not create circumstances that would allow voters to conduct ongoing evalu-
ation of their actions.
Clearly, the European political system suffers from a substantial deficit 
of accountability, as reflected in very limited implementation of one of the basic 
standards of democracy. Consequently, EU structures lack strong legitimacy. 
Although a crisis of participation has affected most of Europe and is not limited 
to „new” members of the Union, it is particularly visible in younger democra-
cies of states that have joined the EU since 2004. This underscores the distance 
between the „new” and „old” member states in terms of development of civil 
society and pro-European attitudes. While accountability constitutes only one 
area in the larger, more complex problem of democratic deficit, it is definitely 
worth more attention on the part of both theorists and practitioners. It is, after 
all, a factor that shapes social and institutional order and is required to build 
high political culture.
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Figure 2. Turnout rates and levels of knowledge about the EP in particular 
countries
The article concerns an analysis of the types of positioning an electoral 
agenda adopted by the Polish political parties during the political campaign be-
fore the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. Positioning the electoral 
offer has been treated as one of the main elements of the electoral strategies of 
political parties, as the way of defining their electoral goals and identifying the-
ir strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities and threats. The scope of 
analysis assumes main Polish political parties represented in the Polish parlia-
ment in the years 2011 - 2014 and additionally the party that managed to cross 
the entry barrier into the parliamentary market in the EP election in 2014. 
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The 2014 European Parliament (EP) election in Poland marks the be-
ginning of an ‘electoral marathon’ that will stretch over 18 months and encom-
pass local election (Autumn 2014), presidential election (Summer 2015) and 
the national parliamentary election (Autumn 2015). Due to the predominantly 
parliamentary character of Polish political system, the last of these events will 
be of most significance to participating parties. At the same time, the above-
-mentioned schedule clearly determines the importance of strategies adopted 
by parties in the EP election. The result of this election will constitute the first 
test of their efficiency. 
This article is focused on analysing one very important element of elec-
toral strategies adopted by Polish political parties - the positioning of their elec-
toral agenda. Positioning is crucial to the strategy for several reasons. Firstly, 
by positioning its agenda, a party conveys information about its key assets and 
resources, or, at the very least, about how it identifies those assets and resources 
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at a certain stage in the development of the political market. Secondly, posi-
tioning strategy contains clues as to current relations between political entities 
and the structure of inter-partisan rivalry. This is so because when positioning 
themselves, parties take into consideration the place and assets of other play-
ers on the market. Finally, the way the agenda is positioned reveals target gro-
ups to which it is addressed. At the same time, it is the one element of partisan 
strategy that is openly announced. Its content can be examined based on mes-
sages the party conveys to the electorate in fliers, banners, TV ads, official do-
cuments, etc. All these sources are readily accessible, which makes scholars’ 
work that much easier. Of course, one needs to remember that any analysis ba-
sed on such sources allows us to determine a given party’s strategic goals, but it 
says nothing about how effectively these goals are being achieved.
This paper presents an analysis of positioning strategies adopted by poli-
tical parties represented in the Polish parliament (Civic Platform - PO; Law and 
Justice - PiS; Democratic Left Alliance - SLD; Polish People’s Party - PSL; 
Europe+ Your Movement - E+TR), as well as new entities created as a result 
of divisions within the already existing formations, for which the EP election 
constituted the first big test.
The key questions I intend to answer in this article refer to positioning 
strategies implemented by political parties in the period from 2011 to 2014 
and later, during the campaign before the 2014 European Parliament election. 
By comparing strategies adopted throughout these two stages, I can determine 
whether the 2014-2015 “electoral marathon” is perceived by parties as a chance 
for a new opening (reformulating their goals and gaining new slices of the mar-
ket) or, rather, as a time to maintain the status quo and confirm their position. 
Examination of types of positioning adopted for the 2014 election will also al-
low me to compare the current strategies with those utilised before the 2004 
and 2009 elections. 
The discussion of research results is preceded by an introduction to the 
issue of positioning partisan agendas on the political market, as well as a brief 
description of the pre-election state of things in Poland.
Positioning partisan agendas on the political market
In one of the most succinct definitions of the term, Philip Kotler and 
Kevin Keller described positioning as ‘the act of designing a company’s offe-
ring (...)’ [Kotler, Keller 2011: 276]. The authors of the concept of positioning, 
Al Ries and Jack Trout, referred to it as the battle for the mind of consumers 
[Ries, Trout 2001] and emphasised that the product is positioned most of all in 
customers’ awareness. Positioning means also differentiating one’s offer from 
that of the competitors. So-called points-of-difference that are promoted most 
are those that have the biggest impact on, or the biggest relevance to, the target 
group - in this case, segments of the electorate at which the agenda is addressed 
[see also: Kotler, Keller 2011: 276-279].
Selection of positioning strategies depends on a number of factors. 
First of all, on elements that shape the current environment of the political mar-
ket - social, economic and demographic factors which affect behaviours of the 
electorate and, hence, the actions of political actors. Secondly, on the structure 
of the market - barriers to entry and elements that limit one’s choice of direc-
tion, including formal and legal aspects (for example, electoral system), as well 
as resources possessed and positions occupied by each actor - particularly, their 
“market share”. Thirdly, on the character and stakes of current political rivalry, 
be it at the polls, in the parliament, or within the government.
Elections are, of course, particularly important to political parties, 
as they determine their influence on the market. Each election reveals the posi-
tion held by every formation compared to its competitors, as well as the elec-
torate’s attitude toward its agenda. Depending on the current market situation 
and the existence of potential barriers to mobility, parties may use elections as 
an opportunity to pursue the following strategic goals:
 - maintaining the status quo (in other words, current market share) - 
in this case, parties continue their positioning strategies without any major 
alterations; they might add new details to their agendas, for example to 
solidify their image among current supporters (so-called deep branding)
 - broadening the market - this implies partial / complete change of 
positioning strategy or, possibly, inclusion of new elements in the agenda 
(for instance, an attempt at addressing other segments of the electorate);
 - reducing support for competitors - a party chooses to use the 
campaign as a chance to implement a specific stage of its long-term 
strategy - that is, to weaken the most significant rival(s) with which it 
competes for the support of the same target group;
 - entering / returning to the market - if barriers to entry do not exist 
or are significantly reduced, newly formed parties may implement 
innovative positioning strategies in order to draw attention to their 
agendas and reach potential supporters; is barriers to entry remain too 
high to be overcome, small entities may want to remind the electorate 
of their existence [Cichosz 2011a: 86].
A different view on strategic goals attained through positioning is pre-
sented by Bruce Newman and Jagdish Sheth [1987: 135], as well as Paul 
Baines [1999: 407-408]. These authors underscore characteristics of the electo-
rate to which the offer of a given party is addressed. By employing two criteria 
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- the candidate (right / wrong) and values (right / wrong) - they distinguish four 
types of strategy:
 - reinforcement strategy - used toward voters who have supported the 
“right” candidate for the “right” reasons; its purpose is to reassure 
those voters that they had made the right choice;
 - rationalisation strategy - used when the “right” candidate has been 
chosen for the “wrong reasons”; it involves inducing a slight shift in 
the behaviour of a given party’s electorate;
 - inducement strategy - applied to voters who pick the “wrong” 
candidate for the “right” reasons; it aims at attracting “misguided” 
voters to the “right” candidate;
 - confrontation strategy - used when the “wrong” candidate is selected 
for the “wrong” reasons; here, strategic goals are achieved through 
negative or comparative campaign.1
When analysing the content of messages related to the positioning of 
agendas on the political market, one can notice three paths most frequently ta-
ken by parties:
 - ideological positioning (through agendas), which places each party 
on the right wing - left wing continuum that has traditionally defined 
inter-party rivalry;
 - situational positioning (through attitude toward specific issues), 
whereby a party builds its niche around its attitude toward the current 
situation and chosen contemporary problems - most typically, those 
which at a given moment are discussed widely by mass media and 
engage the attention of the public opinion;
 - innovative positioning (adopted by outsiders), which allows a party to 
turn away from standard methods of positioning and instead, politicise 
new subjects [for more, see: Cichosz 2005: 152-155].
The choice of one of these options is related to, among other things, 
the life-cycle of a given party. As indicated by previous research on Polish poli-
tical parties [Cichosz 2010: 103-105], ideological positioning is employed pri-
marily by formations that are either newly established or marginal to the politi-
cal scene. Young parties - particularly those formed on the foundation of social 
organisations - are also most likely to use innovative positioning and politicise 
problems that were previously absent from the public debate. Situational posi-
tioning, in turn, is the domain of mainstream parties which have already firmly 
1 See also a typology offered by J. Pietraś [2000: 412-413], who describes four types of 
strategy: reinforcement (addressed at one’s own electorate and aimed at strengthening its 
support), broadening (aimed at gaining new segments of the electorate), reversal (addressed 
at the competitor’s voters with the purpose of changing their preferences) and neutralisation 
(based on discouraging a part of the competitor’s electorate from voting).
established themselves in the electorates’ awareness and specified their position 
on the right wing - left wing spectrum. They tend to distinguish their agendas 
by referring to selected specific problems, and presenting a hierarchy of social 
and economic goals.
In practice, one needs to make one more distinction between ways of po-
sitioning. In one variant, a party focuses on emphasising virtues it represents as 
a whole. In the other, it bases its strategy on promoting particular candidate(s). 
The choice of one of these options depends on how a given party perceives its 
own assets and resources, and how it identifies its strengths. The key question 
here is: which asset has the biggest potential to mobilise the electorate? Is it the 
party leader (or leaders) with his/her personality and leadership traits, or is it the 
image of the entire party, its character, place on the political scene and agenda.
The categories shown above should help in determining positioning 
strategies employed by Polish political parties before the 2014 European 
Parliament election. Since the choice of strategy always depends on the current 
situation on the political market, balance of power among partisan actors and 
patterns of rivalry, we have to first take a look at the shape of the market in the 
period before the election.
Situation before the 2014 European Parliament election
Since 2005, Polish political scene has been increasingly polarised in 
favour of two key players: Civic Platform (Polish abbreviation: PO) and Law 
and Justice (Polish abbreviation: PiS). This division has been stable enough to 
prompt some authors to claim the scene is now almost entirely ossified [Wojtasik 
2010: 76-77; Kolczyński 2010: 121-123]. The rivalry between PO and PiS has 
engaged approximately 70 per cent of all active voters (see: table 2).
Table 1. Support for PO and PiS in the period from 2005 to 2011.
Election
Percentage of valid votes
PO PiS Combined
2005 presidential election (first round) 36,33 33,10 69,43
2005 parliamentary election (lower chamber) 24,14 26,99 51,13
2007 parliamentary election (lower chamber) 41,51 32,11 73,62
2009 European Parliament election 44,43 27,4 71,73
2010 presidential election (first round) 41,54 36,46 88,00
2011 parliamentary election (lower chamber) 39,18 29,89 69,07
Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, www.pkw.gov.pl.
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The division both parties have used to differentiate their political agen-
das was drawn in 2005, when PiS symbolically presented its rivalry with PO as 
„Poland of solidarity vs. liberal Poland”. This conflict referred to pre-existing 
political divisions - most of all, to ideological dispute on economics between 
proponents of statism and liberalism. In the 1990s, the same debate was also 
interpreted as a social conflict between those who as a result of democratic and 
economic transformation were put at a disadvantage, and those who used the 
very same process to gain privileged positions [Pełczyńska-Nałęcz 1998: 222; 
Grabowska 2004]. Another strategic move employed by the two competing for-
mations was to broaden the polarisation so as to encompass political and axio-
logical issues. In the political dimension, the statism vs. liberalism debate was 
presented as a choice between a strong, centralised state, and a weak, decentra-
lised one. Meanwhile, in the cultural realm, the conflict between PO and PiS 
was built around two opposing visions of development: the modern Poland ad-
vocated by PO and traditional Poland championed by PiS [Cichosz 2011b: 157-
158]. Finally, the two political rivals divided the voters with respect to their 
views on European Union2. Supporters of PO claimed Donald Tusk’s party re-
presented Eurorealism, while PiS was the voice of Eurosceptics. Supporters of 
PiS also presented their party as Eurorealists, but attributed PO and its leaders 
with unjustified Eurooptimism [for more, see: Sula 2005]. Leaving such labels 
aside, the fact is that MEPs elected to the European Parliament from PO lists 
join the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), while those put forward 
by PiS associate with European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR).
The two major parties differed also on their visions of foreign policy, 
particularly with regard to Polish-Russian bilateral relations. PO proposed an 
attempt at cooperating with the Russian Federation and following U.S. and 
EU’s policy on this matter. Conversely, PiS was deeply sceptical toward Russia 
and harboured a fear of Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions. This was reflec-
ted in a rather gloomy prediction the then-president Lech Kaczyński made in 
his speech in Tbilisi on 12th of August 2008, just days after Russian assault on 
Georgia: ‘Today, it’s Georgia. Tomorrow, it will be Ukraine. The day after to-
morrow, the Baltic states. Then, it may be my own country - it may be Poland’ 
[Wzyta prezydenta RP w Gruzji].
Other noticeable political formations - including those that in the 
2011 election managed to obtain parliamentary seats for its representatives 
(the Democratic Left Alliance, Polish People’s Party and Palikot’s Movement) 
- have usually been left with the role of mere observers, as PO and PiS kept 
2 Parties’ attitude toward the EU (the desirable scope of integration of goals to be pursued by 
the Union) corresponds directly to their position on the modernism (left-wing formations) 
- traditionalism (right-wing formations) spectrum. Hence, it is treated here as an element of 
ideological positioning.
battling for primacy. Polish People’s Party (PSL) partnered PO in a govern-
ing coalition after the 2007 election and, similarly to PO, put its MEPs in EPP. 
Its main target group and stakeholders are farmers, but it has been under con-
stant threat from PiS, which has continuously tried to garner more support 
from the rural electorate. Nonetheless, PSL has persisted in presenting itself 
as a centric, pragmatic party, well-rooted in local self-government and focused 
on citizens’ everyday problems. It has also emphasised its detachment from the 
PO vs. PiS conflict [Musiał-Karg 2012: 331-332]. Another party that has cham-
pioned the image of rational and cooperative politics (also within the govern-
ment) is the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Positioned on the left wing of 
the scene, SLD has put its MEPs in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D). Ever since 2005, when it suffered a major loss in the par-
liamentary election (only 11,31 per cent of votes, compared to 41,04 per cent 
four years earlier3), SLD has been unable to come up with an attractive agenda 
and prevent much of its electorate from moving toward other major players. 
The most centre-minded of its voters have chosen PO, the ones in favour of 
welfare state have shifted their support to PiS, and the axiological liberals have 
found an alternative in Palikot’s Movement. The latter party, formed before 
the 2011 election, positioned itself as deeply liberal, emphasising its anti-PiS 
standpoint, anticlericalism and liberal attitude toward issues such as soft drugs 
and homosexual civil unions [Modrzejewski 2012: 301-310].
During the 2011-2015 parliamentary term of office, dominant parties ex-
perience several rifts. In September 2013, a group of deputies focused around 
former minister of justice (in the PO-PSL government), Jarosław Gowin, left the 
ranks of PO. As explained by Gowin, the reason for such move was their disap-
pointment with the government’s economic policy (specifically, decisions to in-
crease tax rates and effectively withdraw from the previously introduced reform 
of the retirement funding system) [jagor 2013]. In December 2013, together 
with another group of deputies, who decided to leave a small centre-right forma-
tion Poland Comes First (Polish: Polska Jest Najważniejsza, PJN), they formed 
a new party called Jarosław Gowin’s United Poland (Polish: Polska Razem, PR).
Another formation created during the 2011-2015 term of office is Poland 
of Solidarity. It was established by a group of deputies who in 2011 were ex-
pelled from PiS. Its leader, Zbigniew Ziobro, during his career at PiS reached 
3 In 2001, SLD launched the campaign in a coalition with the Union of Labour (Polish: 
Unia Pracy, UP), while in the 2005 election it ran alone. Still, in the SLD-UP coalition, 
the Alliance was by far the stronger partner, with UP contributing no more than a couple 
per cent of support (in 2005, UP’s candidates ran from the lists of another party - Social 
Democracy of the Republic of Poland; they garnered 3,89 per cent of votes). This means 
that results from both elections can be compared and credibly considered as reflecting 
support for SLD.
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the position of the party’s vice-chairman. From 2005 to 2007, he served as 
the minister of justice in PiS-led government. After falling out of favour with 
Jarosław Kaczyński, he spent the 2009-2014 term of office in the European 
Parliament. Ziobro and his colleagues were expelled for disloyalty to PiS lead-
ership - effectively, as a result of their public calls for increased internal democ-
ratisation of the party [po. PAP 2011].
Polls released before the 2014 election indicated a growing support for one 
other formation - Congress of the New Right, established in 2011 by activists from 
several small political entities of conservative and liberal character. The popular-
ity of the Congress was to be built around the image of its leader, Janusz Korwin 
Mikke - a widely recognised politician with experience dating back to 1989 (who 
after 1993, however, has been somewhat marginalised). Korwin-Mikke gained 
popularity by using Internet as a tool for political communication - he has been 
one of the first Polish politicians to launch his own blog. Polls conducted among 
Internet users gave him as much as over 20 per cent of support, although realisti-
cally, it has been far lower, oscillating from 1 to 2,5 per cent.4
For the four parties described above, the 2014 EP election held particu-
lar importance, as it determined their chance for finding a slightly more perma-
nent niche on the political market.
 
Positioning of partisan agendas during the election campaign
Polish government’s attitude toward Russia changed in the months pre-
ceding the 2014 European Parliament election due to the events in Ukraine.5 
Russian policy toward Ukraine, the invasion of Crimea (February / March 2014) 
and subsequent outbreaks of armed struggles in the Eastern regions of Ukraine 
(April 2014) pushed the major governing party - Civic Platform - to make na-
tional security one of key issues of the campaign. The threat of aggression from 
Russia, not only against Ukraine, but also against its other neighbouring coun-
tries (including Poland) came to the forefront of public debate. Undeniably, 
the government made substantial effort to convince both NATO and the EU to 
devote more attention to matters of European security (including energy secu-
rity). The same issue was used as a centrepiece around which Civic Platform’s 
4 For instance, in one of the Internet polls conducted before the 2010 presidential election, 
Korwin-Mikke received 18 per cent of support, which was the second highest result after 
Bronisław Komorowski (41 per cent), who ultimately was elected the president [Grzesiczak 
2010]. However, Korwin-Mikke’s actual result in the election was only 2,5 per cent.
5 I’m referring to the protest which started in Kiev in November 2013, provoked by Viktor 
Yanukovych’s policy and his decision to postpone signing Ukraine’s association agreement 
with the EU. After the president used force against the protesters, the social movement 
turned strictly against him and his circles.
agenda for the European Parliament could be positioned. The party presented 
itself as the only political force able to provide Poland with sufficient security. 
The strategy was encapsulated in the following slogan: ‚Strong Poland in a se-
cure Europe’. This amounted to a major change in the party’s approach - effec-
tively, Civic Platform moved to the position previously occupied by PiS.
Faced with such move from its most important rival, Jarosław Kaczyński’s 
formation was forced to look for other subjects that would distinguish its offer 
from that of PO. The ‘Serve Poland, listen to the Poles’ slogan was meant to 
emphasise the difference between the Civic Platform - a party interested only 
in power and preoccupied with its own internal conflicts - and Law and Justice, 
which wants to engage with the citizens. As usual, PiS referred to the symbol-
ic meaning of the “Solidarity”, pointing out that “Solidarity” is a ‘movement 
joined by millions of people who would like to have their say’. The post-1989 
transformation arose high hopes among the Poles, but subsequent two decades 
proved, to many citizens, to be a disappointment. (‘This is not the Poland we 
agreed upon’). PiS positioned itself as a representative of all those disappointed 
by the new reality [see: db/mtom 2014]. The party targeted most of all inhabit-
ants of medium and small-sized cities, as well as rural areas.
PO’s coalition partner, Polish People’s Party (PSL), positioned its offer 
by distancing itself from both dominant players and presenting itself as ‘the only 
Polish party focused on dialogue and cooperation’, an entity that is ‘close to peo-
ple and their needs’ [Dlaczego warto głosować na PSL? 2014], ‘the voice of ru-
ral areas - Poland beyond the big cities’. As one quickly notices, the latter claim 
put PSL in direct rivalry with PiS over the voters from rural parts of the country. 
The coalition formed by two left-wing parties, Democratic Left Alliance 
and Union of Labour, chose to follow its course from the 2009 campaign and 
emphasise its affiliation with the family of European socialists - the second most 
numerous group in the European Parliament. It also pledged to pursue changes 
in European policy and focus on creating new jobs across Europe, improving 
social security system and ensuring equal treatment to all citizens. As in case 
of some other parties, it also claimed to ‘improve Poland’s position’ in the EU.
The left-wing and centre-left electorate was targeted by one more ac-
tor - Europe+ Your Movement, a would-be coalition partner of SLD and UP. 
In itself, Europe+ Your Movement was a coalition formed shortly before 
the election by several former SLD members and the Palikot’s Movement. 
Upon joining forces, these two groups created an entity which combined sup-
port for welfare state and modernisation with pro-European views. On the left-
wing - right-wing continuum, it was situated slightly closer to the left than 
Palikot’s Movement alone. The new actor decided to put itself in opposition to 
PO’s vision of foreign policy by proposing a different take on national security. 
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Janusz Palikot stressed that Poles were not doomed to ‘die for Poland’ (in a war 
against Russia, to which prime minister Donald Tusk alluded in his speech - 
M.C.). Instead, he claimed, they could ‘live for Poland’, provided the country 
developed its economy, continued integration with Europe and introduced re-
forms aimed at building social capital [Przemówienie Janusza Palikota 2014]. 
Crucially for the image of coalition, it was backed by Janusz Palikot and former 
Polish president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The support from the latter figure 
meant Your Movement attempted to shed its reputation for political adventur-
ism in favour of a calmer, more sanitised style. At the same time, it was also 
meant to give Your Movement more credibility in the eyes of left-wing voters.
Jarosław Gowin’s United Poland presented itself as Eurorealist, focus-
ing on proposals for limiting EU’s bureaucracy, giving national interests prima-
cy over the Union’s interests (hence the slogan saying ‘A great Poland in a low-
key Union’), further enlargement of the EU and signing association agreements 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Referring to the key subject debated dur-
ing the campaign, Jarosław Gowin called on leaders of PO and PiS to overcome 
particular partisan interests and initiate close cooperation between all right-
wing and centre-right formations. As Poland’s national security was threatened, 
he argued, one sign of such cooperation would be if all Polish MEPs joined the 
same political group in the EP so as to better represent Polish interests on the 
international scene [List Jarosława Gowina 2014].
Another new entity formed as a result of numerous rifts and move-
ments in the Polish parliaments was Zbigniew Ziobro’s Poland of Solidarity. 
(Polish: Solidarna Polska). Going into the EP election, it faced an increasingly 
difficult task of distinguishing itself from all the various formations spring-
ing up on the right wing of the political scene. It positioned itself as a centre-
right party, espousing socialist views on economics and conservative axiol-
ogy. As for Poland’s membership of the EU and the shape of the Union as 
a whole, it chose a utilitarian, somewhat egoistic approach expressed in the 
slogan: ‘As much Union as benefits dictate’ [Program europejski Solidarnej 
Polski 2014]. The main asset of the party was to be its leader, Zbigniew Ziobro, 
pictured as a competent and effective politician.6
The last formation to be described in this part of the paper is the Congress 
of the New Right - the only party of all discussed here without national parlia-
mentary representation. In terms of axiology, Congress presented conservative 
standpoint, while its economic agenda was liberal. It was the only Polish party 
approaching the election with strictly Eurosceptic views (by which I mean “hard 
Euroscepticism”, see: Taggrat, Szczerbiak 2004: 3). Congress’ leader, Janusz 
6 Effective also in the EP, as reflected by Ziobro’s presence in the campaign of Nigel Farage 
- a well-known leader of UK Independence Party (UKIP) and an MEP.
Korwin-Mikke, claimed his formation would act toward ‘abolishing the EU 
(...) by reducing it to a free trade agreement’, ‘stopping federalists’ rush toward 
centralisation’, ‘fighting Eurosocialism (...), fighting EU’s tyranny’ [Program 
Kongresu Nowej Prawicy 2014]. Apart from a visibly anti-EU rhetoric, the par-
ty made use of its position as an outsider on the political scene by attempting to 
garner the support of those voters who openly contested mainstream politics and 
large formations shaping it. Therefore, Congress put itself in opposition to all oth-
er parties, describing them collectively as ineffective ‘crypto-socialists’ or even 
thieves. New Right’s position on Russian-Ukrainian relations was also unique - 
Korwin-Mikke praised Vladimir Putin’s effectiveness in this matter and demand-
ed that Polish government retained neutral position toward the conflict between 
Poland’s eastern neighbours [Oświadczenie w/s sytuacji na Ukrainie 2014].
Table 2. Positioning of agendas for the 2014 European Parliament election.
Political party Slogan Positioning type
Civic Platform ‚Strong Poland in a secure Europe’
- situational
- inducement strategy 
Law and Justice ‚Serve Poland, listen to 
the Poles’
- situational
- reinforcement strategy
Democratic Left Alliance - 
Union of Labour
‚Europe: #Toward 
changes’
- ideological (social 
–democratic)
Europe+ Your Movement ‚Freedom, equality, work’ - ideological (social-liberal)
Polish People’s Party ‚Close to the people’
- situational
- reinforcement strategy
Congress of the New Right ‚New Right - New Europe’ - ideological (liberal-conserva-tive and anti-EU)
Jarosław Gowin’s United 
Poland
‚A great Poland in a low-
key Union’
- ideological (Eurorealism)
Zbigniew Ziobro’s Poland of 
Solidarity ‚Secure and just Poland’
- ideological (statism, 
conservatism)
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Abstract:
European Parliament elections are a special area for the analysis of elec-
toral volatility understood as changes of electoral support for individual parties 
occurring in time. Firstly, it is so because they are referred to as second-order 
elections. Secondly, because despite their supranational character, voting beha-
viours occurring in them are to a considerable extent moderated by the national 
context. The article discusses the qualities of European elections which genera-
te electoral volatility at various analysis levels.
Key words: 
electoral volatility, European Parliament elections, voting behaviours
The latest decades have initiated many changes on the election market, 
whose consequences have changed the relations between voters and political 
parties. These changes include mainly [Lachat 2004]: (a) reducing the clarity 
of traditional social divisions – for example the increase of education level or 
social mobility lead to homogeneity of lifestyles, secularization trends weaken 
the group of believers and churchgoers, the growing significance of the servi-
ce sector lowers the numerical strength of working classes; (b) more intensi-
ve cognitive activation – lowering the costs of acquiring political information 
(e.g. by new kinds of media) and higher level of education in the society indi-
vidualize the voters and make their knowledge resources and ability to acqu-
ire knowledge independent of political parties; (c) changes concerning political 
parties – the role of political parties as intermediaries between citizens and the 
government is more and more questioned, which means that currently it is much 
more difficult for parties to fulfil their traditional functions. Other changes in-
clude e.g.: greater personalization of politics – the “life cycle” of a political le-
ader, usually shorter than that of a political party, weakening of the traditional 
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categories of political manifestation which used to fossilize the political sphere 
(traditional values, economy, nation, social system) and the emergence of new 
ones (ecology or globalization). Moreover, the processes of trivializing the vote, 
resulting among others from their occurrence in more and more political catego-
ries (e.g. the European Parliament or self-government), as well as de-ideologi-
zation of politics, have become more distinctive (weakening of the factor which 
cements group political identities). The outlined changes create an increasingly 
vast space for less stable electorate. On the one hand, it is those voters who are 
attracted only occasionally, not demonstrating an internal need to participate in 
taking decisions significant for the state and society. That electorate may be re-
ferred to as irregular, participating in elections only incidentally. On the other 
hand, that space also includes voters who actively participate in the voting pro-
cess but are not loyally bound to any political subject. Bernadette C. Hayes and 
Ian McAllister [1996: 127-139] call them floating voters, pointing out that elec-
toral influence should considerably focus on this segment, because it is the most 
sensitive to the impact of campaigns. Researchers attribute different characteri-
stics to this type of voters: lower political fanaticism [Converse 1962: 578-599; 
Zaller 2003: 109-130], greater susceptibility to the impact of the media [Zukin 
1977: 244-254], and having less extensive political knowledge [Haller 2003: 
109-130]. The results of the research by Steven Chaffee and Sun Y. Choe [1980: 
53-69] show that indecisive voters are worse at differentiating between candida-
te images in elections, do not identify with particular parties so much and have 
lower education levels. Hence, the explanation of citizens’ voting behaviours 
based on long-term factors such as e.g. one’s position in the social structure has 
become insufficient, and researchers are more and more interested in finding 
multidimensional determinants of electoral volatility. 
The above-mentioned observations draw researchers’ attention to the phe-
nomenon of electoral volatility. It is an indicator of changes in voting behaviours 
observed in time. In literature of the subject we can find various definitions of 
electoral volatility, generating three directions it can be used in the diagnosis of 
changes in voting behaviours. The first group of definitions emphasizes the core 
of electoral volatility, namely change. It refers to the basis of electoral volatili-
ty, which is the transfer of votes between particular subjects on the party scene. 
As a considerable number of authors agree, electoral volatility is a common indi-
cator of voting stability [Pedersen 1979; Dalton, Beck, Flanagan 1984; Bartolini, 
Mair 1990; Mainwaring, Scully 1995; Birnir 2007]. The second type of definition 
clearly emphasizes that transfers of votes may occur at different levels of political 
representation. In literature of the subject, authors usually refer to the three-step 
approach proposed by Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair [1990: 25], who identi-
fy three levels of volatility: systemic, block and party level, referring to transfers 
between the parties within a system. Each of these perspectives is connected with 
changes of electoral support for individual parties in time, but the results are ag-
gregated differently. From the broadest perspective, systemic volatility measures 
changes in electoral support for all the subjects in a party system; a slightly narro-
wer one adds up the support for particular families or blocks of political parties, 
and the narrowest one refers to single parties only. The last group of definitions 
of electoral volatility involves the description of the phenomenon with regard of 
its determinants. Many researchers make terminological effort trying to descri-
be electoral volatility with the use of its sources, which are usually constituted 
as a study hypothesis or the result of conducted empirical analyses.
Thus, a change in political party support is the basic unit of analysis of 
electoral volatility. It is important both from the theoretical and the practical po-
ints of view. Political parties are the main representatives of citizens on the po-
litical scene. One of the fundamental functions of political parties (apart from 
the state/public and organizational ones) is the social function [Herbut 1997: 
68 and the following], which to a greater or lesser degree connects a political 
party with the social structure. Entering the parliament depends on obtaining 
the required number of votes in an election, and this is connected with the de-
velopment and implementation of an election strategy oriented at obtaining the 
votes. “This strategy is a specific commodity introduced to the election market, 
the programmes presented to mass electorate, which usually becomes the point 
of reference for an individual voting decision ... typically based on a specific 
concept defining the ideological and policy identity of the party” [Ibidem: 69]. 
So the election result is a consequence of interactions between voters and the 
political party. The studies on electoral volatility reflect the changes of these re-
lations in time and at various levels.
Analyses of electoral volatility usually refer to national elections. 
Although European Parliament (EP) elections have long been an integral ele-
ment of Europe’s electoral landscape, they actually have a lower social impor-
tance than the national ones. It is explained by the fact that the political sys-
tem of the European Union (EU) does not clearly position the electoral scene 
as the most important element of representative democracy [Wojtasik 2012: 
282]. Although in the social consciousness the mechanism of appointing re-
presentation in the process of EP elections is perceived as similar to that ob-
served e.g. in parliamentary elections, these elections (contrary to those at the 
national level) do not result in ultimate structuring of the political competition 
space. The internal organization of that space is ultimately ensured by national 
governments, delegating their representatives to European institutions. The so-
cial perception of EP elections, attributing them less importance than general 
national elections, is connected with regarding them as second-order elections. 
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Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt [1980] use this term to refer to elections 
which – despite being influenced by national politics of particular countries – 
actually have no significant impact on the national politics. Schmitt [2005: 650 
and the following] points out a few characteristics of EP elections which make 
them second-order elections: (a) lower level of political participation, which 
probably results from not very intensive voting activation processes and low 
politicization of European elections; (b) reflecting the national political situ-
ation in electing supranational representatives – voters often treat European 
elections as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with national poli-
tics; (c) different voting motivations – because European elections are socially 
perceived to have a lower rank and as a consequence to have a weak impact on 
national politics, voters more rarely decide on strategic voting and follow the-
ir natural preferences instead, which may mean greater support for small par-
ties or those with weaker national competition strength. Robert Wiszniowski 
[2008: 9] makes the thesis that the “location” of EP in the European political 
space is not clear for many member states’ citizens. It leads to general “diso-
rientation” among voters, resulting in the trivialization of European elections 
and treating them as less important than national ones. The second order gives 
EP elections a specific character which generates features significantly affec-
ting electoral volatility. Largely they function at the level of the state electing 
its European representation, because despite the supranational character of de-
cisions taken by the EP, voting behaviours in European elections are moderated 
by the national context. Further in the article will be presented the features of 
EP elections which generate electoral volatility at different levels of analysis.
The first significant factor is clearly weaker activation mechanisms ap-
plied at the national level in EP election campaigns, which are bound to transla-
te into citizens’ irregular voting patterns at the systemic level. It results from two 
things. The first is the weaker and less intensive positioning of election campa-
igns in the media, which is the main policy of communication with the electorate. 
Currently, the role of the media is no longer only to provide information. It is an 
active participant of the socio-political reality, in which it creates its own mes-
sages, actually becoming a message in itself [McLuhan 1964 /2005/: 7]. Along 
with the growing speed of information and the development of new information 
technologies which give the media opportunities to influence the society, election 
campaigns and transferring current election information in the media have beco-
me an integral element of each pre-election period. The role of the media in elec-
toral campaigns is focused on two directions of activity. Firstly, candidate images 
are crystallized and campaign topics are presented through mass media. The me-
dia is the most important carrier of – on the one hand – pre-election information 
advertising, oriented at providing voters with the basic information concerning 
the election (voting procedures, seat distribution, also its institutional importan-
ce), and on the other hand, political advertising encouraging to support particular 
candidates in the election. Secondly, the media is often the means of conveying 
various public service campaigns. It is used to provide information on European 
structures or the competencies of particular EU institutions, as well as to conduct 
campaigns oriented at the electoral activation of citizens (e.g. e-Europa, Your 
Europe). Activities taken not only in the pre-campaign period, whose aim is to 
activate the citizens for elections and make them want to participate in the upco-
ming election, may considerably affect the level of (first of all systemic) electoral 
volatility. They are oriented at activating specific target groups which – as shown 
by pre-campaign analyses – do not manifest any significant interest in elections, 
and probably without the pro-turnout activities would not exercise their right to 
vote. Provisional activities stimulating citizens to be active in the election may 
fully accomplish their goal in one election but will upset the stability of citizens’ 
active participation in the next one. Another issue is the strategies used by candi-
dates contesting in European elections, different to those applied in national cam-
paigns. The difference is mainly connected with their lower intensity. Julia Lodge 
[1982; 1986; 1990; 1996], describing the tactics of political parties in European 
election campaigns, observes that these elections are “disappointing” in that par-
ties do not apply themselves to campaign activities and more often rely on social 
opinions, evaluations developed at the national level in the pre-election period. 
The second factor generating electoral volatility in EP elections is move-
ments promoting Euroscepticism, often activated in the campaign period, which 
may result in discouraging voters from participating in elections of supranational 
representatives. The advancing process of extending the European community 
has also caused the activation of negative assessments and attitudes to the integra-
tion process. Tamás Boros and Zoltán Vasali [2013: 11] point out the following 
most important motives moderating discussions on Euroscepticism: (1) the con-
flict between national identity and international cooperation – Eurosceptics claim 
that European integration processes lead to autonomous states having to renoun-
ce their previous accomplishments in the process of strengthening their positions 
in favour of other states which will draw particular benefits from those positions; 
(2) the image of “punishing Europe”, which in order to achieve a quick and ef-
fective improvement in the macroeconomic sphere imposes a number of sanc-
tions and austerity measures, perceived by Eurosceptics as “Brussels dictator-
ship”; (3) the character and quality of democracy in the EU. Currently available 
tools do not always allow EU subjects to protect democratic political institutions 
in member states or to cope with the lack of such institutions. It often results from 
the lack of common democratic standards, consistently adopted in all member 
states. This may translate into difficulties in maintaining the political structure of 
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a whole group of member states; (4) failure to meet expectations connected e.g. 
with the plans of EU structures’ expansion to the Eastern Europe. In literature of 
the subject we can find a number of typologies which show the multidimensio-
nality and different faces of Euroscepticism. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak 
[2001] differentiate between the “hard” Euroscepticism – negating the very idea 
of the EU and demanding the rejection of all existing projects proposed by its 
bodies, and the “soft” one – largely having a situational character, only refer-
ring to certain areas of activity of EU structures not accepted by the individuals 
who express this approach (e.g. joining the Euro zone). Tamás Boros and Zoltán 
Vasali [2013: 10] identify (a) socially-based Euroscepticism – connected with the 
characteristics of particular social groups which seek the causes of difficulties 
their members face (e.g. impoverishment) in EU structures; (b) Euroscepticism 
based on prejudice – for example prejudice to immigrants, other races or other 
nations; (c) rational Euroscepticism – based on reliable information on EU struc-
tures, extensive historical and political knowledge, the ability to find the advan-
tages and disadvantages of politics done at the European level, and predicting the 
consequences of supranational projects; (d) normative Euroscepticism – a speci-
fic kind of Euroscepticism, initiated in the central structures of the EU, openly 
criticizing national policies of member states which do not comply with the va-
lues promoted by the central authorities of the EU (e.g. towards national mino-
rities). The character of Euroscepticism greatly depends on the cultural and ide-
ological context of a given state, which defines the proportions of its particular 
kinds. Thus it can be saturated with the elements of rationality, aggressiveness or 
ideology to different degrees. Depending on the context, various neologisms are 
also used, reflecting the message and form of the movement: “Euro-indifference” 
[Delmotte 2007], “Europhobia” [Rozenberg 2007]; “Eurocynicism” [Krouwel, 
Abst 2007], “Eurorealism” [Neumayer 2007]. But irrespective of the nature of 
Euroscepticism, the movements that demand this approach are oriented at more 
or less intensive criticism of EU institutions, which actually initiates processes 
boycotting election participation. The different strength and scope of Eurosceptic 
activities during electoral campaigns will influence the irregularity of voting be-
haviours and intensify systemic electoral volatility.
The third factor in the analysis will be the voting strategies applied. 
In voting in EP elections a clear tendency is emerging to depart from strategic 
voting, which means that voters more and more often turn to small parties. 
The lack of direct effects of the elections in domestic politics causes citizens 
to activate the model of voting according to their sincere and first preference 
[Markowski 2008: 31-32]. In national elections, strategic voting is more often 
activated, which must meet two conditions – the citizen does not choose be-
tween entities on the basis of their direct “first” preferences and their decision 
results from the internal belief that they are likely to change the result of the 
election [Wiszniowski 2008: 212]. Motivations outlined this way are determi-
ned by the will to change the result of the election and the expectation that it is 
possible. They also mean that in order to maintain the perspective of influen-
cing the final solution of the election, the voter will give up on their real party 
preferences. In this context, European elections give a citizen the opportunity to 
express their authentic preferences. Believing in the autonomy of elections of 
supranational representatives as compared to national ones, as well as the lack 
of direct impact of EP election results on national politics, they are stimulated 
to activate “voting as the heart tells them”. Such voting, based on permanent 
ideological and policy attachment to a particular party, generates the stability of 
voting behaviour in time and leads to lower party electoral volatility.
But because of the characteristics of European elections, an alternative 
hypothesis is also possible: if European elections are treated as an opportunity 
to reflect national politics, they will be more susceptible to changes of public 
mood understood as a combination of emotions in the society generated by the 
socio-political situation. These emotions are negative when subjective expecta-
tions of the actions of decision-making entities in the country are not met and 
central actions receive poor assessment from the society. The mood may be ma-
nifested in various ways: it will be visible in lower trust in party subjects in pu-
blic opinion polls, and in the extreme form they may even generate strikes and 
protests. EP elections – due to the attributed second order – are also a field where 
public dissatisfaction with the authorities is expressed. Hence they will also be 
susceptible to emotions intensified in the society by the national level represen-
tatives. In practice it means that the currently governing national parties usually 
have poorer results in EP elections than in the country. It is a consequence of 
voters’ strategic behaviour: using the opportunity to really punish the authorities 
for unacceptable directions of activity, they resign from supporting the winners 
of national elections. The sensitivity of EP elections will generate a higher le-
vel of party electoral volatility, because it will be a function of changing public 
mood depending on the activities of parties currently taken at the national level. 
The crystallization of dissatisfaction with the rulers occurs within the 
framework of retrospective voting, which indicates direct relations between the 
voter’s perception of economic issues and assigning the responsibility for their 
condition to the current government. The first assumptions of this model were 
outlined by Valdimer O. Key [1966], who expressed the belief in his book that 
when approaching the ballot boxes, voters have their reflections concerning the 
quality of life within the latest inter-election period well thought out. If this as-
sessment is positive, they are inclined to vote for the entity that has been ruling 
as a result of distribution of votes in the previous election. If, however, they 
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have sensed the lowering of life quality, they will vote for another subject. This 
process is referred to as electoral reward and punishment or as a mechanism 
of democratic control of rulers [Cwalina, Falkowski 2006: 70]. Gregory B. 
Markus [1988] identifies pocketbook voting and sociotropic voting within ret-
rospective voting. The mechanism is similar here. Voters attribute responsibil-
ity to the rulers – on the one hand for their individual financial situation, and on 
the other hand, for managing the national economy. Then they evaluate their 
financial situation since the latest election (in the microeconomic perspective) 
or the condition of the national economy in general (in the macroeconomic per-
spective). They punish or reward each of the rulers of the last term of office. 
The accuracy of retrospective voting in its pure classic perspective is 
however only surface in the context of relations between the national and in-
ternational economy. It is so because the politics of the EU plays an important 
role in national economic strategies, as it shapes and determines the directions 
of national economy. In particular, the creation of the Euro zone undeniably 
increases the significance of European structures for national politics. The ta-
king of economic decisions is becoming a more and more multilevel process, 
which must involve the cooperation of national, international and transnational 
subjects. This tendency can be expressed with the question by Mark A. Kayser 
[2007] – How domestic is domestic politics?, which emphasizes the greater and 
greater permeability of European economies and the lower and lower autonomy 
of the national ones. Because of the growing popularity of national economies 
in the European space and their mutual permeation, more and more researchers 
concentrate on the importance of economic voting in the international context. 
However, these studies do not provide absolutely unambiguous results, 
On the one hand, a number of works point out a significant relation between the-
se variables. For example, Timothy Hellwig [2008] proved on the basis of studies 
he had conducted that taking into account the globalization processes in the elec-
toral reflections lowered the importance of economic voting in France and Great 
Britain. In extensive research carried out in the countries of the South Europe 
(Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) Marina Costa Lobo and Michael S. Lewis-Beck 
[2012] made the hypothesis that if voters can see the dependence of national 
economic policy on the European one, they are less likely to blame the govern-
ment for poor development of the country. This conjecture was statistically con-
firmed. The weakening of the tendency to economic voting when noticing the 
impact of international processes on the domestic economy is partially explained 
by research conducted in the year 2001 in 15 European countries [Christensen 
2003]. It proved that nearly half of the respondents share the opinion that natio-
nal governments are unable to control globalization processes. Such a belief di-
rectly exempts national governments from the responsibility for the state’s poor 
economic condition, seeking external reasons for it in a subject difficult to define 
and processes difficult to perceive. The significance attributed to domestic issues 
in the mass media, especially emphasizing economic factors, is also worth men-
tioning. It turns out that the poor economic condition of the country is usually 
attributed by citizens to the fact that the country belongs to EU structures. But if 
the economic standing of the country is good, they explain it with good deci-
sions of domestic political elites [e.g. Adam 2012; Liebert, Trenz 2010]. Robert 
Wiszniowski [2008: 230] shows that the situation is actually even more com-
plicated. It results from the fact that domestic matters are basically completely 
controlled by national party elites, and European matters are far beyond their 
influence. Making use of this, the media (the less restricted ones) “composes” 
the European contents, and often resorts to criticizing the activities of domestic 
governments under the “disguise” of European matters.
*
* *
EP elections are a permanent element not only of the European political 
space but also of national political spaces of each member state. Thus, voting 
behaviours in a supranational election are to a considerable extent moderated by 
domestic factors. It is within the framework of the national structure that key acti-
vation processes are initiated, playing an important role in the electoral activation 
of citizens. They may be intentional – e.g. connected with pro-turnout campaigns, 
spreading information on EU structures and EP elections. They may also result 
from the specific nature of the state – its political culture and freedom of the me-
dia or approval for the activity of formal and informal movements promoting or 
negating the membership of the state in the EU. These factors may significantly 
affect the level of electoral volatility both at the systemic and the party level. 
It seems, then, that although the European political space may be isolated from 
the methodological point of view, it is not really independent. It is subject to clear 
influences of national spaces, which shape it among others through moderating 
the voting behaviours of their citizens in supranational elections.
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Abstract:
This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context 
of the 2014 European Parliament election in Poland. Most often the definition 
of principles of elections’ equality comes down to emphasizing its two aspects: 
the formal one and the material one. The first of them refers to guaranteeing 
each person with the active voting right the same number of votes. The material 
aspect of the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same 
“voting power” to the election participants. Most briefly, it means that a given 
number of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same 
numerical strength.
The main aim of this article is focus on the material aspect of imple-
menting the principle of equality in EP elections. In the article will be em-
phasized three issues decisive for the specific features of the electoral system 
(electoral districts, election threshold and electoral formula), at the same time 
influencing the range of implementation of the material equality of elections. 
General findings will be confronted with empirical data, which will allow to 
formulate conclusions about the degree to which the European Parliament 
election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the principle of material 
equality.
Key words:
equality of elections, the European Parliament, electoral system
Introduction
Equality is a positive value in democratic regimes. When it is empha-
sized, the aim is to show that the members of a certain community are treated 
in the same way regarding their freedoms, rights and responsibilities. So equal 
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treatment of everybody, regardless of sociodemographic differences between 
people, is the goal to which the rulers should strive in political systems consid-
ered to meet the requirements of democracy.
The essence of equality discussed on the political ground comes down to 
the fact that the preferences of one citizen are no more significant than the pref-
erences of another one [Dahl, Lindblom 1953: 41]. Hence, the attempts to create 
an institutional system which will guarantee each citizen an identical opportunity 
to participate in taking political decisions and controlling the decisions taken by 
the authorities are completely understandable. Taking into consideration the fact 
that the contemporary democracy is predominantly representative, the institution 
of elections is of key importance, especially regarding the way they are organized 
and conducted. After all, they are the basic form of citizens’ participation in tak-
ing decisions on who will exercise the authority and as a consequence, whose and 
what kind of political programme will be chosen for implementation by particu-
lar public authority bodies1 [Wojtasik 2012: 54-77; Wojtasik 2013: 25-38].
Elections are organized at various levels. The highest systemic and social 
significance is attributed to elections organized at the national level [Wojtasik 
2011: 209]. By means of such elections, the citizens of a given country decide 
about the personal composition of the parliament (or at least one of the cham-
bers in the case of bi-cameral parliaments). In many countries, it is becoming 
more and more popular to leave the issue of appointing the head of the country 
to the direct decision of the sovereign. Besides, political practice confirms that 
in different countries the institution of general elections is used as a way of cre-
ating still other national authorities (e.g. the election of the Prime Minister in 
Israel), which in turn proves the endemic character of many systemic solutions.
The processes of decentralization of power have led to the development 
of different forms of territorial self-government and/or territorial autonomy 
[Domagała, Iwanek 2013: 15-29; Domagała, Iwanek 2014: 29-41]. As a con-
sequence, the citizens of certain selfgovernmental communities or autonomic 
regions also participate – apart from national elections – in elections at the lo-
cal and regional level.
Finally, it should be noted that internationally – since the 19th century, 
all the way through the 20th century up to now – interrelation of countries, con-
cerning different areas of their existence, has been more and more obvious. 
One of its expressions in Europe is integration processes, with their institution-
al manifestation of the European Union, already including almost thirty states. 
The formation of supranational European structures resulted in the creation of 
1 Significant differences in the execution of the elections’ function are particularly observed 
in the case of European Parliament elections [Hix 2010: 123; Wojtasik 2012: 300], although 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty leads to the reconsideration of some conclusions.
many bodies making a complicated institutional system of the EU [Hix 2010: 
55-183], in which a significant role is attributed to the European Parliament 
[Domagała 2010: 11-27].
The term “parliament” is of key importance, especially that we cannot 
imagine the existence of any democratic political system without a parliament 
elected directly by the sovereign [Antoszewski, Herbut 2001: 237]. At the EU 
level, the parliament of course does not play such a role and does not serve the 
functions that national parliaments do, but since it is composed of “representa-
tives of the Union’s citizens”2 [Treaty of European Union..., Article 14.2], it is 
worth analysing more thoroughly its election mechanisms. From this perspecti-
ve, the history of the European Parliament, which started in 19623, can be divi-
ded into two periods. In the first one, lasting de facto until 1979, its composition 
depended on the decisions made by the parliaments of the member states, hen-
ce it appeared to be an inter-parliamentary body. The beginning of the second 
period was the first general and direct election of members of the European 
Parliament, taking place on 7-10 June 1979. As pointed out by Józef M. Fiszer 
[2005: 12], thanks to that, this body really became a “supranational institution”. 
So since 1979, the citizens of several – currently, of most – European countries 
have been participating in elections to a supranational body, apart from natio-
nal, local and regional elections [Dalton, Scarrow, Cain 2004: 126-127].
For many states and communities, elections at the European level are 
a huge challenge. First, they determine the need for the subjects participating 
in it (citizens who exercise their active and passive voting rights and political 
parties) to adapt to the new conditions, which especially in the countries of the 
former Eastern Bloc resulted changes reflecting the dynamics of democratic 
transformation processes. Second, the subjects responsible for creating the ru-
les of the electoral game should aim at creating an electoral system that would 
guarantee the recognition of European Parliament elections not only as free but 
also as fair elections.
This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context of 
the 2014 European Parliament election. The very concept of equality of elections 
is so broad that it must be at least briefly explained. Most often the definition of 
principles of elections’ equality comes down to emphasizing its two aspects: the 
formal one and the material one. The first of them refers to guaranteeing each 
2 On the basis of national law, their status has been defined as “representatives of nations of 
the European Union” [Election Code..., Article 330]. 
3 The emergence of the European Parliament should be analysed from the processual 
perspective. True, a body called “the European Parliament” appeared in 1962, but even 
before, within the framework of European Communities, there had been a body identified 
with the contemporary European Parliament (with different names whose evolution was 
connected with the dynamics of integration processes) [Dydak 2003: 11-12].
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person with the active voting right the same number of votes. This essentially 
means a demand to create mechanisms which prevent any group of people from 
having a higher number of votes because of the value of property they own, be-
longing to a certain social class, education level or other characteristics used to 
determine people’s social status [�ukowski 1999: 22-23]. The material aspect of 
the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same “voting 
power” to the election participants. Most briefly, it means that a given number 
of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same numeri-
cal strength [Glajcar, Okrzesik, Wojtasik 2006: 14]. This, so to say, rudimentary 
approach to the electoral equality principle is currently being extended, and in 
two directions. First, we can see the extension of application range of this prin-
ciple. This is proved for example by identifying the third aspect of the discussed 
principle apart from the formal and material ones, referred to as the equality of 
electoral opportunities [Uziębło 2013: 218-327]. Second, each of the mentioned 
aspects is connected with a growing number of elements which determine its 
implementation. Thus, the scope of definitions of its particular aspects is some-
times broadened4. The aim of this article, however, is not to carry out conceptual 
analysis but to focus on one – particularly important from the point of view of 
election results – material aspect of implementing the principle of equality in EP 
elections. Further in the article will be emphasized three issues decisive for the 
specific features of the electoral system (electoral districts, election threshold and 
electoral formula), at the same time influencing the range of implementation of 
the material equality of elections. General findings will be confronted with em-
pirical data, which will allow to formulate conclusions about the degree to which 
the European Parliament election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the 
principle of material equality. Obviously, absolute compliance with the principle 
is very unlikely in a dynamic social system, but getting possibly close to the ideal 
will allow us to assume that the said principle has been accomplished.
Assuming that legal norms are the framework within which the election 
participants should operate, it is worth making a few comments on the norma-
tive character of European Parliament elections. In Europe, the regulations are 
general in character, and detailed issues are decided by the legal acts of each 
state. As a consequence, significant differences are sometimes observed betwe-
en the voting systems applied in individual member states. As part of the analy-
sis, it is worth noticing that it was determined at the level of primary European 
Union law that European Parliament elections should only be general and direct, 
4 Piotr Uziębło [2013: 59-60] points out e.g. the necessity to extend the definition of formal 
election equality: “... it is becoming necessary to analyse not only its fundamental element, 
meaning whether voters are entitled to an equal number of votes, but also their other rights 
connected with elections, because even in these aspects some unjustified, discriminating 
differentiation of rights of individual voters may appear”. 
and the ballot should be free and secret [Treaty on European Union..., Article 
14.3]. In addition, aiming at the unification of election procedures, by Council 
Decision of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 amending the Act concerning 
the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct univer-
sal suffrage [2002] it was provided that in each Member State, members of the 
European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representa-
tion, using the list system or the single transferable vote (STV).
It is easy to notice, then, that no declaration concerning equality of elec-
tions was included in the above regulations. It is not surprising, especially that 
the distribution of seats between the member states where they are later allocated 
leads to the material aspect of the elections equality being significantly disturbed. 
The data in Table 1 show the difference in the voting power between voters in 
particular EU member states. Of course we also need to remember that the pre-
sented data only indicate what Jerzy Jaskiernia [1992: 23] calls “potential voting 
power” in contrast to the “actual voting power” . This distinction is worth highli-
ghting not only because of the importance of the turnout aspect for the evaluation 
of material vote equality but also because the citizens of the European Union can 
participate in elections of MEPs on the territory of each EU member state, not 
only the one of which they are citizens. The use of this opportunity, then, may 
modify the findings concerning the “potential voting power” presented in the ta-
ble. However, taking into consideration for example the Polish experience from 
2009 [Glajcar 2010: 57], this phenomenon may be regarded as marginal, not af-
fecting the data presented in the table in any significant way.
There are 503.6 million citizens in the European Union. Taking into 
account the fact that in 2014, 751 European Parliament representatives were 
elected, there is one representative to almost 670,600 citizens (the norm of re-
presentation). The fourth column of Table 1 shows the disproportions of the 
voting power among citizens of the member states. We can see that the vote of 
a citizen of Malta is thirteen times stronger than the vote of a citizen of France. 
So, noticeably, deviations from the material aspect of equality are considerable. 
The votes of citizens of demographically smallest member states of the EU are 
the most powerful. And conversely, the votes of largest states have the lowest 
power. It is connected with the adopted principle of degressive proportionality, 
unfavourable for the citizens of EU largest states. In addition, apart from the de-
mographic potential, the smallest states are guaranteed the minimum number of 
seats (six), thus consciously violating the proportional pattern of seat distribu-
tion. The fact that this clause contradicts equality is beyond doubt. It is enough 
to disregard the smallest member states (Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia) 
to see that the difference between the voting power of citizens of France and 
Slovenia is much lower (the votes of the latter are “only” 3.5 times stronger).
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The general character of the European legal norms concerning European 
Parliament elections resulted in the necessity to regulate the principles of elec-
toral competition at the level of national law. What is interesting, in Poland one 
of the principles of election law regarding European Parliament elections is 
equality [Election Code..., Article 328]. Remarkably, this principle did not ap-
ply in the elections of 2004 and 2009. So the decision included in the Election 
Code is a novelty, changing the essential aspect of the European Parliament 
election system valid in the territory of the Republic of Poland. Since 2014, 
the elections should be conducted in a way which guarantees the implementa-
tion not only of the formal but also the material aspect of equality. Therefore, 
it is even more justified to try and find out to what extent this other aspect was 
present in the election of 25th May 2014. Actually, not only the code require-
ment is important. In literature of the subject it is emphasized that “Failure to 
observe the equality of elections ... may lead to the distortion of voters’ will, 
and this undermines the fundamental goal of free elections: appointing the re-
presentative composition of the representative assembly reflecting the actual 
structure of interests and views occurring in the society” [Kryszeń 2007: 103]. 
Another argument for seeking the mechanisms that guarantee the implemen-
tation of election equality principle (even in the situation it is not part of the 
constitutional or statutory catalogue of election law principles) refers to Polish 
electoral tradition, in which it is deeply rooted [Michalak 2010: 13].
Analysis
The issue of the material aspect of equality of elections is closely related 
to the necessity to analyse the selected elements of the electoral system. The 
first of them is electoral districts. The determination of their territorial range 
and size is – first of all – one of the most politically controversial issues, and se-
condly, as a consequence of that, it may promote equal representation but may 
also violate it, favouring certain parts of the country or territorial communities. 
Further, it may result in benefits for some groups and limit the electoral oppor-
tunities of others. Hence, the beneficiaries of the current solutions will try to 
retain the status quo, while other political actors will strive to change it. 
Regarding European Parliament elections, Poland has been divided 
into thirteen districts. Seven of them cover the areas of single voivodeships 
(Pomorskie – district no. 1, Kujawsko-Pomorskie – district no. 2, Łódzkie 
– district no. 6, Wielkopolskie – district no. 7, Lubelskie – district no. 8, 
Podkarpackie – district no. 9, Śląskie – district no. 11), four were created on the 
territory of two adjacent voivodeships (Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie – 
district no. 3, Małopolskie and Świętokrzyskie – district no. 10, Dolnośląskie 
and Opolskie – district no. 12, Lubuskie and Zachodniopomorskie – district no. 
13), and Mazowieckie Voivodeship was divided into two electoral districts – 
district no. 4 (including the capital city of Warsaw) and district no. 5. Thus the 
hybrid model of determining electoral districts was applied. Basically, the au-
thors of the solution referred to the administrative division into voivodeships, 
but they also used the possibility to combine them, which indicates a distinct 
(in a way, non-administrative) way of creating electoral districts. The applied 
mechanism provides the basis for the formulation of twofold observations. 
First, the fact that decisions in this matter are taken at the statutory level may re-
sult in objections concerning consciously combining or dividing voivodeships 
by the parties which have the parliamentary majority in order to maximize the 
political benefits [Uziębło 2013: 107]. Second, the adopted mode of division 
from the perspective of voters from smaller (e.g. Świętokrzyskie or Opolskie) 
voivodeships constituting districts together with territorial division units which 
have a higher number of voters may distort their sense of justice concerning the 
implementation of the traditional model of territorial representation [Michalak 
2010: 13]. Besides, we must not ignore the important aspect that members of 
the European Parliament formally represent the whole collective subject of so-
vereignty, and in this sense the division into electoral districts may be treated as 
a technical procedure. Remembering this, we need to emphasize the occurrence 
of specific ambiguity of the adopted model of representation, with its territorial 
dimension on the one hand, and the national one on the other. 
The adopted division shows that the potential mean size of a district (3.92) 
is low. It is the result of a relatively low total number of seats to be distributed 
(51). This was one of the reasons for the interesting proposal of creating only 
one electoral district covering the area of Poland, presented during the works 
on the European Parliament electoral system [Glajcar 2010: 57]. Finally, howe-
ver, it was not approved. Still, when adopting the system of thirteen electoral 
districts, a specific numbers of seats were not assigned to each district. Hence, 
the number of the seats a district receives does not depend either on the number 
of citizens of the territory or the number of people entitled to vote. This results 
from adopting a two-step mechanism of seat distribution. First, the votes cast on 
the candidates from the district lists of each election committee are aggregated 
at the national level. On the basis of outcomes determined this way, the seats are 
distributed among the entitled election committees (that is why some authors 
claim that we de facto have one electoral district covering the whole country 
[Antoszewski, Herbut 2006: 327]). After the number of seats of each committee 
is determined, they are distributed among the district lists of candidates.
Thus the number of seats for each electoral district indirectly depends 
on the turnout level within the district. Higher turnout in a district increases the 
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probability that particular committees will achieve better outcomes in this di-
strict than their lists achieved in other districts, and as a consequence, will be 
decisive for the allocation of a higher number of seats in this district. This is 
confirmed by the results of the election of 25th May 2014 (Table 2). The highest 
turnout (35.33%) was observed in district no. 4 (as compared to 23.83% at the 
national level), to which five seats were ultimately allocated. It was significan-
tly more than the potential value calculated for this district, amounting to sli-
ghtly above 3.6. Analogously, we cannot disregard the fact that the most unfa-
vourable ratio of the potential size of electoral district to the actual number of 
seats was observed in district no. 3, where the election turnout was the lowest. 
It was the only district where the turnout did not exceed the 20% threshold. 
Hence, we must conclude that seeking correlations between a high electoral 
turnout and the actual seize of the electoral district is fully legitimate. At the 
same time, as post-election data indicate, this relation is by no means absolu-
te. Not always does a high turnout guarantee the increase of the district pool of 
seats, just like a low turnout does not have to result in its significant decrease 
in comparison with the potential size of the electoral district. For example in 
district no. 6 the turnout level was similar to the national one (23.72%). It was 
the sixth highest result among the thirteen districts. In spite of that, in Łódzkie 
Voivodeship the second highest negative ratio of actual versus potential district 
size was observed (-1.389). At the same time, in district no. 5, where the turnout 
level was one of the lowest (20.08%), this ratio was “only” -0.364 (Table 2.).
 So the above-mentioned fi ndings show that the actual size of an elec-
toral district is not absolutely dependent on the election turnout. Hence, there 
must be another element ultimately decisive for the distribution of seats among 
the districts. Actually, it is the district distribution of support concerning indi-
vidual election committees. It is worth checking, then, to what extent it affects 
the size of particular electoral districts and how the “dynamic”, not “stable”, 
distribution of seats among them influenced the implementation of the material 
aspect of equality of the European Parliament election in Poland in 2014.
 It is indisputable that the mechanism of creating the electoral district 
size in European Parliament elections applied in Poland is more dependent 
on the distribution of support among district lists of a certain election com-
mittee rather than the election turnout. It is fully confirmed by empirical data 
(Table 3). The only election committee which obtained seats in all the thirteen 
districts was Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS (Law and Justice). It is a con-
sequence of relatively even distribution of support among the district lists of 
this party. It achieved the best result in district no. 10 – over three times (3.18) 
higher than in district no. 2, where the result of Jarosław Kaczyński’s party was 
the lowest. The winner of the European Parliament election in 2014, Platforma 
Obywatelska – PO (Civic Platform), obtained seats in twelve of the districts. 
Lubelskie Voivodeship (district no. 8) was the only one where PO did not re-
ceive a seat in the end. The direct reason for that was the poor result of PO’s list 
from that district (2.86% of all the votes cast on that party in the election), even 
more clearly seen against the background of support for the party in the other 
regions. The result of the Lublin list of PO was more than five times poorer 
(5.2) than the result achieved in Śląskie Voivodeship (district no. 11), where the 
support was the highest.
The issue of diversification in the distribution of support for election 
committees is even better shown by the level of extreme deviation from the 
mean result of district lists determined for each of them. This way we can com-
pare not the level of support for each party but first of all their popularity in 
the given district against the background of the all-Poland result. The district 
mean for Platforma Obywatelska was 8.86%, and for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
it was a little higher, 9%. The medians for both parties are also similar in both 
cases: 7.02% and 7.32% respectively. But the fundamental difference occurred 
in extreme deviations from these values, which were 6% for PO (the highest 
among the parties which received seats) and 4.69% for PiS. This index best 
shows that the votes cast for PO, which had the greatest support in the election 
of 25th May 2014, were distributed more unevenly than in the case of Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość. As a result, the latter party obtained seats in all the districts, 
and PO, “only” in twelve.
In the case of the other parties, the level of extreme deviation was also 
varied. The lowest value of the index was observed for Koalicyjny Komitet 
Wyborczy Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej-Unia Pracy – SLD-UP (Democratic 
Left Alliance-Labor Union election committee): 4.55%. For Komitet Wyborczy 
Nowa Prawica (Congress of the New Right election committee) of Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke, it was 5.23%, and for Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL 
(Polish Peasants’ Party), 5.75%. Due to the relatively low number of seats ob-
tained by these three committees at the national level, none of the district lists 
managed to achieve support equal to the calculated Hare quota. Hence, the final 
distribution of seats was determined by the value of the rest, which means that 
the seats fell to those district lists which achieved the highest support, in the 
order of support level (in the case of SLD-UP this referred to five district lists, 
and in the case of Nowa Prawica and PSL, four lists each).
On the basis of the previous findings, we must assume that the factor 
which directly affects the size of the electoral district is the distribution of sup-
port among the districts for the election committee which accomplished the elec-
tion threshold at the national level. The factor which acts in favour of increas-
ing the size may be high election turnout, especially if its level is considerably 
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higher than in the other districts. However, it is not an absolute relation, since 
the votes in such a district may be distributed proportionally among the lists of 
different committees, not improving significantly the result of any of them in 
comparison with the results of the committee in the other districts. Another ele-
ment which weakens the influence of the turnout effect on the size of the elec-
toral district is concentration of support for parties not exceeding the national 
election threshold. This issue is discussed in greater detail further in the article.
At this stage of the analysis, we need to conclude that the adopted way 
of determining the size of electoral districts in European Parliament elections in 
the Republic of Poland does not guarantee the implementation of the material 
aspect of the equality principle or generates deviation from the ideal reflection 
of each voter’s voting power. The ambiguity in the evaluation of the effect of the 
way of determining electoral districts regarding the observing of the elections’ 
material equality, signalled in the previous sentence, results from the fact that no 
document specifies what level of diversification of voters’ voting power means 
the violation of the material equality principle. On the basis of “Code of Good 
Practice in Electoral Matters”: I.2.2.4] we can only assume that the number of 
voters per seat within a given district should not be higher or lower than 10% 
(in special cases, 15%) of the computed electoral quota, indicating the number 
of voters per seat on average in the scale of the whole country. Yet, in the anal-
ysed election, the deviations were much greater (Table 2.). Votes cast in district 
no. 3 had the lowest power. In this case, the deviation from the norm of represen-
tation at the national level was almost 76%. The opposite extreme was district 
no. 4, where the votes proved to be by over one fourth stronger than the national 
standard. If we were to compute mean deviations, for the districts in which the 
voting power was weaker than the national norm of representation (five dis-
tricts), it amounted to 45% For the districts where the voting power proved to be 
higher than the norm of representation computed at the national level (eight dis-
tricts), the mean deviation was slightly over 11%. These data show that the lev-
els of acceptable deviations provided in the “Code of Good Practice in Electoral 
Matters” were exceeded, but not significantly. Of course, this evaluation is sub-
jective, but it is impossible to ignore the fact that in the case of four districts the 
described deviations are within the 0-10% range suggested by the Code, in other 
four, 10-15%, and “only” in five districts the norms determined in the Code were 
obviously violated (this concerned approx. 1/3 of persons entitled to vote).
Therefore, it is proper to think whether as part of electoral engineering 
it would be possible to use solutions more effectively influencing the imple-
mentation of the material aspect of equality. It seems that understanding the 
role and significance of a MEP is of key importance in this matter. Thus, the at-
tention must be focused on the question of representation model [more: see Cf. 
Szymanek 2005: 223-236; Szymanek 2013: 1-22]. The basic problem is that 
the assumptions of who a Member of the European Parliament represents are 
not fully confirmed at the level of electoral practice. On the one hand, by the 
fact that from the point of view of election outcome determination (in the po-
litical party dimension) Poland is actually one electoral district, a seat of a rep-
resentative receives the general national character or is connected with repre-
senting the citizens of a member state of the EU5. On the other hand, the final 
repartition of seats among the district lists determines the way of conducting 
electoral campaigns by individual committees and candidates. It is also reflect-
ed in the binding ballot mode (technique) and it often also affects the voting 
tactics use by voters. Finally, the question of personal seat allocation is settled 
at the district level. These are the premises to recognize that a special bond is 
created between the representative and the voters, which may be cemented by 
both sides’ attachment to a specific territory. This may lead to emphasizing 
the territorial aspect of representation at the expense of its national character. 
This dual nature of representation, created as a result of electoral engineering, 
has a negative impact on the observance of the material aspect of equality of 
European Parliament elections. In the face of the fact that the goal of elections 
conducted on the territory of a state where over thirty million citizens have the 
active voting right is to fill only fifty one seats, from the perspective of imple-
mentation of the material aspect of equality it would be more justified to create 
one electoral district covering the area of the Republic of Poland. It would al-
low to approximate the ideal reflection of the voting power of all the voters as 
accurately as possible. But was/is this the aim of the political actors deciding of 
the adoption of solutions within the framework of the binding electoral system?
It is worth mentioning another of its elements, namely the election thresh-
old. This issue is even more interesting as in the election of 25th May 2014 near-
ly 900 thousand votes were cast for candidates of the committees which did not 
achieve the five per cent statutory threshold as the national level. It was 12.7% 
of all valid votes, so approximately every eighth voter decided to support a party 
which finally was not taken into account in the seat distribution procedure. 
Of course the basic issue is why a certain solution is introduced to the set 
of rules regulating the electoral competition. In the case of the election threshold, 
the wish to avoid excessive fragmentation of the political representation body 
is most often pointed out. This is justified especially when such a body is one 
of the links of a longer representation chain, e.g. when its political composi-
tion is of key importance for the formation and operation of the government 
5 The element which might confirm the fact of perceiving the seat of MEP this way is the 
strategy used by the election committees of some parties, which involves placing a candidate 
“from outside” on the district list, not connected in any way with the particular territory. 
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(parliamentary regimes). But does this argumentation correspond to the functions 
and role of the European Parliament in the EU institutional system? While with 
reference to the previous terms the answer would be clearly negative, the 2014 
election is a significant landmark in this respect. It is connected with the Treaty 
of Lisbon of 13 December 2007, which came into force on 1 December 2009. 
Among other things, it introduced changes in creative powers of the European 
Parliament [Galster, Knade-Plaskacz 2010: 194-195], including those concern-
ing the European Commission, referred to as the “main executive body of the 
EU” [Hix 2010: 35]. It concerns the president of the Commission, who had been 
nominated by the Council of the European Union before, then approved by the 
European Parliament, and finally, appointed together with the other members 
of the Commission by the EU Council. The Lisbon Treaty changed this proce-
dure, increasing the importance of the European Parliament. First, the European 
Council presents a candidate for the position of the European Commission presi-
dent to the European Parliament. Pursuant to Article 17 section 7 of the Treaty 
on European Union, it does so “taking into account the elections to the European 
Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations ...”. Second, the 
indicated candidate is elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its 
members. Thus, the new procedural solution can be perceived as tackling the 
problem of legitimization deficit in the European Union [Kubin 2007: 11]. 
In the present legal state, the European Parliament was entrusted with the elec-
tion of the president of the European Commission, which means authority broad-
er than just “approving”. However, it does not change the fact that the only body 
at the European level being the result of general and direct elections still cannot 
present its “own candidate” but takes a decision as to the nominee previously 
indicated by the European Council. What is even more important in the context 
of European Parliament elections, when indicating the candidate the European 
Council must “take into account the elections to the European Parliament”. 
This expression is at least unclear [Adamiec, Wąsowicz 2014: 15-16]. Not at-
tempting to interpret it thoroughly, we need to assume that the political configu-
ration of the European Parliament as a consequence of its democratic election 
should be reflected in the process of nomination of the candidate for the president 
of the European Commission. It does not mean that the current solutions are clos-
er to those known from national parliamentary or premier-presidential regimes. 
After all, the institutional system of the EU is formed on a different basis. Still, 
the outlined procedure indicates the increasing importance of the results of the 
European Parliament elections in the context of creating the European executive.
Having written these short comments, let us return to the issue of election 
threshold. Poland is one of fifteen EU countries that apply the election thresh-
old in European Parliament elections. It has been established at the maximum 
possible level of 5% of valid votes in the whole country. The above-mentioned 
changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty caused an increase of importance of 
the European Parliament election results for the election of the president of the 
European Commission, which – applying the national measure – might suggest 
the legitimacy of emphasizing the effectiveness of ruling rather than represen-
tative character of the representative body. This would justify the introduction 
of elements limiting the probability of political fragmentation of the electoral 
system. In this situation, however, it is important to differentiate between the 
national level of political competition from the European one so as to under-
stand that the basic phase of the elections, connected with voters expressing their 
preferences and then with the transformation of votes into seats, is not necessar-
ily reflected in the political landscape of the European Parliament6. Firstly, the 
electoral campaign is conducted at the level of member states, and the voters 
cast their votes for lists presented by national political parties or their coalitions. 
Thus they express their approval of particular ideological and policy options but 
only those defined within the national system. Secondly, the relations between 
political parties acting on the national political scene and supranational political 
groups operating in the European Parliament must be taken into consideration. 
The affiliation of a national party to such a fraction is the result of a post-elec-
tion decision. Especially in the situation when the level of institutionalization of 
political parties is relatively low, it cannot be excluded that the choice of a frac-
tion in the European Parliament will not correlate with the voters’ expectations 
[Wiszniowski 2008: 271, 273]. So we cannot say that the results of European 
Parliament elections in individual member states aggregated at the European 
level (in the ideological and policy dimension) will be reflected in the strength 
of supranational political groups functioning within this body. Thus, the elec-
tion threshold applied at the level of the national electoral system is not directly 
translated into the level of political fragmentation of the European Parliament.
The applied election threshold might also be perceived from the per-
spective of protection of national interests at the level of an important European 
authority. It would mean aiming at the formation of mechanisms to guarantee 
that the pool of seats allocated to Poland will be distributed among the parties 
which will constitute real powers within the framework of supranational politi-
cal groups in the European Parliament. Such argumentation seems legitimate, 
especially in the situation of a multi-party system in an extremely pluralized 
version. However, when the multipartyism is only moderate, the strength of 
such arguments is lower.
6 Literature of the subject refers to the stance of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, 
which decided that the introduction of the election threshold in European Parliament elections 
is unconstitutional. The court justified it with the lack of necessity to form stable parliamentary 
majority, connected with the functions this body serves [Uziębło 2013: 202-203].
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The election threshold definitely corrects the decisions taken by the vot-
ers. Yet, we may think to what extent it affects the distribution of seats among 
the subjects participating in elections. We need to remember that the power of 
the election threshold depends not only on the level at which it is applied (na-
tional or district) or its height (expressed in per cent or determined by calculating 
the electoral quota) but also on the situation context, particularly on the num-
ber of subjects taking part in the electoral competition and their social support, 
as well as on whether and to what degree voters use tactics in casting their votes. 
So as to determine it, we can – considering the outcome of voting of 25th May 
2014 – compare the official results of the election with the hypothetical distribu-
tion of votes between the election committees, disregarding the election thresh-
old. It is not surprising that in the latter case the number of subjects receiving the 
seats would increase. The seats would be distributed not among five but among 
eight election committees. However, a shift would only occur in the case of five 
seats (10%). PO and PiS would lose two seats each, and PSL would receive one 
seat less. The beneficiaries would be the parties which achieved support at the 
level of 3-4% (Table 4.), and the natural threshold7, when treating Poland as one 
electoral district (the distribution of seats at the national level) would be lower 
than 2%. It proves, then, that the election threshold does not radically change the 
election results at the level of parties having the greatest voters’ support, but is 
a significant barrier in the case of smaller subjects participating in the electoral 
contest. So Arend Lijphart is right when he writes that “District magnitudes and 
electoral thresholds can be seen as two sides of the same coin: the explicit barrier 
against small parties imposed by a threshold has essentially the same function 
as the barrier implied by district magnitude” [Lijphart 1999: 153].
It is also worth analysing whether (and if so, to what extent) the elec-
tion threshold influences the implementation of the material aspect of equal-
ity. In literature of the subject a negative correlation between a high value of 
election threshold and the implementation of material equality of elections is 
pointed out [Uziębło 2013: 215]. The results of the election analysed in this 
work demand considerable conservatism in formulating such conclusions 
(Table 5.). First, when ignoring the election threshold, the distribution of seats 
would cause a change in the size of only four out of the thirteen districts (dis-
tricts no. 4, 7, 11 and 12). At the same time, 11,742,792 persons had the right 
to vote in these districts, so the changes would affect over 38% of voters regis-
tered in Poland. Second, in two districts the voting power would increase (dis-
tricts no. 4 and 11), and in two other, it would decrease (districts no. 7 and 12). 
Third, in the case of three districts the deviation from the national norm of rep-
resentation would increase, and in one, the voting power would approximate it. 
7 The natural threshold calculated from the formula proposed by Arend Lijphart [1999: 153].
As we can see, ignoring the election threshold would cause greater diversifica-
tion of the voting power of voters from different districts. The maximum devia-
tions from the electoral quota, indicating how many voters there are per seat in 
the whole country on average would be almost 39% in the district where all the 
voters would have the strongest vote (as compared to less than 27% when tak-
ing into account the election threshold) and almost 76% in the district with the 
lowest voting power (this value would not change). As for the mean deviation 
for the districts where the voting power proved to be lower, it would be slightly 
more than 34% (compared to 45% with the election threshold). For districts in 
which the voting power would prove to be higher than the norm of representa-
tion computed at the national level, the mean deviation would oscillate around 
15% (compared to 11% with the election threshold).
The above calculations show that the application of election threshold 
does not have to cause a fundamental disturbance of the implementation of the 
material aspect of elections’ equality. In a particular situation it may even pro-
mote the decrease of disproportion in the voting power among voters from differ-
ent districts. In the analysed case, it turned out that from the perspective of mate-
rial equality of elections the size of electoral districts is more important than the 
election threshold. Also, giving up the constant size of districts in favour of their 
dynamic shaping undoubtedly increases the importance of the election threshold 
for the implementation of material equality of elections. It is so because the ex-
clusive character of the election threshold, eliminating weaker parties from seat 
distribution, not only directly translates into the increase of electoral profits of 
parties with the greatest voters’ support but also indirectly influences the ultimate 
effect of the support distribution. As this analysis has showed, it may cause both 
increase and decrease of the size of electoral districts. The conclusion is, there-
fore, that in the situation when the size of the electoral district is determined at the 
stage of transformation of votes into seats, the election threshold is a factor affect-
ing the implementation of material equality of votes. When the size of electoral 
districts is determined before the election, the election threshold does not modify 
the voting power regardless of whether it is referred to all the citizens or only to 
the part who have full political rights8. This conclusion is an effect of differentia-
tion between the material aspect of equality and the equality of electoral opportu-
nities. In the second case, the effect of election threshold is unquestionable.
Still, the above-mentioned distinction should not obscure the fact that 
the impact of the election threshold on the implementation (or not) of the 
8 In this situation, we could only speak about the modifying impact of the election threshold 
on the material equality of elections if the voting powers were computed merely considering 
persons who actually exercise their active voting right. It should be remembered, though, 
that the elected person represents all the citizens (voters), also those who did not decide to 
participate in the voting. 
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equality of electoral opportunities in the case of European Parliament elections 
may modify the material aspect of equality of elections. Although the accuracy 
of this thesis is rather doubtless, it is impossible to measure the range of this ef-
fect precisely. On the one hand, it would require the knowledge on the decision-
making process of the parties which finally did not decide to contest for seats of 
Members of the European Parliament, and on the other hand it would be nec-
essary to conduct a study among the voters, concerning: 1) the determinants of 
their political choice during the said election, 2) the motivations for resigning 
from participation in voting.
Analysing this issue from the perspective of collective, secondary sub-
jects of politics, we need to note that the election threshold may be an element 
decisive for their failure to participate in the electoral competition. It espe-
cially refers to regional parties, which without the election threshold or the 
threshold at the electoral district level would have a real chance to obtain seats. 
Increasing the number of subjects taking part in election competition, in turn, 
would not only have a positive influence on the increase of election turnout but 
also probably (at least in some districts) lead to a modification of support distri-
bution. Thus it would indirectly affect the size of electoral districts.
From the perspective of the voter, it should be assumed that a higher 
number of subjects taking part in competition for seats and lack of institutional 
barriers to limit the equality of electoral opportunities (such as small elector-
al districts or the election threshold) lower the probability of tactical voting. 
And when realizing the fact that a party the voter supports for ideological and 
policy reasons will have a problem with accomplishing the election threshold 
level, the voter may vote for a candidate of another election committee which 
in the voter’s opinion has a real chance of obtaining a seat, at the same time 
representing similar policies. It cannot be excluded either that some of the vot-
ers, aware of the institutional barriers incorporated in the electoral system and/
or finding no party representing an outlook similar to his among the subjects 
competing for seats will resign from the participation in the election.
The scale of voting behaviours described here, in the context of the 
European Parliament election of 2014, is not known. Still, the awareness of the 
existing conditions allows to see an indirect impact of the election threshold on 
shaping the size of electoral districts. As a result, it turns out that the strength 
of its impact on the implementation of the material aspect of election equality 
may be significant. The basic difficulty lies in the fact that in the analysis we 
have to refer to a hypothetical situation. This, however, is always connected 
with high risk. Therefore, because of a lack of objective instruments to measure 
the defined relations, this work aims at emphasizing their potential, not real, 
dimension. 
Studying the material aspect of equality of European Parliament elec-
tions should also involve the question of the electoral formula, i.e. the way of 
transforming votes into seats. The multiplicity of methods existing in this regard 
helps to see the different ranges of influence they have on the level of reflection 
of voters’ preferences. Some of them promote a relatively proportional reflection 
of voters’ will, and others deform it to a greater or lesser extent; finally, there are 
methods which in certain conditions reveal their discriminative character.
Generally, we should conclude that the electoral formula is the element 
of the electoral system which – when considered in isolation – does not affect 
the implementation of the material aspect of equality or its impact is negligi-
ble. It is so because if we measure the voting power referring it to the number 
of citizens (residents, persons with the right to vote), not persons actually tak-
ing part in the elections, then the way of transformation of the votes into seats 
can only be evaluated from the perspective of implementation of the equality 
of electoral opportunities. Only the placing of the electoral formula in a broader 
perspective (taking into consideration the size of electoral districts and the elec-
tion threshold) makes its significance concerning the material aspect of equality 
grow. In the context of the electoral system existing at the European Parliament 
election in Poland, the importance of the electoral formula is undoubted due to 
the adopted “dynamic”, not “constant”, size of electoral districts. If a specific 
number of seats is assigned to each district even before the election, the election 
threshold cannot directly affect the voting power in any direct way. If, howev-
er, the size of electoral districts is connected with the outcome of the election, 
the choice of the electoral formula is very important.
 The above-mentioned two-step mechanism of seat distribution in the 
European Parliament elections in Poland results in applying two methods of 
transformation of votes into seats. First at the national level the seats are distrib-
uted among the election committees which accomplished the election threshold 
with the use of D’Hondt method, the one most favourable for the parties with 
the greatest support among all the divisor methods. The result is a derivative of 
the fact that between particular divisors shaping the successive electoral quo-
tients there is a small, unitary difference (1, 2, 3,… 51). And the smaller the dif-
ference, the higher value the successive electoral quotients have. Especially in 
the situation when the difference between the election outcome of the strongest 
parties and of those with lower support is significant, this method brings mea-
surable benefits to the former. In the context of material equality of European 
Parliament elections, it must be noted that the ultimate effect of seat distribu-
tion at the national level may lead to a change of their distribution among dis-
tricts. The results of the 2014 election proved that the power of the method of 
transformation of votes into seats would be especially significant in a situation 
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of no election threshold. This is illustrated by the data presented in Table 4. 
The comparison of the effects of seat distribution with the use of D’Hondt and 
Hare-Niemeyer methods (mathematical proportion system) shows how obvi-
ous is the impact of electoral formulas on the ultimate distribution of seats.
After allocating seats to particular election committees at the national 
level, they are distributed among their district lists on the basis of the Hare-
Niemeyer method. This second level of repartition of seats translates directly 
into the size of electoral districts, which has already been described. Here we 
need to highlight that the Hare-Niemeyer method promotes more faithful re-
flection of the voting results at the level of seat distribution. That is why it is 
more beneficial from the point of view of the districts in which a certain party 
received weaker support. This method does not protect such districts from a 
complete lack of seats, but the result of the district list is decisive in this respect. 
Conclusions
This study concentrated on the implementation of material equality of 
European Parliament elections in Poland. Three elements of the electoral sys-
tem were analysed: 1) the size of electoral districts, 2) the election threshold, 
and 3) the electoral formula. It turns out that none of them is clearly decisive for 
the assessment of implementation of the discussed principle. Still, undoubtedly 
the key issue is the size of electoral districts, essentially affected by the distribu-
tion of support among the district lists of election committees that obtain seats. 
An important determinant, though not necessarily of key importance, is the in-
ter-district election turnout. But both the election threshold and the electoral 
formula have a modifying impact on the size of electoral districts. This analy-
sis also showed that apart from the formal rules determining the framework of 
electoral competition, the situation context is significant, especially the charac-
ter of the party system, the level of institutionalization of political parties, the 
strategies used by the subjects participating in the elections and the fact that 
some parties resign from the competition for seats. Voters’ behaviours also play 
a role, especially the issues connected with their political choices.
On the basis of the European Parliament election in Poland of 25th May 
2014, it may be said that in contrast to the statutory declaration, the election 
violates the material aspect of equality. The deviation from the ideal point is 
not very high, although it exceeds the parameters indicated in “Code of Good 
Practice in Electoral Matters”. But if the legislator decided to adopt the prin-
ciple of election equality for implementation, they should consistently aim this. 
At the level of the electoral system it would be possible to adopt rules which 
would increase the probability of approximating material equality. From this 
perspective it would be fully justified to adopt a single level system of reparti-
tion of seats within the framework of one (national) electoral district. Taking 
into account the functions of the European Parliament in the institutional space 
of the EU and considering the way of participation of national political parties 
at the European level, it would be fully justified to disregard the use of the elec-
tion threshold in this election.
The proposals presented above are only an opinion in the discussion. 
Presenting them, one needs to be aware that a change in the electoral rules is the 
subject of political competition between the beneficiaries of the current solutions 
and those who feel harmed by them. Besides, a change of the formal frame of 
electoral competition may modify the behaviours of potential participants of the 
election game. This way a complex network of relations appears, showing the 
multiplicity of interests connected with the competition for the seats of MEPs.
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Table 1. Material aspect of (in)equality of European Parliament elections – 
pan-European level
State Number of citizens (in millions) Seats
Deviations from the European 
norm of representation 
Malta 0.4 6 10.059
Luxembourg 0.5 6 8.047
Cyprus 0.8 6 5.029
Estonia 1.3 6 3.095
Slovenia 2 8 2.682
Latvia 2.3 8 2.332
Lithuania 3.3 11 2.235
Croatia 4.4 11 1.676
Finland 5.3 13 1.645
Ireland 4.5 11 1.639
Slovakia 5.4 13 1.614
Denmark 5.5 13 1.585
Bulgaria 7.6 17 1.500
Sweden 9.2 20 1.458
Austria 8.3 18 1.454
Hungary 10 21 1.408
Czech Republic. 10.5 21 1.341
Portugal 10.6 21 1.328
Belgium 10.7 21 1.316
Greece 11.2 21 1.257
Netherlands 16.4 26 1.063
UE 503.6 751 1
Romania 21.5 32 0.998
Poland 38.1 51 0.898
Italy 60 73 0.816
Great Britain 61.7 73 0.793
Spain 45.8 54 0.791
Germany 82 96 0.785
France 64.3 74 0.772
Own study based on demographic information available from: [Official portal of the European 
Union...].
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